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BÜLENT KÖKSAL 
THREE ESSAYS ON NYSE SPECIALIST STRATEGIES 
 
In our first essay, we investigate how the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
specialists react to the changes in market variables while making participation decisions 
to the posted quotes by analyzing specialists’ choices to undercut or add depth to the limit 
order book. We find that the primary factor that affects the participation strategy of the 
specialists in the current period is the changes in the best prices and depths on the limit 
order book. In addition, specialists participate to the posted quotes more for volatile or 
low volume stocks. The levels of specialists’ participation in the posted quotes have 
predictive power over future stock returns. This predictive power is stronger for short-
term returns. 
In our second essay, we analyze trading strategies of the specialists conditional on 
their decisions to participate in the current posted quotes. We find that the specialists use 
limit order book asymmetry and cumulative order imbalance as two information sources 
about the true security value. If the relative size of the market order is high, specialists 
choose not to participate and let the market order trade with the limit order book. 
Consistent with the theoretical results in the previous literature, specialists trade more 
aggressively when the spread is large. We also find significant inventory effects. The 
specialists trade more aggressively, if the trade with the incoming market order restores 
their inventories. 
Our third essay shows that there exist significant differences between the 
performances of individual specialists in terms of quotes, depths, spreads and execution 
 vii
costs. We find that, as the trading frequency increases, order processing costs increase for 
both the specialist firms and individual specialist portfolios, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that profits from active stocks subsidize inactive stocks. We also show that 
individual NYSE specialists differ significantly in their participation strategies to the 
posted quotes and trades. This suggests that there are significant differences in the 
execution costs between specialists, because they use different strategies. 
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Chapter 1 
Participation Strategy of the NYSE Specialists to the Posted Quotes 
Abstract 
Using 2001 NYSE system order data in the decimal pricing environment, we 
analyze how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while making 
participation decisions to the posted quotes. We analyze the specialists’ decision to 
undercut or add depth to the limit order book. We distinguish bid and ask side of the 
quotes. We find that the primary factors that affect the participation strategy of the 
specialists to the current posted quotes are the changes in the best prices and depths on 
the limit order book since the previous quotes. In addition, specialists participate to the 
posted quotes more for low-volume or high price stocks. Unlike some previous studies, 
we find significant inventory effects providing some evidence that the specialist actively 
manages his inventory. The levels of specialists’ participation to the posted quotes have 
predictive power over future stock returns. This predictive power is stronger for short-
term returns. Overall, our results indicate that on average specialists quote in a manner, 
which is consistent with their affirmative obligations. 
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1. Introduction 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialists are responsible for making 
markets for the stocks assigned to them. Their primary obligation is to ensure that there 
exists a fair and orderly market in their stocks. They should be willing to trade when 
other traders are unwilling to trade and the bid-ask spread should not be too wide. Also 
the specialists should intervene to prevent large price jumps, and create price continuity.1 
The NYSE uses the average width of the quoted bid-ask spread, the average depth of the 
quotes, the number of large price jumps, and the average size of price reversals to 
evaluate specialists’ performances. The specialists’ also have negative obligations that 
restrict their trading. Specialists cannot trade for their own accounts if there exist public 
orders at the same price or better. In addition, they should not trade with limit orders in 
order not to take the liquidity available to public traders. 2 
 In this paper, we analyze three fundamental issues by partitioning posted depth into 
the specialist’s contribution and the limit order book’s (LOB) contribution. First issue we 
investigate is that, what affects the changes in specialists’ participation strategy to the 
posted quotes over time in an individual stock? Specifically, do they quote according to 
their affirmative obligations? What are the effects of the changes in the LOB on their 
current quoting decisions? Do they use information from the LOB to predict the future 
returns of the stocks? Do they use both sides of the quotes to implement their strategies? 
Do they manage their inventories as inventory theories suggest? What are their reactions 
to the possibility of informed trading? Do the specialists increase their contribution to the 
                                                 
1 For a detailed description of the specialists’ functions, see Rule 104 (Dealings by Specialists) in NYSE 
(1999). 
2 See Harris (2003) p.494 for an extensive description of specialists’  roles and how they can act against the 
interests of the public investors on the NYSE. 
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LOB when prices are volatile or when they are stable? Second, how do specialists’ 
quoting strategies vary across stocks? Specifically, what is the effect of volume on 
specialists’ decisions? Do the specialists quote aggressively or defensively as the price 
volatility increases across stocks? Is the relative tick size, as defined by the ratio of the 
minimum tick to stock price, important in quoting strategy of the specialists? Finally, are 
the participation strategies of the specialists to the posted quotes informative about 
direction of future price changes? How successful are the specialists in forecasting future 
stock returns?  
The answers to these questions are very important because the information about 
a particular stock is disseminated to the market by specialist quotes. On the NYSE, the 
dollar value of average monthly trading volume that the specialists oversee was $968.18 
billion and average specialist volume as percentage of the NYSE total volume was 
around 20% in 2004.3 The NYSE specialists oversee this huge trading activity and there 
are potential conflict of interests between the specialists desire to make profits for 
themselves and their obligation to be fair to all public traders. There has been an 
important debate going on about the role of the specialists and whether their contributions 
are valuable in the overall trading activity. Recently, as a result of an investigation by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission into floor trading practices, five largest 
specialist firms at the New York Stock Exchange were required to pay a combined 
$241.8 million to settle charges of improper trading.4  The NYSE claims that the 
                                                 
3 See “Market Activity” in the NYSE fact book that can be found at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/. 
Generally, the specialist participation rate mentioned in the literature is the specialist volume as percent of 
NYSE 2x total volume which was approximately 10% in 2004. If one wants to calculate the total volume 
that the specialists traded for their own accounts, specialist volume as percent of NYSE total volume is the 
correct figure to use. 
4 See for example, Wall Street Journal (October 16, 2003) “NYSE to Punish Five Specialists In Trading 
Inquiry”. 
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investors get the best available price most of the time in the specialist system. However, 
many institutional investors prefer faster executions and believe that the human-based 
system for auctioning stocks does not allow this.5 To address these concerns, the NYSE is 
planning to allow investors to execute more stock orders automatically.6 Our paper 
directly addresses the question of whether the specialists are participating to the posted 
quotes in a manner consistent with their affirmative obligations.  
Despite the important role played by the NYSE specialists, one can find little or 
no analysis of their participation strategy to the posted quotes. One reason for this lack of 
analysis in the previous literature is the shortage of relevant data. For a meaningful 
analysis of specialist behavior, one needs detailed data about orders. Publicly available 
TAQ database contains information about posted quotes on the NYSE. However, posted 
quotes reflect trading interests of the limit order traders, floor brokers, and specialists. 
Therefore, the mere analysis of TAQ quote changes is not sufficient to elicit information 
about quoting strategies of the specialists. In addition to TAQ, the NYSE provided 
researchers with TORQ (Trades, Orders, Reports, and Quotes) database that contains 
transactions, quotes, order processing data, and audit trail data for a sample of 144 stocks 
for three months; November 1990 through January 1991.7 This database can be used to 
separate specialist contribution to quotes from those contributed by the limit order book 
(LOB). However, this database cannot provide much information about the current 
behavior, considering the numerous changes in the trading system and procedures on the 
                                                 
5 See “Fidelity Urges NYSE to Revamp Trading Operation“, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2003. 
6 See“NYSE's Automatic Transition”, Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2004 and NYSE Newsletter August 
2004 issue on  http://www.nyse.com. 
7 See Hasbrouck (1992) for a detailed description of TORQ database. 
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NYSE since 1991.8 Because of the public order precedence rule, the specialist has to 
better the quotes in the LOB if he wants to trade. The quoting strategy of the specialists 
has changed considerably after the decimalization on the NYSE, because undercutting the 
LOB became less costly.9  
Using 2001 NYSE system order data in the decimal pricing environment, we 
analyze how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while making 
participation decisions to the posted quotes. We define “the participation strategy of the 
specialists to the posted quotes” as their strategy while determining their contribution to 
the posted quotes in addition to the LOB. A specialist has three choices for both sides of 
the posted quotes. He may not participate and let the posted quotes reflect the prices and 
depths on the LOB (0% contribution to the posted quotes from the specialist); he may add 
depth to the LOB at the best prices on the book (mixed case, specialist percentage 
contribution is positive and less than 100%); and he may undercut the LOB which 
implies that the posted quotes fully reflect the trading interest of the specialist (100% 
contribution from the specialist). If he chooses to participate to the posted quotes, the 
second issue is to decide how much depth to add. We will discuss these available 
strategies in more detail below in the context of the empirical methodologies we employ. 
Participation decision to the quotes is very important because it is a key part of 
the specialist’s strategies. The specialist participates in quotes strategically to make 
profits (or avoid losses) and manage inventory by changing the probability that he 
participates in the upcoming trade, to fulfill obligations to provide enough depth when the 
depth from public limit orders is insufficient, or narrow spread when the spread from 
                                                 
8 The most important change is the switch to decimal pricing. For a list of other rule changes since 1997, 
visit http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.nsf/AllPubRuleChanges?openview&count=500 . 
9 See Coughenour and Harris (2003) and references therein. 
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public limit orders is too wide. In addition, when the specialist quotes bid and ask prices, 
he commits himself to trading at those prices until the next quote revision. 
 This work is related to a number of papers in the previous literature. Kavajecz 
(1999) investigates whether specialists manage quoted depth to reduce adverse selection 
risk. Our paper extends his analysis by formally analyzing the determinants of specialists’ 
percentage contribution to the posted quotes.  Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) 
examine how specialists update the price schedules consisting of bid quotes, ask quotes, 
bid depths, and ask depths. Analyzing the changes in posted quotes is interesting in itself, 
however, as discussed above, these price schedules contain information from the LOB 
and the specialist does not have discretion about the portion of the price schedule changes 
coming from the LOB. The specialist is obliged to display the best prices and depths from 
the LOB if he does not quote better prices.10 Therefore, the changes in the price schedules 
posted by specialists reflect the combined strategies of the limit order traders, specialist, 
and floor brokers, but not the specialist’s contribution alone.11  To separate the strategy of 
the specialist from that of the limit order traders’, we have to estimate the LOB at 
different points in time, and calculate the net specialist contribution to the LOB depth. 
Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) analyze specialist participation in total transaction 
volume. Our analysis complements theirs by analyzing the specialists’ participation to the 
posted quotes. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that LOB is informative about 
future prices and that specialists use this information strategically. Our paper extends 
                                                 
10 See McInish and Wood (1995) for an analysis of undisplayed limit orders on the NYSE that are at better 
prices than those of limit orders actually displayed. 
11  Floor brokers leave some orders with the specialist for the specialist to execute. These orders are what 
Sofianos and Werner (2000) call “orders passively represented by a floor broker”. Posted price schedules 
may reflect these types of orders if there are any. 
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their analysis by showing directly that specialists’ participation to the posted quotes also 
has some predictive power about future returns. 
As the previous theoretical and empirical literature show, the specialists use all 
components of the posted price schedule, namely bid and ask prices, and bid and ask 
depths, while making the market for their stocks. 12  For example, if a specialist wants to 
sell rather than buying shares of his stock, he can decrease the probability that he will be 
on the buy side and increase the probability of being on the sell side of the next trade by 
using some combination of the following posted price schedule changes: decrease the bid 
and ask prices, decrease bid depth and increase ask depth that he adds to the posted 
quotes in addition to the LOB. However, because of his affirmative obligations, the 
specialist may not be able to choose a particular component of the price schedule freely. 
Therefore, to implement his strategy, he uses all variables in the posted price schedule, 
which requires that we analyze all variables in the posted quotes simultaneously. We 
examine the specialists’ participation strategy to the posted quotes by taking the 
simultaneity of the bid and ask side into account.  
Our results provide evidence that the specialists participate to the posted quotes in 
a manner, which is consistent with their affirmative obligations. Changes in the 
differences between best limit prices and quote midpoint are statistically and 
economically significant. When the difference between best limit bid (ask) price and 
quote midpoint increases, causing a decrease in liquidity from bid (ask) side of the LOB, 
specialists step in to provide additional liquidity. Other primary variables that affect the 
strategy of the specialists are the changes in best LOB prices and the LOB depths at those 
prices. Results from analyzing individual stocks over time also indicate that as volatility 
                                                 
12 See Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Harris (1994), and Kavajecz (1999). 
 8
increases the contribution of the specialists to the posted quotes increases indicating that 
they quote in a price-stabilizing manner. Specialists’ participation to the posted quotes 
decreases by transaction volume suggesting that specialist services are needed more for 
low-volume stocks. The levels of specialists’ participation to the posted quotes have 
predictive power over future stock returns. This predictive power is stronger for short-
term returns. Finally, we find significant inventory effects in the discrete analysis, 
providing some evidence that the specialists actively manage their inventories.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the determinants 
of the specialist quoting strategy as predicted by the previous literature and states the 
hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data. Exogenous variables that we use are discussed 
in section 3. Section 4 presents methodology and results for simultaneous equations 
analysis. Section 5 presents methodology and results for multinominal logit analysis. We 
discuss methods for cross sectional analysis and results in Section 6. Section 7 
investigates if the participation strategies of the specialists to the posted quotes are 
informative about future price changes and section 8 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1. The determinants of specialist participation to posted quotes over time 
The specialist can consider several factors while determining his strategy. In Kyle 
(1985) model, the market maker revises his expectations about the value of the stock 
upwards (downwards) and increases (decreases) the stock price as a result of buy (sell) 
orders which possibly includes orders coming from informed traders. Although there are 
no bid and ask prices in the Kyle model, the idea is that the market maker updates his 
belief of what the stock is worth and adjusts the price so as to minimize his loss to 
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informed traders. In the context of our model, updated beliefs after a buy (sell) order will 
cause the specialist to increase (decrease) his contribution to the bid quotes and decrease 
(increase) his contribution to the ask quotes.  
As first analyzed by Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), the risk of carrying 
inventory is sufficient by itself to induce a positive bid-ask spread. However, many 
previous studies (e.g. Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), 
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001)) find weak inventory effects in stocks.13 We expect 
that risk averse specialist increases (decreases) his participation to the posted ask (bid) 
quotes when he is in long position and increases (decreases) his participation to the 
posted bid (ask) quotes when he is in short position. 
 Easley and O'Hara (1992) shows that time between trades can be correlated with the 
factors related to the value of the asset. In their model trade is positively correlated with 
the occurrence of an information event. If no trade occurs in some time interval, the 
market maker raises his probability that no information event has occurred. Accordingly, 
he moves his bid and ask closer to the true value of the stock which is between bid and 
ask prices. This implies that the spread will be smaller as the time between trades 
increases.14 In the context of our model, we expect that as no-activity time increases, the 
specialist increases his contribution to the both bid and ask sides of the market. 
 Dupont (2000) shows that the market maker reduces depth when the volatility of 
the asset value is high. Intuitively, higher volatility increases the risks associated with 
carrying inventory which will result in less specialist contribution to depth. On the other 
hand, Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) state that “Price continuity rules require specialists 
                                                 
13 Lyons (1998) finds strong inventory effects for a dealer in the foreign exchange market. 
14 For a similar result, see Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997). For evidence of transaction clustering, see 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) and Engle and Russell (1998). 
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to trade to stabilize prices, suggesting that participation will be higher in stocks whose 
intraday return volatility is large.” In a cross sectional analysis of specialist participation, 
they find a positive relationship between their volatility variable and the specialist 
participation rate. Bondarenko and Sung (2003) theoretically show that when the price 
volatility is high, the optimal strategy of the specialist is to increase his participation even 
when he is not constrained by the rules imposed by the exchange. The effect of volatility 
on the specialist’s quoting decision is therefore an empirically open question.  
 The state of the LOB is an important consideration for the specialist while 
determining his participation to the posted quotes. During our sample period, the 
specialist was required to share the general information about the LOB with the floor 
brokers when asked.15 However, this information was not available to most traders in the 
market and the specialist had considerable advantage in having exclusive access to the 
LOB. In Seppi (1997) model, limit order traders are the primary source of competition 
that the specialist faces. His model suggests that the LOB has a significant impact on the 
strategy of the specialist. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) find that the specialist uses 
the information from the LOB in ways that favors him. They argue, for example, that an 
asymmetry in the LOB predicts the likely direction of future price changes. If the 
specialist exploits the information in the LOB, we would expect that he increases his 
participation to the buy (sell) side of the quotes when the LOB is heavy on the buy (sell) 
side to increase the probability that he buys (sells) shares of his stock.16 On the other 
                                                 
15 Recently, the NYSE started selling aggregate order book volume at each price point through its new 
system called the NYSE OpenBookTM. The information in this system is updated every 5 seconds. This 
reduces but not eliminates the advantage of the specialists because they still have the exclusive access to 
individual orders. For more information, visit http://www.nysedata.com/openbook/. For the effects of the 
NYSE OpenBookTM, see Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2003). 
16 Specialists may also use quote matching strategies. As described in Harris (2003), p.248 and p.502, quote 
matching is a front-running strategy in which quote matchers try to trade in front of large patient traders. 
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hand, if the specialist trades according to his affirmative obligations, he would increase 
the probability that he participates to the trade when a market buy (sell) arrives at times 
when the LOB is heavy on the buy (sell) side to maintain price continuity.17 The effect of 
LOB variables on the specialist’s participation strategy to the posted quotes is therefore 
an empirically open question.   
 As discussed in the introduction, the NYSE uses the average width of the quoted 
bid/ask spread, the average depth of the quotes, the number of large price reversals, and 
the average size of price reversals to evaluate specialists’ performances. We expect that if 
the previous bid-ask spread is large, then the specialist will undercut the LOB in the 
current posted quotes (increase his percentage participation) causing the spread to be 
small. Similarly, if the depth that the specialist has added to the bid (ask) side in the 
previous quote is small, then the depth that the specialist adds to the bid (ask) side in the 
current quote will be large. 
2.2. Cross-sectional determinants of specialist participation to posted quotes 
Existing literature suggests that specialists’ services are more valuable for illiquid 
stocks.18 We expect that specialist participation to posted quotes should decline as the 
liquidity of the assigned stock increases. Trading volume can be used as a proxy for 
liquidity. So there should be an inverse relationship between specialist’s participation and 
trading volume of the stock. 
                                                                                                                                                 
For example, when a quote matcher trades (buys) in front of a large buy limit order, and prices move 
against him, he limits his losses by trading with the standing buy limit order. When a specialist buys in a 
similar situation, and the prices move against him, he should not trade with the limit buy order (a negative 
obligation) but at least he does not need to be on the contra side of upcoming market sells until the liquidity 
on the buy side of the LOB is exhausted. 
17 When the specialist undercuts the LOB on one side of the market, his contribution to the posted quotes 
on that side of the market is 100%, i.e., his percentage contribution increases compared to the previous 
quotes, if his contribution in the previous quotes was not 100%. 
18 See for example, Grossman and Miller (1988), Glosten (1989), Huang and Liu (2004). 
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As discussed in the previous section in detail, when volatility is high, the specialist 
might reduce depth because of the risks associated with carrying inventory, or he might 
increase depth to stabilize the prices. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) find a positive 
relationship between their volatility variable and the specialist participation rate in a cross 
sectional analysis of specialist participation. The effect of volatility on the specialist’s 
participation decision to quotes is an empirically open question.  
 Seppi (1997) analyzes a model in which specialists face direct competition from 
public limit orders that have precedence under NYSE rules. He shows that specialist’s 
profits are maximized as the tick size goes to zero. The reason is that as the tick size 
approaches to zero, it becomes less costly for the specialist to undercut the LOB. The tick 
size on the NYSE switched from eights to sixteenths on June 24, 1997 and to pennies for 
a number of stocks on August 28, 2000. Finally, on January 29, 2001, all stocks in NYSE 
started being traded in pennies.19 This decrease effectively relaxed the public order 
precedence rule and increased the set of prices over which the specialist can choose. As 
predicted by the Seppi model, Coughenour and Harris (2003) find empirically that 
participation rates and high frequency trading profits increased for specialists making 
markets for low price stocks as a result of decimalization. In the context of our model, it 
is more costly for the specialist to undercut the LOB for low price stocks which implies 
that the specialist participation to the posted quotes will be inversely related to the 
“Relative Tick” defined as the ratio of the minimum tick ($0.01) to the stock price. 
                                                 
19 See the “trading” column in NYSE timeline at http://www.nyse.com/about/timeline/TimeLine.html. 
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3. Data 
Our data is from the NYSE System Order Database (SOD). Because of the volume of 
the data, it is necessary to select a sample of NYSE-listed securities. The original sample 
is selected as follows:  Initially, 50 most actively traded NYSE stocks during the 20 
trading days prior to January 29, 2001 are chosen. In addition, 25 stocks from each of 
four Volume-Price groups are randomly selected. To pick the 100-stock random sample, 
NYSE-listed securities are ranked on share trading volume and, separately, on average 
NYSE trade price during the 20 trading days prior to January 29, 2001. Each security is 
placed into one of four categories after comparing its share price to the median NYSE 
share price and its trading volume to the median NYSE volume. These groups (of 
unequal numbers of stocks) are a high-volume:high-price group, a high-volume:low-price 
group, a low-volume:high-price group, and, a low-volume:low-price group. Within each 
group, securities are arranged alphabetically (by symbol) and every Nth security is 
chosen, where N is chosen to select 25 securities from that group. Because two of the 50 
stocks with the highest trading volume also are randomly chosen as part of the high 
volume groups, the final sample has 148 securities. 
NYSE’s System Order Database (SOD) gives detailed information on the entry and 
processing of orders. Order data include security, order type, a buy-sell indicator, order 
size, order date and time, limit price (if the order is a limit order), and the identity of the 
member firm submitting the order. Execution data include the trade’s date and time, the 
execution price, the number of shares executing, and cancellation information. Orders, 
executions and cancellations are time-stamped to the second. 
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Because of the size of the dataset, we estimated the LOBs for active stocks for one 
week (April 2nd ,2001 – April 6th, 2001) only. In addition, we drop 5 very active stocks. 
For the rest of the stocks we estimate the LOBs for three months (April 2nd, 2001 – June 
29th, 2001).  See Appendix A, for the symbols, and data period for each stock used in the 
analysis.  
Since the posted quotes reflect trading interests of the limit order traders, floor 
brokers and the specialist, we need to estimate the LOB to separate the portion of the 
posted depth coming from the LOB. The LOBs are estimated by using the method 
described in Kavajecz (1999).  First, the limit order book at the beginning of the sample 
period is estimated by searching for all execution and cancellation records that refer to 
orders placed before the sample period. Second, initial and each limit order book after 
that is updated sequentially depending on the placed orders, executions and cancellations. 
The result is the estimate of the LOBs at each point in time. After the LOBs are 
estimated, if the posted bid (ask) price is the same as the best limit bid (ask) price, then 
the LOB bid (ask) depth is subtracted from the posted bid (ask) depth. The residual depth 
comes from the specialist’s trading interest and the orders left by the floor brokers with 
the specialist for the specialist to execute (passive floor broker participation). We call this 
residual as the “specialist’s participation to the posted quotes”.20  
Sofianos and Werner (2000) estimate by using data from January and February 1997 
that passive floor broker participation rate is 10.6% of buy plus sell volume of all 
purchases and sales. They also state that most orders left by floor brokers with the 
specialist are percentage orders. A percentage order is a limited price order to buy (or 
sell) 50% of the volume of a specified stock after its entry. All percentage orders have 
                                                 
20 Our dataset does not allow us to split out the passive floor broker participation. 
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explicit price limits. Since these orders are left with the specialist (they are not actively 
represented), floor brokers do not actively react to market activity variables by changing 
the specification of these orders. Also when we examine the exogenous variables in 
section 3.1 that determine the strategy of the specialist, we can see that most of these 
variables (like the LOB variables) are not continuously observed by the floor brokers. 
Therefore, most of the systematic variation in the residual that we get after subtracting 
the LOB depth from posted depth should come from the reaction of the specialist to the 
changes in exogenous variables. Considering these facts, we assume that the residual is 
coming from the specialist and calculate the percentage contribution of the specialist to 
the posted quotes by using this residual. If one is not satisfied with this assumption, one 
can interpret the quoting strategy analyzed in this paper as the aggregated strategy of the 
NYSE floor members (specialists and floor brokers).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics according to volume and price categories. If 
the average daily volume (price) of a security is above the median, then it is in the high 
volume (price) category, otherwise it is in the low volume (price) category. While 
calculating the buy and sell transaction volume, we use Lee and Ready (1991) method to 
classify transactions as buyer- or seller-initiated in the TAQ database of the NYSE. 
We can make a couple of observations from Table 1. First, the specialist 
participation is higher in low-volume stocks consistent with the intuition that specialist 
services are needed more in thinly traded, less liquid stocks. In addition, high-volume 
stocks are more volatile. Finally, as expected, spreads are lower for high-volume stocks. 
We also observe from Table 1 that specialist participation is higher for high-price 
stocks. This is consistent with the Seppi (1997) finding that, when the stock price is high, 
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the tick size is less important, and it is easier for the specialist to undercut the LOB. 
Spreads are also larger for high-price stocks. A wide spread leaves a lot of room for the 
specialist to undercut the LOB. This might explain high specialist participation in high-
price stocks. 
4. Exogenous Variables 
4.1. Stock by stock analysis    
 We use two models that complement each other for the time series analysis of the 
specialist participation to posted quotes. These models are simultaneous equations model 
and multinominal logit model and they are discussed in more detail in Sections 4.1 and 
5.1 below. To test the hypotheses discussed in the first section we use the following 
variables for the time series analysis. We will only discuss the liquidity provider’s buy 
side variables, as sell side variables are similarly defined. 
LOB variables. 
Change in the Best Limit Bid Price is the current best limit bid price minus previous best 
limit bid price; 
Change in the Best Limit Bid Size is the current best limit bid depth minus previous best 
limit bid depth; 
LOB Asymmetry is the total size of the sell limit orders minus total size of the buy limit 
orders in the LOB; 
Change in the % Best Limit Bid Gap is the defined as the change in the ratio of the 
difference between posted quote midpoint and best limit bid price to the posted quote 
midpoint since the last quote revision (i.e., ∆(Midquote-Best Limit Bid)/Midquote)); 
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(The relevant variable for sell side is Change in the % Best Limit Ask Gap and defined 
similarly; ∆(Best Limit Ask - Midquote)/Midquote)); 
Buy Order Placement is the sum of buy limit orders placed since the last quote revision; 
Buy Cancellation Activity is the sum of buy limit orders cancelled since the last quote 
revision; 
Other Variables. 
Buy volume since the last quote revision is the total buy transaction size since the last 
quote revision; 
Change in the Specialist’s Inventory since the last quote revision. This variable is positive 
if the specialist has increased his inventory, i.e., he has bought more shares than he has 
sold, since the last quote revision; 
Volatility is the coefficient of variation of the transaction prices during the last ten 
minutes before the current quote; 
LOB idle time is the time in seconds between the last two LOB revisions;21 
Previous Percentage Spread is the ratio of the spread to quote midpoint in the previous 
quotes; 
Previous Posted Bid Depth is the posted bid depth in the previous quotes; 
Previous Posted Ask Depth is the posted ask depth in the previous quotes. 
                                                 
21 A more intuitive variable would be to use the time elapsed since the last posted quote revision. However, 
this variable might have the problem of being endogenous. This variable and the variable that we use are 
highly correlated. Nevertheless, when we included this variable in our regressions, we got qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar results. 
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4.2. Cross sectional analysis   
 We use the following variables to analyze how the specialists’ participation 
decisions to posted quotes vary across stocks. 
Log Mean Daily Volume is the logarithm of average daily volume over the sample period; 
Log Market Capitalization is the logarithm of market capitalization as calculated by 
shares outstanding times stock price.  
Relative Tick is the tick size (=$0.01) divided by the mean price over the sample period; 
Volatility is the average of the volatility variable from the time series analysis over the 
sample period (see the definition in the previous section); 
Average Percentage Spread is the average ratio of the spread to quote midpoint during 
the whole sample period for each stock.  
5. Stock by stock analysis I: Simultaneous Equations Model 
5.1. Methodology  
 As discussed in the introduction, the specialist uses all variables in the posted 
quotes while determining his strategy. In addition, previous literature finds that there 
exist asymmetric effects of the independent variables on bid and ask side of the posted 
quotes.22 Accordingly, we model the revision process of the specialist participation to 
posted quotes as a system of two simultaneous equations, where the dependent variables 
are the changes in percentage specialist participation at the bid and ask since the last 
quote revision. Percentage specialist participation at the bid (ask) is simply the 
                                                 
22 See, for example Madhavan and Smidt (1991), and Panayides (2004). 
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percentage of the depth that belongs to the specialist in the current total posted bid (ask) 
depth.  
 We use percentage specialist participation rather than levels of the depth that the 
specialist adds to the LOB because, posted quotes include four variables: bid and ask 
prices, and bid and ask depths. If we used levels of specialist depth only as dependent 
variables, it would not be possible to analyze the pricing decision of the specialist. For 
example, consider the following two cases: 
Case 1. Posted Bid = $20, Posted Bid Depth = 200 (100 from the LOB, and 100 from the 
Specialist) 
Case 2. Posted Bid = $20, Posted Bid Depth = 100 (100 from the Specialist only).  
 In both of the cases above, the specialist has 100 shares in the posted bid depth. 
However, in the second case, he has undercut the LOB. When we use percentage 
specialist participations as the dependent variables, in the first case the value of the 
dependent variable will be 50%, and in the second case, it will be 100%. So using the 
percentage contribution of the specialist to the posted quotes allows us to distinguish 
between the two cases above. Table 2 reports the variables and equations that are 
estimated by simultaneous equations model. 
Identification is an important problem in estimating the simultaneous equations 
models. For example, to identify the coefficients in their simultaneous equations model, 
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) impose the restrictions that their bid-side (ask-side) 
LOB variables, the bid-side (ask-side) activity variables, and the bid-side (ask-side) 
regional quote variable appear only in the bid-side (ask-side) equations. In their model, 
8.7% of the restrictions were rejected. However, as discussed before, it is very possible 
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that the specialist uses both sides of the quotes while determining his strategy and it 
would be natural to think that he uses exogenous variables from both sides of the market 
while determining his strategy. When we imposed restrictions similar to those of 
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001), the rejection rate turned out to be well above 10%. 
Identification is not a problem in our model, because the previous posted bid (ask) depth 
variable appears only in the bid-side (ask-side) equation and the model is exactly 
identified. It is important to note that this is not a restriction, i.e., we do not restrict 
previous posted bid (ask) depth variable to exist only in the bid-side (ask-side) equation. 
Because consistent with the affirmative obligations of the specialists, we expect that if the 
depth that the specialist has added to the bid (ask) side in the previous quote is small, then 
the depth that the specialist adds to the bid (ask) side in the current quote will be large. 
Therefore, the depth that the specialist added to the bid (ask) side in the last posted quotes 
only affects his current decision of how much to add to the posted bid (ask) and 
accordingly previous posted bid (ask) depth variable exists only in the bid-side (ask-side) 
equation.  
 We estimated our model for each stock in our sample by using GMM and 
adjusted the standard errors using the Newey-West autocorrelation consistent covariance 
estimator.23 We used only one week of data for active stocks because of the size of the 
datasets. See Appendix A for the symbols, and data periods for each stock. 
                                                 
23 Other methods like 2SLS or 3SLS produced similar results. 
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5.2. Results 
The results from the simultaneous equations analysis are presented in Table 3. We 
report the mean and median of estimated coefficients for all stocks. The last column 
reports the percentage of significant coefficients at the 5% level. 
Endogenous variables are negatively (positively) correlated in the bid-side (ask-side) 
equation. Positive coefficients imply that when specialists increase their participation on 
one side of the market because of their updated beliefs about the stock value, they also 
increase their participation to the other side of the market to support that relatively weak 
side of the market and to maintain price continuity.24 Negative coefficients indicate that 
specialists use both sides of the market to implement their strategies. As an example, let’s 
say that a specialist updates his beliefs about the value of the stock downwards or his 
inventory is above his target and he wants to decrease his inventory. He increases his 
participation to the ask side (to decrease his holdings of the stock), and he decreases his 
participation to the bid-side (to avoid buying the stock). For example, when the 
specialist’s participation to the ask-side increase by 10 %, the effect of this on the bid-
side is a decrease in his participation in bid side by 6.4% (0.1*0.64). The reason why he 
uses both the bid and ask quotes to implement his strategy when he wants to decrease his 
holdings might be that if he is caught with a large positive inventory when the stock 
prices are declining, he would suffer big losses, so price continuity motive is not very 
strong in this case, causing a decrease in participation to the bid-side.  
                                                 
24 An increase in the percentage participation of the specialist may result from an increased percentage 
participation of the specialist at the quoted price, or from specialist’s undercutting the LOB. The distinction 
between these two cases is not clear in the simultaneous equations analysis because of the definition of the 
endogenous variables. Multinominal logit analysis in section 5 makes this distinction in a clearer way. 
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On the other hand, let’s say that the specialist updates his beliefs about the value of 
the stock upwards. Then he increases his participation to the bid-side (to increase his 
holdings of the stock and/or to minimize his losses to informed traders), and ask-side (to 
maintain price continuity). For example, when specialist’s participation to the bid-side 
increases by 10 %, the effect of this increase on the ask-side is an increase in his 
participation by 10.31% (0.1*1.031). There is a strong price continuity motive in this 
case, because after he buys the stock, if he ends up selling the stock (because of relatively 
high participation to the ask-side) he only loses profit opportunities from high future 
prices, rather than suffering direct losses. 
 One of the most important players in the posted quotes is the limit order book 
(LOB). We use several LOB variables in our analyses. As the intuition suggests, bid-side 
(ask-side) LOB variables are more significant in explaining the participation of the 
specialists to the bid (ask) quotes, because bid-side (ask-side) LOB variables have a 
direct effect on the bid (ask) quotes. Consistent with prior expectations, specialists use all 
variables that they can to implement their strategies. 
 The specialist increases (decreases) his percentage contribution to the bid-side 
(ask-side) when best limit bid price increases. For example, a 1-cent increase in the best 
limit bid causes the specialist to increase his participation to the bid quotes by 57.77 % 
($0.01 x 57.77). This implies that he uses information from the LOB, i.e., he updates his 
beliefs about the stock value upwards and increases (decreases) his participation to the 
bid-side (ask-side) to increase (decrease) the probability that he buys (sells) the stock. On 
the other hand, the specialist increases (decreases) his percentage contribution to the ask-
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side (bid-side) when best limit ask price increases. Therefore, consistent with his 
affirmative obligations, he supports the relatively weak ask-side in this case. 
 Besides the changes in the best limit prices, changes in the sizes at those prices 
are significant too. When the best limit bid size increases, the specialist increases his 
contribution to the bid quotes. There might be two explanations. First, the specialist 
might update his belief about the stock value upwards and increase his participation to the 
posted bid quotes accordingly to increase the probability that he buys. Second, when the 
size at the best prices increases, the specialist can hide behind this size and safely 
increase his participation to the posted quotes, which improves his performance by 
increasing the average depth that he quotes. When the best limit ask size decreases, the 
specialist increases his contribution to the ask quotes to support the relatively weak ask 
side. However, the positive sign of the median coefficient indicates that, for most of the 
stocks, there is a positive relationship between the change in best limit ask size and the 
change in specialist participation in the ask quotes, implying that the specialist updates 
his belief about the stock value downwards and increase his participation to the posted 
ask quotes accordingly to increase the probability that he sells. 
 The most direct way to see if the specialists participate to the quotes in a manner 
consistent with their affirmative obligations is by looking at the best limit bid and ask gap 
variables. A large gap between best limit bid (ask) price and posted quote midpoint 
indicates a weak bid (ask) side that needs support from the specialist. The median of 
estimated coefficients for both gap variables are positive showing that when the liquidity 
from the LOB is not sufficient, specialists step in to provide additional liquidity. The 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are also large indicating that these “gap 
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variables” are two primary variables that the specialist looks at while determining his 
strategy.  
 We use some activity variables from the LOB. These variables are cumulative 
buy and sell order placement and cancellation since the last quote revision. Limit buy 
(sell) order placement variable is negative and more significant for the bid (ask) side 
equation indicating that, as cumulative size of limit buy (sell) orders placed increases, the 
specialist decreases his contribution to the bid (ask) quotes because buy-side (sell-side) of 
the market is strong and does not need support from the specialist. Similarly, as 
cumulative size of cancelled limit buy (sell) orders increases, the specialist adds more 
depth from his own inventory to the posted bid (ask). As a specific example, let’s say that 
the size of cancelled buy orders since the last quote revision is 1000. This causes the 
specialist to increase his participation to the bid-side by 6.6% (= 1000 x 6.6 x 10-5). 
Therefore, economic significance of the activity variables on specialists’ strategy seems 
to be secondary when compared to changes in the best limit prices. 
 Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) find that an asymmetry in the LOB has 
significant explanatory power in predicting the future price movements. “LOB 
Asymmetry” variable is defined as total size of limit sell orders minus limit buy orders 
and measures the overall asymmetry in the LOB. When LOB asymmetry increases 
(because of a relative increase in limit sell orders), the specialist decreases his 
participation to the posted ask quote as the sign of the median coefficient indicates, 
because ask-side of the market is relatively strong now. This provides evidence that 
specialists do not try to undercut a heavy LOB on the sell-side. However, as the sign of 
the mean coefficient suggest, this is not true for many all specialists. The effect of the 
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LOB asymmetry is small though as the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
indicates.  
 As the volatility of the security price increases, the specialist increases (decreases) 
his percentage contribution in the bid (ask) sides of the quotes. This provides evidence in 
support of the theoretical results of the Bondarenko and Sung (2003). When the limit 
order depth is low as a result of high volatility, the specialist increases his contribution to 
the limit order book in order to stabilize prices. Estimated volatility coefficients are not 
positive for all stocks (not reported) however, suggesting insufficient price stabilization 
activity by the specialists of those stocks. 
 The average of estimated coefficients for “Elapsed time between the last two LOB 
revisions” variable is positive. This result provides evidence in favor of the finding of the 
Easley and O'Hara (1992) that if no activity  occurs in some time interval, the market 
maker raises his probability that no information event has occurred. Accordingly, he 
increases (decreases) his participation to the bid (ask). The mean elapsed time between 
the last two LOB revisions is around 20 and 160 seconds for high- and low-volume 
stocks, respectively. A 10 minute (600 seconds) no activity time causes the specialist to 
increase his participation to the bid (ask) quotes by 29.88% (7.74%). 
 The sum of estimated coefficients of percentage bid-ask spread in the last period is 
positive. Bid-ask spread is an important measure of the specialist performance. Therefore, 
when the previous bid-ask spread is large, specialists decrease the current bid-ask 
spread.25 The estimated coefficients are economically significant also. A 10% increase in 
percentage bid-ask spread in the previous period causes the specialist to increase 
                                                 
25 Current period bid-ask spread is smaller only if the specialist increases his participation by undercutting 
the LOB. Multinominal Logit results below show that this is indeed the case. 
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(decrease) his participation to the ask (bid) quotes by 96.18% (80.87%). Hence, when the 
spread is large in the previous period, the specialist tries to narrow the spread by 
increasing his overall participation in the posted quotes. 
 As the posted bid (ask) depth in the previous period gets larger, the specialist adds 
more (less) depth to the posted bid (ask) in the current period. Therefore, if the depth in 
the posted bid in the previous quotes is small, the specialist increases his participation in 
the current bid quotes to improve his performance. The opposite is true for the ask 
quotes, however. One explanation might be that when the specialist wants to evaluate his 
own performance by looking at the ask depths he has quoted, he uses an average of 
posted depths that belong to many periods before the current quote. 
 
5.2.1. Trading Volume Effects   
 Previous literature (e.g. Easley and et al. (1996) ) finds that the specialists handle 
frequently traded stocks and infrequently traded stocks differently. In their analysis of 
posted quote changes, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) find that there exist significant 
differences between high- and low-volume stocks.  
 To investigate the effect of volume on the strategy of the specialist, we divide the 
stocks in our sample into two volume categories based on average daily volume. If the 
average daily volume of a stock is greater than the median, it is considered a high-volume 
stock; otherwise, it is a low-volume stock. The results are presented in Table 4, Panel A. 
 We do not find important differences between the estimated coefficients for high- 
and low-volume stocks in terms of significance of the coefficients. Percentages of 
significant variables are generally close to each other for both categories. There exist, 
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however, significant differences in terms of the absolute value of magnitudes of the 
coefficients which imply that the specialists give more weight to those variables for a 
particular category.  
 The coefficients of endogenous variables are greater in absolute value for low-
volume stocks than high-volume stocks. This implies that while determining their 
strategies on one side of the posted quotes, the specialists of low-volume stocks place 
more weight to their strategies on the opposite side. One possible explanation might be 
that using only one side of the market to implement their strategies is not sufficient 
because of the low trading frequency.26 
 Changes in the LOB variables, except for the changes in best limit prices, are more 
important for specialists of the low-volume stocks. As suggested by Kavajecz and 
Odders-White (2001), one possible explanation might be that informed traders trading in 
low-volume stocks have less opportunities to hide their information because of the low 
trading activity. Therefore, they may submit limit orders instead, making the LOB more 
informative when compared to high-volume stocks.  
 Finally, the posted bid and ask depth in the previous quote has more explanatory 
power for the low-volume stocks. Low-volume stocks generally have a thin LOB, and 
need specialists’ services more. Therefore, as also suggested by higher specialist 
participation rates to the posted quotes for low-volume stocks, posted depths on the 
previous quotes are more important for the specialists of low-volume stocks while 
making their current participation decisions.  
                                                 
26 Trading frequency and trading volume are highly correlated. 
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5.2.2. Trading Price Effects  
 To investigate if the level of the price of a stock has any effects on the strategy of 
the specialist, we report results according to the price categories. To determine the 
categories, we first calculated the mean price of each stock over the sample period. If the 
mean price of a stock is above the median price across sample stocks, then it is in the 
high-price category, otherwise it is in the low-price category. 
 The level of transaction price can be an important consideration for the specialist 
while participating to the posted quotes for the following two reasons. First, when he 
adds depth to the LOB, for the same number of shares, he is risking more capital for 
high-price stocks. This is important, for example, for the inventory. The increase in the 
specialist’s inventory of 1000 shares produces more risk for the specialist of a high-price 
stock than it produces for the specialist of a low-price stock. Therefore, depending on the 
risks that a particular change in one of the exogenous variables pose, the coefficient of 
that variable might have more explanatory power.   Second, when the specialist wants to 
take a particular position in the posted quotes in levels, he has to add more depth to the 
quotes for low-price stocks when compared to the high-price stocks. This effect can lead 
to larger coefficients in absolute values for low-volume stocks. The results based on price 
categories are presented in Table 4, Panel B. 
6. Stock by stock analysis II: Multinominal Logit Model 
6.1. Methodology 
 Simultaneous equations model is powerful in the sense that it is a continuous 
analysis. However, specialist’s decision process can be also thought to have a discrete 
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nature where he has to decide whether to undercut the best limit price, add depth to the 
LOB at the best limit price, or allow the posted quotes to fully reflect the LOB. 
Simultaneous equations model is not suitable for this analysis. One other potential 
problem with the endogenous variables in the simultaneous equations framework is that 
the specialist participation rates are defined as percentages, so the model does not 
distinguish between the levels added by the specialist the posted quotes. For example, the 
value of the dependent variable is same and equals 90% for both of the following 
strategies:  
i. 900 shares of the 1000 shares posted on the bid side belong to the specialist, 
ii. 9000 shares of the 10000 shares posted on the bid side belong to the specialist. 
At first sight, these two strategies seem to be different, because in the second strategy, 
the level of the specialist’s contribution to the posted quotes is large, and therefore he 
puts more capital at risk. However, in the second strategy, the contribution from the LOB 
is also large which limits the risks to the specialist because of the public order precedence 
rule. Therefore, it is not very clear why these two strategies might be very different. 
Nevertheless, the multinominal logit framework that we utilize addresses these issues. 
Multinominal logit incorporates the simultaneity of specialist’s choices in a natural way. 
A specialist faces a fundamental choice of strategy while determining his 
participation strategy to the posted quotes which can be thought of as a two step choice 
process: The first step is to decide for each side of the market whether to undercut the 
best limit price (Undercut: U), add depth to the LOB at the best limit price (Mixed: M), 
or allow the posted quotes to fully reflect the LOB (Do not undercut: D). Therefore, the 
specialist has three choices (D, M, U) on both the bid and ask-sides for a total of nine 
 30
combinations. This decision can be seen as a pricing decision. Given that his decision at 
the first step is U or M, the second step is to decide whether to add small (S) or large (L) 
depth. According to this specification, the specialist has five choices (D, MS, ML, US, 
UL) on both sides of the market for a total of 25 combinations.  
Table 5 reports the frequency distribution of the 9 strategies available to the specialist 
while deciding whether to undercut or add depth to LOB. We observe that, mostly, the 
specialists do not participate in the posted quotes, i.e., they choose the D-D strategy. In 
addition, given that a specialist chooses the U-strategy on one side of the market, he is 
more likely to choose the D strategy on the other side of the market. This implies that the 
specialists strategically use both side of the quotes to implement their strategies. 
Table 5, Panels B and C report the frequency distribution on each side of the market 
according to price and volume categories. We observe from these panels that the 
specialists quote more aggressively for low-volume stocks. Average percentage of bid 
(ask) quotes in which specialists undercut the LOB for low-volume stocks is 16.24 % 
(17.42 %) and the respective numbers for high-volume stocks is 10.13 % (16.95 %). One 
reason might be that low-volume stocks have thin LOBs and they need more specialist 
participation. Another reason might be that it is more profitable to undercut the LOB for 
low-volume stocks. The specialists also quote more aggressively for high-price stocks. A 
possible explanation consistent with the discussion in Section 1.2 is that as the relative 
tick size approaches zero, it becomes less costly for the specialist to undercut the LOB. 
To account for the level of depth that the specialist chooses to add, we use a 
multinominal logit specification that incorporates the second level decision of how much 
depth to add. As discussed above, we use S for small depth, and L for large depth. 
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Definition of “small depth” and “large depth” are stock specific. If the depth added by the 
specialist is greater than the median sample depth for that stock, then we classify this 
depth as “large”, otherwise we classify it as “small”. This specification implies 25 
choices that are available to the specialist.27 The problem with this specification is that, 
some of the 25 strategies mentioned above were never chosen by the specialists, 
especially for low-volume stocks. This leads to “quasi-complete separation of data 
points”,28 and the log-likelihood function in the multinominal logit model does not have a 
maximum, i.e., the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist. Normally, “quasi-
complete separation of data points” is a small sample problem. But as stated in Altman, 
Gill and McDonald (2004), “even in large samples, it will frequently occur when there 
are extreme splits on the frequency distribution of either the outcome or explanatory 
variables”. This is the case in our sample. Frequency distribution of the 25-events above 
(not reported) shows that, some events have frequencies that are less than 1% of the 
overall sample size.  
To alleviate this problem, we combine the “mixed” and “undercut” strategies and call 
it “participate”. Hence, the specialist can choose between the following strategies for both 
the bid- and ask-side for a total of nine combinations: do not participate (D), participate 
and add small depth (PS), and participate and add large depth (PL). So for example, the 
strategy PS-PL means that the specialist has participated and added small depth to the 
posted bid quotes, and he participated and added large-depth to the posted ask quotes. As 
another example, D-PS means that the specialist has chosen not to participate to the bid-
quotes, and has participated and added small depth to the ask-quotes. Since our focus is 
                                                 
27 5 choices (D, MS, ML, US, UL) on both sides of the market for a total of 25 combinations. 
28 See chapter 10 in  Altman, Gill and McDonald (2004) for details and possible solutions. 
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on analyzing the specialists’ choice between adding levels of depth, this simplification 
should not be very costly. Table 6 reports detailed frequency distribution for this reduced 
structure. 
We can make the following observations in addition to the observations from Table 5. 
Given that the specialist has participated, he is more likely to add small depth. Specialists 
participate more for low-volume stocks, and they do so by adding small depth. Similarly, 
they participate more for high price stocks by adding small depth to the posted quotes. 
General conclusion from this table is that, specialists do not participate for most of the 
time, and when they participate, they are more likely to add small depth. 
6.2. Results 
 As discussed in Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings (2004), the exogenous variables 
affect the probability of choosing base case strategy, but because of the multinominal 
logit estimation, this effect can’t be determined directly from the coefficients. In addition, 
occasionally, the signs of the coefficients of the non-base case variables can be different 
from the signs of their impact on the choices. To solve this problem, following Ellul, 
Holden, Jain and Jennings (2004), we calculate what they refer to as impulse sensitivities. 
“Impulse sensitivity” is defined as the change in the probability of an event caused by a 
one standard deviation increase in an explanatory variable. The benchmark probability of 
each event is calculated by using the estimated logistic function evaluated at the mean of 
each of the explanatory variables. The significance of an impulse sensitivity is calculated 
by the method described in Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings (2004). 
Table 7, panel A reports the mean coefficient estimates from the multinominal 
analysis for the first level or pricing decisions of the specialists along with overall 
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significance of coefficients at the 5% levels. Overall significance rate is high, indicating 
that exogenous variables in our model were important for the specialists while choosing 
one of the 9 strategies available. Table 7, panel B reports the mean impulse sensitivities 
of each event. Almost all impulse sensitivities are significant at the 0.1% level.  We will 
discuss and interpret the mean impulse sensitivities.  
The percentage probability changes in a row in the impulse sensitivity tables allow 
us to determine how the net effect of a one standard deviation increase in an explanatory 
variable from its mean is distributed among 9 strategies available to the specialist. This 
distribution allows us to determine the strategies that the specialist leans towards, by 
looking at the overall change in predicted probabilities.  It is important to note that these 
numbers are not levels, i.e., they are not overall probabilities of selecting the strategies. 
The average probabilities of selecting each strategy across stocks found by using the 
means of all exogenous variables (not reported) produce estimated probabilities close to 
the frequency distributions reported in Panel A of Tables 5 and 6.  
 An increase in the best prices in the LOB would cause the market to be stronger on 
the bid-side and weaker on the ask-side in terms of liquidity. This may also indicate that 
stock prices will increase in the future.  Results in Table 7, Panel B show that, a one 
standard deviation increase in the best limit bid cause the specialist to increase the 
probability of choosing strategy M-D by 5.69 %. In addition, the probability that the 
specialist undercuts the LOB on the buy-side increases by 6.69%.29 Hence, the specialist 
increases the probability of trading in front of a heavy limit order book on the buy-side. 
In contrast, when the change in the best limit ask increases by one standard deviation the 
highest probability increase (11.92%) belongs to the strategy D-U implying that the 
                                                 
29 Sum of probability changes of the strategies U-D, U-M, and U-U. 
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specialist supports the sell-side of the market. The total increase in the probabilities of the 
strategies where the specialist undercuts the LOB on the sell-side is 28.14%.30 These 
results are consistent with the fact that the specialists participate to the quotes to smooth 
the prices on the sell side, whereas they try to step in front of the LOB on the buy-side.31 
Price continuity seems to be the main motivation of the specialist while reacting to 
the changes in the best limit prices. However, when there is an increase in LOB depth at 
the best price in the book, the motivation of the specialist seems to be more profit 
motivated. As a result of one standard deviation increase in the “change in the best limit 
bid (ask) size” variable, the specialist increases the probability of undercutting the LOB 
on the buy (sell) side by 2.24% (3.40%). Therefore, when the specialist does not have a 
constraint related to price smoothing, he undercuts the LOB and quotes in front of the 
heavy side of the LOB.  
As discussed in Section 4.2, a direct way to see if the specialists participate to quotes 
according to their affirmative obligations is to look at the effects of changes in the 
difference (gap) between the best limit price and the posted quote midpoint. A large gap 
indicates a weak side of the market that the specialist should provide additional liquidity 
by stepping in. The results about “gap” variables are very strong. When one side of the 
market has low liquidity in the posted quotes, the specialist decreases the probability of 
choosing D-D strategy sharply. He increases the probability that he undercuts the LOB on 
the buy-side (sell-side) by 22.60% (10.99%) because of a one standard deviation shock to 
the bid-side (ask-side) gap variable.  
                                                 
30 The strategies where the specialist undercuts the LOB on the sell-side are D-U, M-U, and U-U. 
31 Specialists do not have to make firm quotes for large sizes to maintain price continuity.  For example, if 
there were a selling pressure and the prices would fall quickly without specialist intervention, the specialist 
would simply quote decreasing bid prices with bid depths that equal one round lot to smooth the prices. 
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We make similar observations from activity variables. Impulse sensitivity of 
cumulative size of cancelled buy (sell) limit orders is an increase in the probability that 
the specialist undercuts the LOB on the buy (sell) side by 1.03% (1.58%). As the liquidity 
provided by the LOB decreases, the specialist steps in to provide additional liquidity. We 
can also observe this by looking at the decreases in the probabilities of the D-D strategies. 
 Of course, specialists perform their duties only if they make at least normal profits. 
Otherwise, they would not provide this additional liquidity. Since the specialists have an 
advantage of observing the activity in the LOB, they might use this information to predict 
future price changes.32 For example, when cumulative size of cancelled limit orders 
increases, the probability of U-U strategy increases for both the buy- and sell-side of the 
market. Therefore, when the specialist increases his participation on one side of the 
market to provide additional liquidity, he also increases his participation on opposite side 
of the market to hedge his position. 
 The impulse sensitivities for cumulative limit buy and sell order placement provides 
additional evidence that the specialists support the weak side of the market. As 
cumulative size of limit buy (sell) orders since the last quote revision increases, the 
probability that the specialist undercuts the LOB on the buy (sell) side decreases by 
1.04% (1.14%). The effects of activity variables are small however, when compared to 
the effects of the changes in the best limit prices and changes in gaps between those 
prices and the posted quote midpoint.  
 If LOB asymmetry has some predictive power in predicting the future price 
movements and the specialists use this information, then as LOB asymmetry increases, 
they should increase their participation to the sell side more, relative to their participation 
                                                 
32 Section 7 below analyzes this issue in more detail. 
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to the buy-side. We do not observe strong LOB asymmetry effects on the strategies of the 
specialists. Impulse sensitivities of the available strategies are all less than 1%. Analysis 
of Section 7 below shows that, overall asymmetry in the LOB does not have strong 
predictive power to forecast future price movements. 
 Previous literature that analyzed quote changes generally found insignificant 
inventory effects, possibly because they did not analyze the depth coming from the LOB 
and the specialist separately. We find statistically significant inventory effects. The 
impulse sensitivity of D-U and M-U strategies associated with the inventory variable is 
0.42 % and the impulse sensitivity of U-D and U-M is -0.13 %. These impulse 
sensitivities are statistically significant. 
 One of the obligations of the specialists is to prevent large price reversals. 
Therefore, if the specialists are participating to posted quotes in a manner consistent with 
this obligation, we should see increased specialist participation during volatile periods. 
This is what we observe from the impulse sensitivities of the nine strategies available to 
the specialist. When there is a shock to the volatility by one standard deviation, the 
probability that the specialist undercuts the LOB on one or both sides of the market 
increases by 1.75%.  This number indicates that there is some contribution from the 
specialists to decrease the volatility.  
 As discussed above, some of the variables that the NYSE uses to evaluate the 
specialist performance are the width of the quoted bid-ask spread, and average depth of 
the quotes. When the percentage spread in the previous quotes increases, the probability 
that the specialist chooses D-D strategy increases by 4.17%. Therefore, we do not find 
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evidence that the specialist increases probability of narrowing the spread in the current 
period, if the spread in the previous period was large. 
 We now turn to specialists’ choice between adding small and large depth to the 
LOB and we will not discuss the impulse sensitivities of the explanatory variables for 
which this effect is marginal. Table 8 reports the results.    
Changes in best limit prices are one of the most important variables that the 
specialist uses while determining his strategy. When best limit bid price increases, 
indicating either good news about the stock or strong buy side because of the liquidity 
reasons, the specialist increases his probability of choosing the D-PL strategy by 0.22%.33 
Since sell side of the market is relatively weak in this case, the specialist increases 
probability of participating and adding large depth to the ask-quotes, but this probability 
is smaller than the impulse sensitivity of D-D strategy associated with the change in best 
limit bid price. Since buy-side is relatively strong, it does not need support from the 
specialist. Because of an increase in the best limit ask price, the probability of the 
strategy D-PL increases most. When the change in best limit ask price increases by one 
standard deviation, the specialist increases his probability of adding large depth to the 
ask-quotes to provide additional liquidity. He also increases his probability of adding 
large depth to the bid quotes possibly because he updates his estimate of true stock value 
upwards.   
The difference between best limit prices and midquote is an important proxy of the 
liquidity available in the LOB. As the liquidity in one side of the LOB is small, the 
specialist chooses strategies through which he increases his participation to that side of 
the market. However, he does not have to add large depth to maintain price continuity, so 
                                                 
33 Sell side of the market is relatively weak in this case. 
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he chooses to add small depth to maintain price continuity and limit his possible losses to 
informed traders. This is clearly seen in Table 8, Panel B. When “∆ in the % Best Limit 
Bid Gap” variable increases from its mean by one standard deviation, the probability that 
the specialist chooses PS strategy on the buy side increases by 18.879%. When “∆ in the 
% Best Limit Ask Gap” variable increases from its mean by one standard deviation, the 
probability that the specialist chooses PL strategy on the sell side increases by 9.82%. 
Therefore, whenever one side of the market has insufficient liquidity, the specialist 
supports that side, but he does so defensively by adding small depth for the buy-side and 
aggressively by adding large depth for the sell-side. 
 We can see a similar result consistent with “affirmative obligations” of the 
specialist from the results about “cumulative cancelled limit buy orders” and “cumulative 
cancelled limit sell orders”. When the cumulative size of cancelled buy (sell) limit orders 
increases, the buy (sell) side of the market will be relatively weak. Therefore, specialist’s 
probability of choosing strategy PS for buy (sell) side increases by 1.58% (2.30%), to 
provide additional liquidity. As discussed above, however, he does so by adding small 
depth. 
 When the change in specialist’s inventory is positive, probabilities of the strategies 
D-PL and D-PS increase most suggesting inventory management by the specialist. 
However, economic significance of these results seems to be small.  
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7. Cross Sectional Regression Model 
7.1. Methodology 
 To analyze how participation of the specialists to the posted quotes varies across 
stocks, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model: 
ii
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where, for stock i, iSpecPart  is the sum of average percentage specialist participation at 
the bid and ask, ilyVolLogMeanDai  is the log of average daily volume, iapLogMarketC  
is the log of market capitalization, ilTickRe  is the tick size divided by the average stock 
price over the sample period, iVolatility  is the average volatility of the transaction prices 
from the time series analysis, ieadAvePercSpr  is the average percentage spread over the 
sample period and iε  is the error term.  
 In equation 1, right hand side variables may not be exogenous because specialist 
participation to the posted quotes has some effect on these variables. Accordingly, we 
estimate equation 1 by using instrumental variables regression. The instruments that we 
use are the average of the same variables over the three months prior to the sample 
period. 
7.2. Results 
 Table 9 presents the coefficient estimates of our cross sectional regression analysis. 
Coefficient of logarithm of mean daily volume is negative and significant. Specialist 
participation to posted quotes decreases as transaction volume increases. This might 
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indicate either that specialist services are needed more for thinly traded, illiquid stocks or 
participating to posted quotes for low-volume stocks is more profitable. 
 Another significant variable is the relative tick size. As relative tick size increases, 
it becomes more costly for the specialists to undercut the LOB; hence, their participation 
to the posted quotes decreases.  In addition, there is a positive relationship between the 
volatility of the stock and the average percentage specialist participation providing 
evidence that specialists increase their participation to smooth prices for volatile stocks. 
8. Are the participation strategies of the specialists to the posted quotes 
informative about future price changes?  
 By using the TORQ database, Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that the LOB 
is informative about the future price movements, and that specialists use this information 
while making trading decisions. During the period of TORQ database, the tick size was 
equal to $1/8, and after decimalization, the strategies of the specialists have changed 
considerably.34 Following Harris and Panchapagesan (2005), to investigate if the LOB is 
informative about future prices and specialists use this information while making 
participation decisions to the posted quotes, we estimate the following model by using 
OLS for each security i : 
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where subscript t  denotes posted quote time, ktiR +,  is the transaction price return in basis 
points over k  periods starting at time t , ktiR −,  is the transaction price return in basis 
                                                 
34 See Coughenour and Harris (2003). 
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points over k  periods ending at time t , tiSpBid ,  is the percentage specialist participation 
to the posted bid at time t , tiSpBidLevelSpBid ,)( ×  is an interaction variable where 
SpBidLevel  is the amount of depth that the specialist adds to the current bid quotes, 
tiSpAsk ,  is the percentage specialist participation to the posted ask at time t , 
tiSpAskLevelSpAsk ,)( ×  is an interaction variable where SpAskLevel  is the amount of 
depth that the specialist adds to the current ask quotes, timNearLOBAsy ,  represent the 
quantity asymmetry (sells-buys) in the LOB within 20 cents of the best limit prices, and 
tiLOBAsym ,  is the overall quantity asymmetry (sells-buys)  in the LOB and ti ,ε  is the 
random error term. k  equals 5 minutes, 1 hour or 1 day. The model captures the 
predictive power of the specialists’ strategies and the LOB asymmetry over different time 
horizons. We include the lagged return to model return mean reversion in short horizon 
transaction price returns documented in the previous literature. 
 The results are reported in Table 10. A positive (negative) coefficient of  SpBid  or 
SpBidLevelSpBid ×  ( SpAsk  or SpAskLevelSpAsk × ) indicates that the specialist predicts 
the future return correctly. Negative coefficients of mNearLOBAsy  and LOBAsym  
shows that these variables are informative about future returns.  
 We would expect that near LOB asymmetry to the best limit prices is informative 
about future returns over shorter time intervals, and overall asymmetry in the LOB is 
informative about future returns over longer time intervals. Results show that, 
interestingly, the asymmetry in the LOB close to the best limit prices is informative about 
the future returns over both short and long time horizons. Overall asymmetry in the LOB 
is not very informative about future price changes.  
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 To investigate the effect of the level of the depth that the specialist adds to the 
quotes, we use interaction variables. For example, the percentage specialist participation 
is 50% for both cases where the specialist has 100 shares in posted depth of 200 shares, 
or 5000 shares in posted depth of 10000 shares. But if the position of the specialist in the 
quotes is informative about future price changes, we would expect that the second case is 
more informative about this ability. 
 The signs of the interaction variables show that the overall success of specialists in 
predicting future returns is high. The specialists predict short-term future returns correctly 
for the bid-side (ask-side) for 71.22 % (82.01%) of the stocks. However, as time horizon 
increases, the specialists’ ability to predict future returns decreases. Coefficients of 
interaction variables indicate that the success rate for the bid-side (ask-side) decreases to 
65.47% (69.06%) for the medium-term returns and it decreases to 53.96% (58.99%) for 
the long-term returns. 
 Another observation is that the success rate of the specialists is close to the success 
rate of the asymmetry in the LOB close to the best limit prices. It appears that the 
specialists use the “near LOB asymmetry” as a source to predict short- and medium-term 
future price changes. The success rate of the specialists in predicting long-term price 
changes is not close to that of “near LOB asymmetry” possibly because, they believe that 
asymmetry in the LOB close to the best limit prices is short-lived and is not very useful 
to predict longer term returns. 
9. Conclusion 
 We examine how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while 
making participation decisions to the posted quotes. We analyze the specialists’ decision 
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to undercut or add depth to the limit order book. We distinguish between bid and ask side 
of the quotes. We test several hypotheses and find that the primary factor that affects the 
participation strategy of the specialists in the current period is the changes in the best 
prices and depths on the limit order book. In addition, specialists participate to the posted 
quotes more for low volume or high price stocks. We find significant inventory effects 
providing some evidence that the specialist actively manages his inventory. The levels of 
specialists’ participation to the posted quotes have predictive power over future stock 
returns. This predictive power is stronger for short-term returns.   
 Our results indicate that on average specialists’ participation to the posted quotes is 
consistent with their affirmative obligations, contributing to the recent debates about the 
usefulness of the specialist system. This is not true for all specialists, however, because 
there exist some heterogeneity across stocks as reflected by differences in signs and 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. 
references Ho and Stoll (1983, Ho and Stoll (1981)   
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Tables 
High
Variable Mean Std Low Mean Std
0.17 0.35 H 0.20 0.37
0.21 0.39 L 0.18 0.36
0.28 0.41 H 0.30 0.42
0.23 0.40 L 0.22 0.39
0.00 0.32 H 0.00 0.35
0.00 0.34 L 0.00 0.31
0.00 0.35 H 0.00 0.37
0.00 0.34 L 0.00 0.32
0.00 0.07 H 0.00 0.10
0.00 0.11 L 0.00 0.07
0.00 0.11 H 0.00 0.14
0.00 0.15 L 0.00 0.12
-2.88 16,614.03 H -1.10 10,936.32
-2.18 12,961.90 L -4.08 18,549.77
-5.53 19,326.72 H -1.42 14,337.03
-3.26 17,320.76 L -7.76 21,914.47
0.00 0.00 H 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01 L 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 H 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.01 L 0.00 0.01
1,459.74 9,454.57 H 1,191.88 7,137.33
576.26 7,110.37 L 1,019.12 9,825.96
1,476.89 10,132.47 H 1,181.04 7,418.98
561.63 7,705.13 L 1,038.43 10,738.19
698.21 5,721.43 H 589.67 4,419.06
407.80 6,833.60 L 573.48 7,539.85
726.91 5,625.20 H 602.75 4,646.92
392.02 7,511.39 L 582.11 7,828.35
19.55 26,216.60 H 3.40 16,973.67
-17.58 19,651.96 L 5.93 28,990.23
1,097.27 13,365.79 H 892.91 11,610.94
145.67 3,237.60 L 540.10 9,387.55
1,205.64 43,186.57 H 965.07 40,859.35
147.04 10,591.51 L 598.81 25,725.35
0.87 2,790.03 H 0.23 2,485.12
-1.23 920.67 L -0.17 1,959.70
21.82 68.23 H 53.70 1,564.07
161.61 2,991.16 L 101.54 2,171.94
0.20 0.26 H 0.13 0.19
0.09 0.18 L 0.17 0.28
6.40 28.25 H 7.91 31.56
9.67 29.50 L 7.53 25.80
3,067.97 9,150.06 H 2,483.12 8,067.23
1,598.55 12,591.81 L 2,475.40 12,748.40
4,032.43 10,185.39 H 3,109.35 7,917.32
1,925.43 12,690.81 L 3,265.76 13,846.58
∆ Best Limit Bid Price
Buy Order Placement
Spread in cents
Sell Order Placement
∆ Best Limit Ask Price
Volatility
Buy volume since the
last quote revision
Sell volume since the
last quote revision
Change in Specialist's Inventory
Price Categories
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Volume Categories
This Table provides descriptive statistics according to volume and price categories. Prices are denominated in
dollars and quantities are denominated in shares.
% Spec. Partc. to the posted bid
% Spec. Partc. to the posted ask
∆  % Spec. Partc. to the posted bid
∆  % Spec. Partc. to the posted ask
Posted Bid Depth
Posted Ask Depth
∆ Best Limit Bid Size
∆ Best Limit Ask Size
∆ % Best Limit Bid Gap
∆ % Best Limit Ask Gap
Change in LOB Asymmetry
Buy Cancellation Activity
Sell Cancellation Activity
Time between consecutive LOB
revisions in seconds
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Table 2. Equations that are estimated by simultanous equations model 
   
   
 Endogoneous Variables 
Explanatory Variables 
Change in 
% Specialist 
Participation  
at the Bid 
Change in 
% Specialist 
Participation 
at the Ask 
Intercept X X 
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Bid  X 
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Ask X  
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Price X X 
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Price X X 
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Size X X 
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Size X X 
∆ in the % Best Limit Bid Gap X X 
∆ in the % Best Limit Ask Gap X X 
∆ in the LOB Asymmetry X X 
Cumulative Limit Buy Order Placement X X 
Cumulative Limit Sell Order Placement X X 
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Buy Orders X X 
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Sell Orders X X 
Elapsed time between last two LOB revisions X X 
Volatility X X 
Buy volume since the last quote revision X X 
Sell volume since the last quote revision X X 
∆ in the Specialist's Inventory X X 
Previous Percentage Spread X X 
Previous Posted Bid Depth X  
Previous Posted Ask Depth   X 
   
X indicates a right hand side variable included in the relevant equation. 
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Table 3. Simultaneous Equations Model Results for stock by stock estimation
Exogenous variables Mean Median 5% Mean Median 5%
Intercept 0.026 -0.024 50.360 -0.040 -0.012 30.935
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Bid 1.031 0.304 16.547
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Ask -0.640 0.028 12.230
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Price 57.770 0.790 25.899 -15.125 -4.519 37.410
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Price -56.220 -1.047 28.058 14.596 3.731 36.691
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Size* 0.674 0.020 47.482 9.500 -0.034 13.669
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Size* 3.200 -0.033 10.072 -1.000 0.024 58.273
∆ in the % Best Limit Bid Gap 1,848.011 100.662 35.252 -651.671 -211.751 47.482
∆ in the % Best Limit Ask Gap 1,467.203 -29.090 29.496 -299.060 25.469 33.813
∆ in the LOB Asymmetry* 0.552 0.065 22.302 0.635 -0.176 49.640
Cumulative Limit Buy Order Placement* -2.000 -0.223 24.460 -6.000 -0.005 12.950
Cumulative Limit Sell Order Placement* 3.200 -0.020 7.914 -4.000 -0.106 23.741
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Buy Orders* 6.600 0.683 44.604 1.300 0.062 11.511
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Sell Orders* 15.700 0.138 5.755 5.300 0.321 30.935
Elapsed time between last two LOB revisions* 49.800 0.589 27.338 12.900 0.419 15.827
Volatility 0.890 -0.013 15.108 -0.009 -0.003 7.194
Buy volume since the last quote revision* -1.000 -0.072 11.511 2.900 0.000 19.424
Sell volume since the last quote revision* 3.300 0.010 7.914 11.500 -0.068 14.388
∆ in the Specialist's Inventory* 1.700 -0.022 7.914 -0.243 0.080 10.072
Previous Percentage Spread -8.087 3.863 44.604 9.618 2.141 25.899
Previous Posted Bid Depth* -0.958 0.127 35.971
Previous Posted Ask Depth* 0.675 0.031 40.288
For each explanatory variable in each equation, the mean and median of all coefficient estimates across the stocks in
the sample are provided. % column reports the percentage of significant coefficients at the 5% level. All numbers for
explanatory variables with a * are multiplied by 100000.
Equations
∆ in % Spec. 
Partc. at the Bid
∆ in % Spec. 
Partc. at the Ask
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Panel A. Volume Categories
Exogenous variables Cat. Mean Median 5% Mean Median 5%
H 0.00 -0.02 40.00 -0.02 -0.01 22.86
L 0.05 -0.03 60.87 -0.06 -0.02 39.13
H -0.11 0.37 14.29
L 2.18 0.19 18.84
H 0.53 -0.13 10.00
L -1.83 0.12 14.49
H 97.79 1.35 14.29 -21.95 -8.16 42.86
L 17.17 0.51 37.68 -8.20 -0.36 31.88
H -94.83 -1.30 15.71 21.26 7.22 40.00
L -17.05 -0.68 40.58 7.84 -0.55 33.33
H 0.08 -0.06 42.86 -0.40 -0.01 7.14
L 1.30 0.13 52.17 19.60 -0.08 20.29
H 0.69 -0.03 4.29 -0.13 -0.10 58.57
L 5.70 -0.04 15.94 -3.00 0.35 57.97
H 3,248.18 125.53 27.14 -968.43 -722.59 55.71
L 427.55 42.80 43.48 -330.32 -41.18 39.13
H 2,484.91 -42.61 20.00 -569.29 7.05 31.43
L 434.74 -28.95 39.13 -24.92 41.79 36.23
H 0.30 0.04 22.86 -0.20 -0.15 52.86
L 0.81 0.11 21.74 1.50 -0.22 46.38
H 0.23 -0.09 15.71 -0.07 -0.04 12.86
L -5.00 -0.48 33.33 -11.00 0.11 13.04
H -0.36 -0.07 8.57 -0.08 -0.04 7.14
L 6.80 0.14 7.25 -7.00 -0.96 40.58
H 0.35 0.26 30.00 0.56 0.07 15.71
L 13.00 2.70 59.42 2.00 -0.02 7.25
H 0.62 0.11 5.71 0.16 0.05 14.29
L 30.90 0.20 5.80 10.40 4.10 47.83
H 97.10 32.10 27.14 25.00 19.70 12.86
L 1.80 0.04 27.54 0.66 0.09 18.84
H -0.01 -0.02 20.00 -0.01 0.00 10.00
L 1.80 -0.01 10.15 0.00 0.00 4.35
H -0.38 -0.05 10.00 -0.22 -0.02 24.29
L -2.00 -0.14 13.04 6.10 0.13 14.49
H 0.27 -0.01 7.14 -0.11 -0.06 17.14
L 6.30 0.14 8.70 23.30 -0.10 11.59
H 0.23 0.06 5.71 0.30 -0.02 8.57
L 3.10 -0.10 10.15 -0.80 0.29 11.59
H -10.98 8.29 44.29 15.01 3.47 22.86
L -5.15 2.71 44.93 4.14 0.97 28.99
H 0.03 0.04 28.57
L -2.00 0.47 43.48
H 0.01 -0.03 25.71
L 1.30 0.44 55.07
Sell volume since the last quote revision*
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Size*
∆ in the % Best Limit Bid Gap
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Ask
∆ in the LOB Asymmetry*
∆ in the % Best Limit Ask Gap
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Size*
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Price
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Price
Cumulative Limit Buy Order Placement*
∆ in the Specialist's Inventory*
Previous Posted Ask Depth*
Previous Posted Bid Depth*
Previous Percentage Spread
Buy volume since the last quote revision*
Volatility
Elapsed time between last two LOB revisions*
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Sell Orders*
Equations
Table 4. Simultaneous Equations Model Results for stock by stock estimation by trading volume and price 
categories
For each explanatory variable in each equation, the mean of all coefficient estimates across the stocks in the sample
are provided. 1% and 5% columns report the percentage of significant coefficients at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively. All coefficient estimates for explanatory variables with a * are multiplied by 100000. Prices are
denominated in dollars and quantities are denominated in shares.
Intercept
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Bid
∆ in % Spec.
Partc. at the bid
∆ in % Spec.
Partc. at the ask
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Buy Orders*
Cumulative Limit Sell Order Placement*
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Table 4. cont'd
Panel B. Price Categories
Exogenous variables Cat. Mean Median 5% Mean Median 5%
H 0.00 -0.02 43.48 -0.06 -0.01 28.99
L 0.05 -0.03 57.14 -0.02 -0.01 32.86
H 1.90 0.26 14.49
L 0.18 0.30 18.57
H 1.19 0.03 14.49
L -2.44 0.03 10.00
H 111.27 0.61 21.74 -29.39 -10.24 40.58
L 5.03 1.87 30.00 -1.06 -2.99 34.29
H -106.77 -0.91 24.64 29.13 10.69 39.13
L -6.39 -1.75 31.43 0.27 2.67 34.29
H 0.39 -0.01 53.62 19.30 -0.07 17.39
L 0.95 0.03 41.43 -0.17 -0.02 10.00
H 1.00 -0.06 10.15 -3.00 -0.09 62.32
L 5.30 -0.02 10.00 0.06 0.07 54.29
H 3,501.51 165.22 28.99 -1,264.17 -802.97 49.28
L 218.14 57.52 41.43 -47.92 -73.95 45.71
H 2,648.45 -111.53 28.99 -746.67 2.88 27.54
L 302.84 -21.89 30.00 142.16 29.42 40.00
H 0.36 0.12 26.09 1.80 -0.22 52.17
L 0.74 0.02 18.57 -0.53 -0.11 47.14
H -0.33 -0.20 26.09 -11.00 -0.04 13.04
L -4.00 -0.31 22.86 -0.12 0.01 12.86
H -0.70 -0.07 10.15 -6.00 -0.10 17.39
L 7.10 0.00 5.71 -1.00 -0.17 30.00
H 3.20 0.62 40.58 2.00 0.06 13.04
L 10.00 0.73 48.57 0.57 0.06 10.00
H 1.40 0.17 5.80 6.20 0.21 30.44
L 29.70 0.10 5.71 4.40 0.73 31.43
H 49.80 0.38 20.29 21.20 0.98 13.04
L 49.80 1.10 34.29 4.70 0.13 18.57
H 0.01 -0.03 17.39 -0.04 0.00 5.80
L 1.76 -0.01 12.86 0.03 0.00 8.57
H -0.09 -0.05 10.15 5.50 0.00 15.94
L -2.00 -0.11 12.86 0.33 0.00 22.86
H 1.20 0.04 8.70 22.70 -0.08 10.15
L 5.30 -0.01 7.14 0.55 -0.03 18.57
H 0.25 0.05 5.80 -1.00 0.00 5.80
L 3.00 -0.07 10.00 0.55 0.13 14.29
H -13.17 6.13 39.13 17.32 3.50 23.19
L -3.08 3.41 50.00 2.03 1.16 28.57
H 1.10 0.10 28.99
L -3.00 0.17 42.86
H 0.96 0.02 33.33
L 0.40 0.06 47.14
Equations
∆ in the Specialist's Inventory*
Previous Percentage Spread
Previous Posted Bid Depth*
Cumulative Limit Buy Order Placement*
Cumulative Limit Sell Order Placement*
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Buy Orders*
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Sell Orders*
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Size*
∆ in the % Best Limit Bid Gap
Previous Posted Ask Depth*
Elapsed time between last two LOB revisions*
Volatility
Buy volume since the last quote revision*
Sell volume since the last quote revision*
∆ in the % Best Limit Ask Gap
∆ in the LOB Asymmetry*
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Ask
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Price
∆ in the Best Limit Ask Price
∆ in the Best Limit Bid Size*
∆ in % Spec.
Partc. at the bid
∆ in % Spec.
Partc. at the ask
Intercept
∆ in % Spec. Partc. at the Bid
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Table 5. Percentage participation by the NYSE specialists to the posted quotes  
        
This table reports the percentage of bid side and ask side participation decisions of the 
specialists for 38 stocks in the current sample according to volume and price categories. The 
pricing decisions are D (Don't Participate to the Posted Quotes; no specialist depth), M ( Add 
Depth to the Limit Order Book; mixed), and U (Undercut the Limit Order Book; specialist 
alone). If mean daily volume (mean price) of a stock is higher than the median, then it is in 
"high" category, otherwise it is in "low" category. The numbers in the rows sum up to 100%.  
       
       
       
       
Panel A.       
       
Ask Side Choice   Bid Side 
Choice D M U Total   
D 52.33 11.06 12.12 75.51   
M 7.00 2.77 2.14 11.91   
U 7.79 1.92 2.88 12.59   
Total 67.12 15.74 17.14 100   
 
Panel B.    
    
Volume Categories 
D  
(LOB Alone) 
M  
( LOB+Specialist) 
U 
(Specialist Alone) 
Bid-Side of the posted quotes    
High 75.60 14.27 10.13 
Low 75.37 8.39 16.24 
    
Ask-Side of the posted quotes    
High 63.87 19.18 16.95 
Low 71.96 10.62 17.42 
    
    
Panel C.    
    
Price Categories 
D  
(LOB Alone) 
M  
(LOB+Specialist) 
U  
(Specialist Alone) 
Bid-Side of the posted quotes    
High 73.42 13.46 13.11 
Low 77.55 10.38 12.07 
    
Ask-Side of the posted quotes    
High 61.91 18.56 19.53 
Low 72.23 12.98 14.79 
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Table 6. Percentage participation by the NYSE specialists to the posted quotes in levels 
        
The decisions are D (Don't Participate to the Posted Quotes; no specialist depth), PL 
(Participate and add large depth), and PS (Participate and add small depth). If mean daily 
volume (mean price) of a stock is higher than the median, then it is in "high" category, 
otherwise it is in "low" category. In Panel A, for a particular strategy, reported two numbers are 
frequency and percent of total. In Panel B, values reported are row percentages that sum up to 
100% subject to rounding. 
        
        
Panel A.            
Specialist Strategies    
Posted Ask    Posted 
Bid D  PL PS Total    
D  52.32 10.66 12.53 75.51    
PL 6.59 2.01 2.2 10.8    
PS 8.22 2.17 3.3 13.69    
Total  67.13 14.84 18.03 100    
 
 
Panel B. 
    
Volume Categories D PL PS
Bid-Side of the posted quotes   
High 75.59 11.44 12.96
Low 75.37 9.81 14.82
    
Ask-Side of the posted quotes  
High 64.03 17.05 18.92
Low 71.96 11.4 16.64
    
Price Categories D PL PS
Bid-Side of the posted quotes   
High 73.42 12.04 14.54
Low 77.45 9.65 12.89
    
Ask-Side of the posted quotes  
High 61.91 17.34 20.75
Low 72.01 12.5 15.49
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Exogenous Variables D-M D-U M-D M-M M-U U-D U-M U-U 1% sig. 5% sig.
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Price 4.19 -62.79 12.77 12.70 -76.57 -4.81 2.22 -51.98 58.62 77.01
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Price -12.40 58.26 -10.11 -16.11 75.49 -0.12 -10.73 44.29 58.62 72.41
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Size* -0.20 -0.09 -2.88 -2.90 -2.64 1.68 1.54 1.57 72.41 80.46
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Size* -1.41 1.35 0.12 -1.65 1.04 0.03 -1.40 1.18 62.07 67.82
∆ in the % Best
Limit Bid Gap 81.63 -3465.20 24.15 160.47 -3831.14 1347.08 1702.90 -948.97 80.46 90.80
∆ in the % Best 
Limit Ask Gap -27.31 -523.85 423.93 319.98 -931.26 -797.38 -442.64 -1379.89 60.92 67.82
∆ in the 
LOB Asymmetry* -0.55 -0.50 0.46 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 -0.31 -0.40 35.63 51.72
Cumulative Limit Buy 
Order Placement* -2.08 -0.16 -1.81 -4.59 -1.89 -4.21 -12.05 -3.00 18.39 39.08
Cumulative Limit Sell 
Order Placement* -1.81 -6.81 -0.81 -4.56 -9.25 0.09 -3.73 -7.92 19.54 31.03
Cumulative Cancelled 
Limit Buy Orders* -3.46 0.63 0.22 -11.19 -4.05 4.86 1.56 5.24 36.78 49.43
Cumulative Cancelled 
Limit Sell Orders* 0.24 7.62 -3.47 -37.58 5.10 1.34 -12.57 7.51 28.74 35.63
Elapsed time between 
last two LOB revisions* 124.07 -335.36 293.55 341.11 -94.03 -278.57 -211.00 -0.01 59.77 71.26
Volatility -0.08 0.85 -0.41 -0.97 0.44 0.18 0.19 1.37 90.80 94.25
Buy volume since the 
last quote revision* -3.86 0.18 -0.57 -11.10 -3.76 -1.85 -4.31 -2.48 20.69 31.03
Sell volume since the 
last quote revision* -2.08 -0.30 -3.22 -8.01 -3.27 -1.38 -4.37 -4.50 16.09 27.59
∆ in the Specialist's 
Inventory* 0.93 3.19 0.14 1.62 -1.78 -1.35 -0.46 0.88 18.39 31.03
Previous % Spread -263.80 -128.76 -68.14 -349.00 -175.27 75.25 -109.45 14.62 100.00 100.00
Previous Posted Bid 
Depth* 1.25 2.68 4.60 3.71 4.96 -18.40 -20.25 -19.17 98.85 100.00
Previous Posted Ask 
Depth* 5.53 -7.61 -0.46 4.62 -7.42 1.51 5.57 -6.91 97.70 100.00
Table 7. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation
Overall
Significance (%)9 Choices Available to the Specialist (D-D is the base case)
In Panel A, we report the mean of estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that converged. In Panel B, we
report the impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event caused by a one standard
deviation shock in the explanatory variable. Strategies of the specialist for both sides of the posted quotes are
defined as follows: D-Do not undercut the LOB; M (Mixed)-add depth to the LOB at the best limit price; and U-
Undercut the best limit price. Overall significance in Panel A comes from "Type III Analysis of Effects" table
produced by SAS logistic regression which gives the Wald Chi-square statistic for the effect of an explanatory
variable. Overall significance columns reports the percentage of significant variables at the stated levels of
significance. Impulse sensitivities reported in Panel B are significant at the 0.1% level. All coefficient estimates for
explanatory variables with a * are multiplied by 100000.
Panel A. Mean Regression Coefficient Estimates
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Table 7. cont'd
Exogoneous Variables D-D D-M D-U M-D M-M M-U U-D U-M U-U
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Price -9.17 -0.69 -6.57 5.69 5.02 -0.97 1.36 3.57 1.76
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Price -24.05 -3.88 11.92 -2.41 0.86 6.94 0.50 0.83 9.28
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Size 0.51 0.28 0.09 -1.09 -0.54 -0.36 0.74 0.14 0.23
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Size -0.10 -0.89 1.02 0.24 -0.44 0.14 -0.05 -0.18 0.26
∆ in the % Best
Limit Bid Gap -13.13 -1.14 -9.48 0.64 2.31 -1.81 11.10 8.27 3.24
∆ in the % Best
Limit Ask Gap -15.32 -1.85 4.45 2.86 3.36 2.30 -1.21 1.18 4.24
∆ in the 
LOB Asymmetry 0.64 -0.76 -0.53 0.51 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.00 -0.07
Cumulative Limit Buy 
Order Placement 1.10 0.00 0.50 -0.30 -0.28 0.01 -0.65 -0.28 -0.11
Cumulative Limit Sell 
Order Placement 0.81 0.16 -0.58 0.08 -0.13 -0.27 0.26 -0.05 -0.29
Cumulative Cancelled Limit 
Buy Orders -0.37 -0.65 0.04 0.10 -0.15 0.01 0.72 0.04 0.27
Cumulative Cancelled Limit 
Sell Orders -1.37 0.25 1.20 -0.38 -0.10 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.26
Elapsed time between last 
two LOB revisions 0.54 0.17 -0.42 0.05 0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.20
Volatility -0.82 -0.15 1.12 -0.49 -0.29 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.39
Buy volume since the last 
quote revision 1.04 -0.73 0.13 0.13 -0.22 -0.08 -0.14 -0.17 0.03
Sell volume since the last 
quote revision -0.43 -1.14 -0.25 -0.01 -0.57 -0.05 0.74 0.34 1.38
∆ in the Specialist's 
Inventory -0.33 0.12 0.41 -0.10 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 0.01
Previous % Spread 4.17 -4.07 -1.39 -0.19 -0.86 -0.20 1.65 0.04 0.86
Previous Posted Bid Depth -0.99 1.73 1.14 1.16 0.25 0.36 -2.27 -0.63 -0.76
Previous Posted Ask Depth -3.78 3.98 -0.93 -0.07 0.54 -0.33 0.26 0.81 -0.49
9 Choices Available to the Specialist
Panel B. Mean Impulse Sensitivites (%)
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Exogenous Variables D-PS D-PL PS-D PS-PS PS-PL PL-D PL-PS PL-PL 1% sig. 5% sig.
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Price -32.15 -24.33 5.00 -40.02 -1.59 -4.73 -35.60 -18.52 56.38 70.21
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Price 29.13 13.32 -5.72 36.89 -7.24 3.08 32.61 8.30 53.19 61.70
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Size* -0.16 0.03 0.34 0.29 0.13 -0.22 -0.12 -0.71 57.45 68.09
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Size* 0.68 0.63 -0.09 0.43 0.79 0.30 0.44 0.32 57.45 64.89
∆ in the % Best
Limit Bid Gap -1503.65 -1614.04 736.99 -1017.46 310.49 410.75 -953.89 -706.61 74.47 76.60
∆ in the % Best
Limit Ask Gap -285.13 -382.81 -184.02 -1107.57 128.17 -322.33 -572.13 -510.36 46.81 58.51
∆ in the 
LOB Asymmetry* -0.33 -0.88 0.38 -0.06 -0.77 0.27 0.09 -0.48 50.00 58.51
Cumulative Limit Buy 
Order Placement* -0.45 -0.33 -8.77 -7.51 -15.91 -4.37 -6.18 -5.65 32.98 48.94
Cumulative Limit Sell 
Order Placement* -10.69 -1.40 -0.37 -13.31 -6.66 0.17 -9.88 -2.84 36.17 46.81
Cumulative Cancelled 
Limit Buy Orders* 0.27 -0.26 12.77 9.68 12.65 0.29 -4.40 -2.69 37.23 51.06
Cumulative Cancelled 
Limit Sell Orders* 15.78 0.46 -0.15 13.67 -7.07 1.53 14.82 -2.91 30.85 47.87
Elapsed time between last 
two LOB revisions* -25.82 16.29 35.57 -96.07 -90.31 203.82 88.26 136.91 50.00 60.64
Volatility 0.29 0.70 -0.05 0.41 0.56 0.05 0.20 0.85 92.55 95.74
Buy volume since the last 
quote revision* -3.59 0.76 -7.55 -10.00 -7.43 2.51 -4.08 1.02 36.17 47.87
Sell volume since the last 
quote revision* -3.99 0.79 -10.96 -19.68 -18.27 1.94 -10.42 3.70 25.53 35.11
∆ in the Specialist's 
Inventory* 3.56 4.86 -0.06 -0.57 4.83 -0.75 2.34 1.71 27.66 39.36
Previous % Spread -102.11 -280.64 -18.97 -104.01 -314.38 45.93 -21.89 -175.28 98.94 98.94
Previous Posted Bid 
Depth* 1.24 3.25 -54.85 -59.20 -46.13 6.57 7.26 6.51 100.00 100.00
Previous Posted Ask 
Depth* -43.59 9.52 0.52 -47.56 10.27 1.47 -35.42 10.12 100.00 100.00
Table 8. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation
Overall
Significance (%)9 Choices Available to the Specialist (D-D is the base case)
In Panel A, we report the mean of estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that converged. In Panel B, we
report the impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation
shock in the explanatory variable. Strategies of the specialist for both sides of the posted quotes are defined as
follows: D-Do not participate; PS (PL)- Participate and add small (large) depth. Overall significance in Panel A comes
from "Type III Analysis of Effects" table produced by SAS logistic regression which gives the Wald Chi-square statistic
for the effect of an explanatory variable. Overall significance columns reports the percentage of significant variables at
the stated levels of significance. Impulse sensitivities reported in Panel B are significant at the 0.1% level. All
coefficient estimates for explanatory variables with a * are multiplied by 100000.
Panel A. Mean Regression Coefficient Estimates
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Table 8. cont'd
Exogoneous Variables D-D D-PS D-PL PS-D PS-PS PS-PL PL-D PL-PS PL-PL
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Price -5.59 -5.26 -2.82 3.98 1.50 5.83 -0.84 0.71 2.49
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Price -22.53 4.62 5.23 -1.83 5.02 2.29 -1.41 5.52 3.09
∆ in the Best
Limit Bid Size 0.39 0.16 0.22 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 -0.17 -0.08 -0.13
∆ in the Best
Limit Ask Size -0.33 -0.09 0.39 -0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.18 -0.10 0.01
∆ in the % Best
Limit Bid Gap -9.56 -7.59 -5.55 9.56 3.57 5.74 2.04 0.09 1.70
∆ in the % Best
Limit Ask Gap -11.78 0.02 0.69 0.99 2.29 5.10 -2.18 0.83 4.03
∆ in the 
LOB Asymmetry 0.64 -0.27 -0.96 0.33 0.04 -0.13 0.32 0.10 -0.08
Cumulative Limit Buy Order 
Placement 1.34 0.39 0.38 -1.19 -0.43 -0.23 -0.13 -0.07 -0.06
Cumulative Limit Sell Order 
Placement 1.06 -1.47 0.69 0.21 -0.52 -0.02 0.27 -0.25 0.02
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Buy 
Orders -1.10 -0.44 -0.31 1.27 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.01 0.02
Cumulative Cancelled Limit Sell 
Orders -2.15 1.82 0.36 -0.43 0.22 -0.01 -0.11 0.26 0.05
Elapsed time between last two 
LOB revisions -0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.11 0.04 -0.05 0.06
Volatility -1.24 0.22 0.89 -0.22 -0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.25
Buy volume since the last quote 
revision 0.96 -0.08 -0.30 -0.55 -0.16 -0.18 0.34 -0.01 -0.01
Sell volume since the last quote 
revision -1.18 -1.54 0.91 -0.79 -0.36 0.63 1.39 0.22 0.72
∆ in the Specialist's Inventory -0.44 0.33 0.30 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.03 0.01
Previous % Spread 3.02 -1.32 -3.61 0.22 0.04 -0.43 1.66 0.38 0.05
Previous Posted Bid Depth -0.17 0.97 2.19 -4.59 -1.28 -0.99 2.43 0.62 0.82
Previous Posted Ask Depth -2.41 -7.07 8.22 0.13 -1.55 2.15 0.46 -1.21 1.28
9 Choices Available to the Specialist
Panel B. Mean Impulse Sensitivites (%)
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Table 9. OLS Results from Cross-sectional Regression of Specialist 
Participation 
    
This table reports results from estimation of equation 1. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the sum of average 
percentage specialist participation at the bid and ask. 
    
Dependent Variable  
Sum of average percentage specialist participation at the bid and ask 
Exogenous Variables Coefficients   
Intercept 0.337 ***  
 (0.095)   
Log Mean Daily Volume -0.047 ***  
 (0.015)   
Log Market Capitalization 0.03098 **  
 (0.013)   
Relative Tick -19.283 **  
 (7.65)   
Volatility (Std. Dev. of Transaction Prices) 0.090 *  
 (0.043)   
Average Percentage Spread -0.629   
  (2.612)    
    
Sample Size 114   
R2 0.17    
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Variables
Average of
Estimated
Coefficients
Std. Error of 
Estimated
Coefficients Negative Positive
% 
Correct
Intercept -0.0568 3.1561 58 81
Lagged Return -0.0010 0.0525 75 64
Specialist participation to the posted Bid -0.3663 4.7509 86 53 38.13
Spec Part. Bid x Spec. Bid Depth 0.0004 0.0022 40 99 71.22
Specialist participation to the posted Ask 0.2347 5.8364 61 78 43.88
Spec Part. Ask x Spec. Ask Depth -0.0009 0.0052 114 25 82.01
LOB Asymmetry Close to the Best Limit Prices -2.61E-05 5.44E-05 109 30 78.42
Overall LOB Asymmetry -5.19E-06 5.25E-05 63 76 45.32
Variables
Average of
Estimated
Coefficients
Std. Error of 
Estimated
Coefficients Negative Positive
% 
Correct
Intercept -5.3478 49.5499 62 77
Lagged Return -0.0278 0.1317 85 54
Specialist participation to the posted Bid -1.8902 21.0177 78 61 43.88
Spec Part. Bid x Spec. Bid Depth 0.0029 0.0119 48 91 65.47
Specialist participation to the posted Ask -0.7085 23.6373 67 72 48.20
Spec Part. Ask x Spec. Ask Depth 0.0000 0.0121 96 43 69.06
LOB Asymmetry Close to the Best Limit Prices -6.87E-05 4.73E-04 95 44 68.35
Overall LOB Asymmetry -1.11E-05 3.72E-04 47 92 33.81
Variables
Average of
Estimated
Coefficients
Std. Error of 
Estimated
Coefficients Negative Positive
% 
Correct
Intercept -141.1554 600.1769 71 68
Lagged Return -0.0269 0.3305 80 59
Specialist participation to the posted Bid -13.1692 69.0943 81 58 41.73
Spec Part. Bid x Spec. Bid Depth 0.0016 0.0309 64 75 53.96
Specialist participation to the posted Ask 2.3429 84.8441 70 69 50.36
Spec Part. Ask x Spec. Ask Depth -0.0080 0.0886 82 57 58.99
LOB Asymmetry Close to the Best Limit Prices -4.73E-04 2.20E-03 106 33 76.26
Overall LOB Asymmetry 1.76E-04 1.59E-03 28 111 20.14
k = 1 day
Table 10. OLS Results from Cross-sectional Regression of Future Returns
k = 5 minutes
k = 1 hour
This table reports results from estimation of equation 2 for each of the 38 stocks in our sample. For each
future return regression (k=5 minutes, 1 hour, or 1 day), mean and standard error of all coefficient
estimates across stocks are reported. The last two columns report the number of positive and negative
coefficients. A positive (negative) coefficient of percentage specialist participation to the bid (ask) quotes
or bid (ask) side interaction variable indicates that the specialist predicts the direction of future return
correctly. The last column reports thepercantage of correct predictions for the relevant independent
variable.
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Symbol
Data
Period Symbol
Data
Period Symbol
Data 
Period Symbol
Data
Period
AIG x FMO xx MRK x SZ xx
ALS xx FNM x MU x T x
AOT xx FOE xx MWC xx TGT x
AP xx FTD xx MWD x TLM PRB xx
AVB xx MXE xx TMK x
AXP x GGT PR xx NAP xx TRP xx
AXP PRA xx GLW x NKE x TYC x
BAC x GNA xx NOK x UBT xx
BBV xx GPS x NPC xx UDS x
BK x GPT x NR xx UMG PRY xx
BKE xx GRP xx NUI xx USI xx
BPL xx GX x OFG xx VIAB x
BRM xx HD x OMX xx VOD x
BZL xx HI PRT xx ONE x VTP xx
C x HIF xx OUI xx WB x
CB x HPT xx PBR xx WFC x
CBA xx HRC x PCG x WMK xx
CHH xx HWP x PCS x WMS xx
CLP PRA xx IBM x PFE x WMT x
CM xx IMY xx PFP xx XOM x
CMS x IRT xx PNK xx XRX x
CNC x JBL x PP xx ZNH xx
CPN x JPM x PST PRA xx ZNT xx
CQB PRA xx JPM PRC xx PTM xx ZQK xx
CSD PRA xx JW B xx Q x ZTR xx
CUZ xx KGC xx RI xx
CWF xx KM x RKY x
DIS x KWD xx ROM PR xx
DL xx LMGA x SBC x
DRE xx LNC PRG xx SBP PRA xx
DRE PRA xx LNC PRY xx SCH x
DUC xx LTD x SGP x
EIX x MC xx SJI xx
ELY x MCD x SJR xx
ENE PRT xx MER x SKO xx
EQT x MIJ xx SLR x
F x MKT xx SQM A xx
FCP xx MO x SSS PRB xx
FIG PRA xx MOT x SUS xx
x : 04/02/2001 - 04/06/2001
xx: 04/02/2001 - 06/29/2001
Appendix A
Information about the sample that consists of 143 stocks we employ to compare 
specialist strategies. 
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Chapter 2 
Participation Strategy of the NYSE Specialists to the Trades 
Abstract 
Using 2001 NYSE system order data in the decimal pricing environment, we analyze 
how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while making participation 
decisions to the trades. We analyze the following options that are available to the 
specialist before he trades: do not participate; participate at the quoted price; participate 
and improve the price. We find that the specialist uses information in the limit order book 
as summarized by the limit order book asymmetry. The specialist increases the 
probability that he participates to the trade when a market order arrives if he is able to 
step in front of the heavy side of the LOB. If the relative size of the market order, as 
described by the ratio of the market order size to the posted depth at the relevant side of 
the market, is high, the specialist chooses not to participate and let the market order trade 
with the limit order book. Consistent with the theoretical results in the previous literature, 
specialists trade more aggressively when the spread is large. We find that specialist 
trading strategies in stocks from different volume and price categories vary substantially. 
Finally, we also find significant inventory effects. The specialist trades more 
aggressively, if the trade with the incoming market order restores his inventory. 
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1. Introduction 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialists are responsible for making 
markets for the stocks assigned to them. Their primary obligation is to ensure that there 
exists a fair and orderly market in their stocks. They should be willing to trade when 
other traders are unwilling to trade and the bid-ask spread should not be too wide. Also 
the specialists should intervene to prevent large price jumps, i.e., they should create price 
continuity. The NYSE uses the average width of the quoted bid/ask spread, the average 
depth of the quotes, the number of large price jumps, and the average size of price 
reversals to evaluate specialists’ performances. The specialists’ also have “negative 
obligations” that restrict their trading. Specialists cannot trade for their own accounts if 
there exist public orders at the same price or better. Also they should not trade with limit 
orders in order not to take the liquidity available to public traders. 35 
In this paper, we investigate the following issues by analyzing the participation 
decisions of the specialists to trades on the NYSE. First, what affects the participation 
strategy of a specialist to trades over time in an individual stock? Specifically, does he 
trade according to his affirmative obligations? Does he use information from the Limit 
Order Book (LOB) to predict the future returns of the stocks? Does he manage his 
inventory by using trades as inventory theories suggest? What is his reaction to the 
possibility of informed trading? Does he increase his participation to the trades to smooth 
prices when prices are volatile or does he avoid trading to stay away from risks inherent 
in volatile markets? Second, how do specialists’ trading strategies vary across stocks? 
Specifically, what is the effect of volume on specialists’ decisions? Does the specialist 
                                                 
35 See Harris (2003) p.494 for an extensive description of specialists’  roles and how they can act against 
the interests of the public investors on the NYSE. 
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trade aggressively or defensively as the price volatility increases across stocks? Is the 
relative tick size, as defined by the ratio of the minimum tick to stock price, important in 
trading strategy of the specialists?  
The answers to these questions are very important because NYSE specialists 
make markets for a huge trading volume. On the NYSE, the dollar value of average 
monthly trading volume that the specialists oversee was $968.18 billion and average 
specialist volume as percentage of the NYSE total volume was around 20% in 2004.36 
Therefore, the average dollar volume that the specialists traded for their own accounts per 
month can be approximated as $193.64 billion. Specialists take one side of this huge 
trading activity and there are potential conflict of interests between the specialists desire 
to make profits for themselves and their obligation to be fair to all public traders. There 
has been an important debate going on about the role of the specialists and whether their 
contributions are valuable in the overall trading activity. Recently, as a result of an 
investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission into floor trading 
practices, five largest specialist firms at the New York Stock Exchange were required to 
pay a combined $241.8 million to settle charges of improper trading.37  More recently, 
the New York Times reported that the United States attorney's office was investigating 
individual specialists for executing proprietary orders before customer orders, and getting 
involved in a trade that should be carried out automatically with no intervention.38  
                                                 
36 See “Market Activity” in the NYSE fact book that can be found at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/. 
Generally, the specialist participation rate mentioned in the literature is the specialist volume as percent of 
NYSE 2x total volume which was approximately 10% in 2004. If one wants to calculate the total volume 
that the specialists traded for their own accounts, specialist volume as percent of NYSE total volume is the 
correct figure to use. 
37 See for example, Wall Street Journal (October 16, 2003) “NYSE to Punish Five Specialists In Trading 
Inquiry”. 
38 “A New Inquiry Into Big Board Specialists”, New York Times, February 7, 2005. This paper does not 
address the issue of improper trading. 
 65
The NYSE claims that investors get the best available price most of the time in 
the specialist system. But many institutional investors prefer faster executions and believe 
that the human-based system for auctioning stocks does not allow this.39  To address 
these concerns, the NYSE is planning to allow investors to execute more stock orders 
automatically.40 
Despite the important role played by the NYSE specialists, one can find little or 
no analysis of their trading strategy. One reason for this lack of analysis in the previous 
literature is the lack of the data. To provide a meaningful analysis of specialist behavior, 
one needs detailed data about orders. Publicly available TAQ database contains 
information about volume and prices of individual transactions on the NYSE. However, 
this transaction data provides no information about specialist participation in individual 
trades. In addition to TAQ, the NYSE provided researchers with TORQ (Trades, Orders, 
Reports, and Quotes) database that contains transactions, quotes, order processing data, 
and audit trail data for a sample of 144 stocks for three months: November 1990 through 
January 1991.41 This database can be used to partition posted depth into the specialist’s 
contribution and the LOB’s contribution (which is necessary for our analysis). Since the 
specialist IDs are removed from the TORQ database, one should rely on algorithms 
similar to the one provided in Panchapagesan (2000) to infer the trades with the specialist 
participation.  
Considering the numerous changes in the trading system and procedures that 
occurred on the NYSE since 1991, TORQ database cannot provide much information 
                                                 
39 See “Fidelity Urges NYSE to Revamp Trading Operation“, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2003. 
40 See“NYSE's Automatic Transition”, Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2004 and NYSE Newsletter August 
2004 issue on  http://www.nyse.com. 
41 See Hasbrouck (1992) for a detailed description of TORQ database. 
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about the recent behavior of quotes and transactions.42 Because of the public order 
precedence rule, the specialist has to better the quotes in the LOB if he wants to trade. 
The trading strategy of the specialists changed considerably after the decimalization in 
the NYSE, because undercutting the LOB became less costly now. 43  
 When a market or marketable order arrives, the specialist faces the decision of 
choosing between the following strategies: i. Do not participate; ii. Participate at the 
quoted price; and iii. Participate and improve the price. Using 2001 NYSE system order 
data in the decimal pricing environment, we analyze how the specialist reacts to the 
changes in the market variables while choosing one of the three strategies above. To 
complete this analysis, it is important to determine the position of the specialist in the 
posted quotes, because this position is a constraint on specialist’s strategy. For example, 
if a market buy order of size 100 arrives and the posted ask depth of 200 is coming from 
the specialist only, the specialist has no option but to trade with this market buy order 
unless another trading interest appears at the same time that can be matched with this 
market buy. In our example, if we did not look at the position of the specialist in the 
posted ask, we would incorrectly think that the specialist took the contra side of this 
market buy strategically, reacting to changes in market variables, where in fact he did not 
have any choice other than trading with the market buy. Accordingly, for each trade, we 
determine the position of the specialist in the posted quotes and determine his feasible 
strategies that do not contradict his affirmative obligations. Analyzing trading decisions 
of the specialists allows us to see if their trades are consistent with their market making 
                                                 
42 The most important change is the switch to decimal pricing. For a list of other rule changes since 1997, 
visit http://apps.nyse.com/commdata/PubInfoMemos.nsf/AllPubRuleChanges?openview&count=500 . 
43 See Coughenour and Harris (2003) and references therein. 
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obligations as described above, or if they take away liquidity from the market for their 
own profits.  
This work is related to a number of papers in the previous literature. Madhavan 
and Sofianos (1998) analyze specialist participation in the total transaction volume. 
Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that LOB is informative about future prices and 
specialists use this information. 44 In this paper, we extend and complement their analysis 
in a number of ways. First, as described above, we take the position of the specialist in 
the posted quotes as given. So we are able to answer the question that “given his position 
in the posted quotes, i.e., given his participation strategy to the posted quotes, how does 
the specialist participate to the trades?”. Second, we analyze the trading strategies of the 
specialists in the decimal pricing environment. The decimalization had many effects on 
the market variables including the profits of the specialists.45 Therefore, our study also 
contributes to the previous literature by showing how the strategies of the specialists 
changed after the decimalization. 
Our results from analyzing individual stocks over time indicate that the primary 
variables that the specialist looks at are the “Excess Spread”, defined as spread minus 
minimum tick, and the “Relative Order Size”, defined as the ratio of the market order size 
to the posted depth at the relevant side of the market. As the excess spread increases, 
more room is available for the specialist to undercut the LOB, and he trades more 
aggressively. This aggressiveness can also be the result of the specialists market making 
obligations. Since an increase in the spread is an indication of a weak market, the 
specialist might simply be trading because he has an obligation to trade when no one else 
                                                 
44 See Ready (1999) also. 
45 See Coughenour and Harris (2003) and references therein. 
 68
is willing to trade. When the size of the market order relative to the posted bid size 
increases, the specialist increases the probability that he lets the market order trade with 
the LOB to protect himself from the possibility of informed trading.  
The specialist increases the probability that he participates to the trade when a 
market order arrives if he is able to step in front of the heavy side of the LOB. In 
addition, the specialist uses information from the cumulative order imbalance since the 
last trade to update his beliefs about the true value of the stock. If the order imbalance, 
defined as cumulative buy volume minus sell volume during the last 15 minutes or 15 
trades increases (decreases), the specialist increases the probability that he undercuts the 
LOB when a market sell (buy) arrives. 
We also find significant inventory effects. The specialist trades more 
aggressively, if the trade with the incoming market order restores his inventory. 
The effects of other variables seem to be secondary. There is some evidence that 
when the size of the arriving market order is medium, the specialist decreases the 
probability of participating in the trade, which supports the finding of Barclay and 
Warner (1993) that informed traders prefer medium sized orders.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the determinants 
of the specialist trading strategy predicted by the previous literature and states the 
hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data. Empirical methodology is discussed in section 
3. Section 4 presents the results from our analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Hypotheses 
2.1. The determinants of specialist participation to trades over time 
As first analyzed by Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), the risk of carrying 
inventory induces a positive bid-ask spread. However, many previous studies (e.g. 
Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Kavajecz and Odders-
White (2001)) find weak inventory effects. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) provide 
evidence that specialists manage their inventories through the timing and direction of 
their trades rather than adjusting bid and ask quotes. Therefore, we expect a risk averse 
specialist to increase (decrease) the probability of taking the contra side of a market buy 
(sell) order when he has a long inventory position and, inversely, to decrease (increase) 
the probability of taking the contra side of a market buy (sell) order when he has a short 
inventory position.  
 Seppi (1997) models the competition between limit order traders and a strategic 
specialist. He shows that when the bid-ask spread is greater than the minimum tick, the 
specialist undercuts the LOB for small trades. As the spread increases, there will be more 
price points that the specialist can use to undercut the LOB and make profits. Also, a 
wide spread might cause large jumps in the prices. Therefore, a large spread may induce 
the specialist to increase his participation because he has the market making obligation to 
maintain price continuity. Accordingly, we expect that the specialist increases the 
probability that he participates in a trade when the bid-ask spread is large. 
 Easley and O'Hara (1992) shows that time between trades can be correlated with 
the factors related to the value of the asset. In their model, the frequency of trades is 
positively correlated with the occurrence of an information event. If no trade occurs in 
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some time interval, the market maker raises his probability that no information event has 
occurred. Accordingly, he moves his bid and ask quotes closer to the true value of the 
stock, which is between bid and ask prices, because the probability of trading with an 
informed trader is low. This implies that the spread will be smaller as the time between 
trades increases.46 In the context of our model, we expect that as no-activity time 
increases, the specialist increases the probability that he participates to the next trade. 
The state of the LOB is an important factor considered by the specialist while 
determining his strategy to participate in the trades. During our sample period, the 
specialists were required to share the general information about the LOB with the floor 
brokers when asked.47 However, this information was not available to most traders in the 
market, so the specialist had considerable advantage in having access to the LOB. In 
Seppi (1997) model, limit order traders are the primary source of competition that the 
specialist faces. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) find that specialist uses information 
from the LOB in ways that favor him. They argue, for example, that an asymmetry in the 
LOB predicts the likely direction of future price changes.  
Specialists may also use quote-matching strategies.48 As described in Harris (2003), 
quote matching is a front-running strategy in which quote matchers try to trade in front of 
large patient traders. For example, when a quote matcher trades (buys) in front of a large 
buy limit order, and prices move against him, he limits his losses by trading with the 
standing buy limit order. When a specialist buys in a similar situation, and the prices 
                                                 
46 For a similar result, see Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997). For evidence of transaction clustering, see 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) and Engle and Russell (1998). 
47 Recently, the NYSE started selling aggregate order book volume at each price point through its new 
system called the NYSE OpenBookTM. The information in this system is updated every 5 seconds. This 
reduces but does not eliminate the informational advantage of the specialists because they still have 
exclusive access to individual orders. For more information, visit http://www.nysedata.com/openbook/. For 
the effects of the NYSE OpenBookTM, see Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2003). 
48 See Harris (2003), p.248 and p.502. 
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move against him, he should not trade with the limit buy order (a negative obligation) but 
at least he does not need to be on the contra side of upcoming market sells until the 
liquidity on the buy side of the LOB is exhausted.  
If the specialist exploits the information in the LOB, we would expect that when the 
LOB is heavy on the buy (sell) side, he increases the probability that he participates to the 
trade when a market sell (buy) arrives. There are two reasons for this. One of them is 
quote matching as described above. The second one is having information about the 
direction of future price changes. On the other hand, if the specialist trades according to 
his affirmative obligations, he would increase the probability that he participates to the 
trade when a market buy (sell) arrives at times when the LOB is heavy on the buy (sell) 
side to maintain price continuity. The effect of LOB asymmetry on the specialist’s 
participation strategy to the trades is therefore an empirically open question.   
In Kyle (1985) model, the market maker revises his expectations about the value of 
the stock upwards (downwards) and increases (decreases) the stock price as result of buy 
(sell) orders which possibly includes orders coming from informed traders. Although 
there are no bid and ask prices in the Kyle model, the idea is that the market maker 
updates his belief of what the stock is worth and adjusts the price so as to minimize his 
loss to informed traders. Obviously, this updated belief about the value of the stock will 
be crucial for the specialist when he has to decide whether to take the contra side of a 
market order. We expect that, as the buy (sell) transaction volume since the last trade 
increases, the specialist increases (decreases) the probability that he participates when a 
market sell order arrives, and decreases (increases) the probability that he participates 
when a market buy order arrives. 
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 Barclay and Warner (1993) shows that most of the cumulative stock-price change 
is due to medium-size trades providing evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category. Following Madhavan and 
Sofianos (1998), we define a trade as medium if it is between 50th and 99th percentile in 
size. We expect that, the specialist decreases the probability of his participation if the size 
of the market order is medium. 
  Dupont (2000) shows that the market maker reduces depth when the volatility of 
the asset value is high. Intuitively, high volatility increases the risks associated with 
carrying inventory which will result in less specialist contribution to depth. On the other 
hand, Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) state that “Price continuity rules require specialists 
to trade to stabilize prices, suggesting that participation will be higher in stocks whose 
intraday return volatility is large.” In a cross sectional analysis of specialist participation, 
they find a positive relationship between their volatility variable and the specialist 
participation rate. Bondarenko and Sung (2003) theoretically show that when the price 
volatility is high, the optimal strategy of the specialist is to increase his participation even 
when he is not constrained by the rules imposed by the exchange. The effect of volatility 
on the specialist’s quoting decision is therefore an empirically open question.  
  Peterson and Sirri (2002) find that “marketable limit orders are used 
proportionally more often: i) for larger orders, ii) by non-individual investors, iii) when 
the order size exceeds quoted depth, iv) when quote imbalances exist, v) when the depth 
is relatively low, and vi) when spreads are narrow.” Therefore it is more difficult and less 
profitable to execute a marketable limit order for the specialist. We expect that, if the 
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arriving order is a marketable limit order, the specialist decreases the probability that he 
chooses strategy 3, i.e., strategy of undercutting the LOB. 
 
2.2. Cross-sectional determinants of specialist participation to trades 
Previous theoretical literature shows that specialists’ services are more valuable for 
illiquid stocks. We expect that specialist percentage participation to trades should decline 
as the liquidity of the assigned stock increases. Trading volume and market capitalization 
can be used as proxies for liquidity. So there should be an inverse relationship between 
specialist’s participation and these proxies. 
As discussed in detail in the previous section, when volatility is high, the specialist 
might reduce depth because of the risks associated with carrying inventory, or he might 
increase depth to stabilize the prices. Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) find a positive 
relationship between the volatility as measured by the standard deviation of the midquote 
to midquote transaction returns, and the specialist participation rate in a cross sectional 
analysis of specialist participation. The effect of volatility on the specialist’s participation 
decision to quotes is an empirically open question.  
 Seppi (1997) analyzes a model in which specialists face direct competition from 
public limit orders that have precedence under the NYSE rules. He shows that specialist’s 
profits are maximized as the tick size goes to zero. The reason is that as the tick size 
approaches to zero, it becomes less costly for the specialist to undercut the LOB. The tick 
size on the NYSE switched from eights to sixteenths on June 24, 1997 and to pennies for 
a number of stocks on August 28, 2000. Finally, on January 29, 2001, all NYSE stocks 
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started being traded in pennies.49 This decrease effectively relaxed the public order 
precedence rule and increased the set of prices over which the specialist can choose to 
undercut the limit orders. As predicted by the Seppi model, Coughenour and Harris 
(2003) find empirically that participation rates and high frequency trading profits 
increased for specialists making markets for low price stocks as a result of 
decimalization. In the context of our model, it is more costly for the specialist to undercut 
the LOB for low price stocks which implies that the specialist participation to the trades 
will be inversely related to the “Relative Tick” defined as the ratio of the minimum tick 
($0.01) to the stock price.  
 
3. Data 
Our data is from the NYSE System Order Database (SOD). Because of the volume of 
the data, it is necessary to select a sample of NYSE-listed securities. The original sample 
is selected as follows:  Initially, 50 most actively traded NYSE stocks during the 20 
trading days prior to January 29, 2001 are chosen. Also 25 stocks from each of four 
Volume-Price groups are randomly selected. To pick the 100-stock random sample, 
NYSE-listed securities are ranked on share trading volume and, separately, on average 
NYSE trade price during the 20 trading days prior to January 29, 2001. Each security is 
placed into one of four categories after comparing its share price to the median NYSE 
share price and its trading volume to the median NYSE volume. These groups (of 
unequal numbers of stocks) are a high-volume:high-price group, a high-volume:low-price 
group, a low-volume:high-price group, and, a low-volume:low-price group. Within each 
                                                 
49 See the “trading” column in NYSE timeline at http://www.nyse.com/about/timeline/TimeLine.html. 
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group, securities are arranged alphabetically (by symbol) and every Nth security is 
chosen, where N is chosen to select 25 securities from that group. Because two of the 50 
stocks with the highest trading volume also are randomly chosen as part of the high 
volume groups, the final sample has 148 securities.  
NYSE’s System Order Database (SOD) gives detailed information on the entry and 
processing of orders. Order data include security, order type, a buy-sell indicator, order 
size, order date and time, limit price (if the order is a limit order), and the identity of the 
member firm submitting the order. Execution data include the trade’s date and time, the 
execution price, the number of shares executing, and cancellation information. Orders, 
executions and cancellations are time-stamped to the second. 
Because of the size of the dataset, we estimated the LOBs for active stocks for one 
week (April 2nd ,2001 – April 6th, 2001) only. For the rest of the stocks we estimate the 
LOBs for three months( April 2nd, 2001 – June 29th, 2001).  See the appendix for the 
symbols and data period for each stock used in the analysis.  
To determine the available strategies to the specialist when a market order arrives, 
we have to determine his position in the posted quotes. For example, as discussed in 
detail in Section 3.2.1 below, if the specialist represents all depth in the posted bid quote 
which is equal to 1000 shares, and if a market sell order of size less than 1000 arrives, the 
specialist has no choice but to take the other side of this trade (assuming that there does 
not exist a simultaneously arriving public order that could be matched with this market 
sell). 50 Since the posted quotes reflect trading interests of the limit order traders, floor 
brokers and the specialist, we need to estimate the LOB to separate the portion of the 
posted depth coming from the LOB. The LOBs are estimated by using the method 
                                                 
50 Our sample also contains marketable limit orders. 
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described in Kavajecz (1999).  First, the limit order book at the beginning of the sample 
period is estimated by searching for all execution and cancellation records that refer to 
orders placed before the sample period. Second, initial and each limit order book after 
that is updated sequentially depending on the placed orders, executions and cancellations. 
The result is the estimate of the LOBs at each point in time. After the LOBs are 
estimated, if the posted bid (ask) price is the same as the best limit bid (ask) price, then 
the LOB bid (ask) depth is subtracted from the posted bid (ask) depth. The residual depth 
comes from the specialist’s trading interest and the orders left by the floor brokers with 
the specialist for the specialist to execute (passive floor broker participation). We call this 
residual as the “specialist’s participation to the posted quotes” and use it to determine the 
position of the specialist in the posted quotes.51 Sofianos and Werner (2000) estimate by 
using data from January 1997 to February 1997 that passive floor broker participation 
rate is 10.6% of buy plus sell volume of all purchases and sales. The remaining trade 
volume belongs to the specialist (10.8%), system orders (44.9%), and orders actively 
represented by the floor brokers (33.7%).  
To calculate the transaction volume used in our analysis, we use Lee and Ready 
(1991) method to classify transactions in the TAQ database of the NYSE as buyer- or 
seller-initiated. 
 
                                                 
51 Our dataset does not allow us to split out the passive floor broker participation. 
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4. Empirical Methodology 
4.1. Stock by Stock Analysis (Specialist participation over time) 
When a market or marketable order arrives, the specialist faces the decision of choosing 
between the following strategies: 
1. Do not participate, 
2. Participate at the quoted price, 
3. Participate and improve the price.52 
 Not all of above strategies are available to the specialist for all incoming market 
orders. Availability of the above strategies depends on the position of the specialist in the 
posted quotes. As an example consider the following scenario: The posted bid size is 
1000 shares all of which comes from the LOB. Then, a market order to sell 500 shares 
arrives. In this case, only the choices 1 and 3 are available to the specialist. The specialist 
cannot participate at the quoted price because of the public order precedence rule.  
Table 1 reports the percentage of each quote case for different volume and price 
categories of stocks. We observe from the table that specialists quote more aggressively 
for low-volume stocks. Average percentage of bid (ask) quotes in which specialists 
undercut the LOB for low-volume stocks is 31.78 % (29.85 %) and the respective 
numbers for high-volume stocks is 15.54 % (18.95 %). One reason might be that low-
volume stocks have thin LOBs and they need more specialist participation. Another 
observation is that the specialists quote more aggressively for high-price stocks. A 
                                                 
52 In their analysis of specialist trading decisions, Harris and Panchapagesan (2003) add one more case 
which is to “stop the order”.  The percentage of stopped orders in our sample is around 0.01%. 
Accordingly, we exclude this choice from our analysis. 
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possible explanation consistent with the discussion in Section 1.2 is that as the relative 
tick size approaches zero, it becomes less costly for the specialist to undercut the LOB. 
 We determine the strategies for different cases as follows. Let’s partition the posted 
bid depth into two parts that come from the specialist and the LOB. 53 So posted bid depth 
equals SB + LB, where SB comes from the specialist, and LB comes from the LOB. Let MS 
denote the size of the incoming market sell. There exist three possible quote conditions 
according to the values that SB and LB take and for each quote condition there are two 
possible cases depending on the size of the incoming market sell order, MS.54 Therefore 
we have the following 6 cases for bid quotes (mirror image holds for the ask quotes). 
Case 1. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS > LB; LOB provides all depth; Market sell size > bid 
depth. 
Case 2. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB; LOB provides all depth; Market sell size ≤ bid 
depth. 
Case 3. SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB; Mixed Case ; Market sell size > bid depth. 
Case 4. SB > 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB; Mixed Case; Market sell size ≤ bid depth. 
Case 5. SB > 0; LB = 0; MS > LB; Specialist provides all depth; Market sell size > bid 
depth. 
Case 6. SB > 0; LB = 0; MS ≤ LB; Specialist provides all depth; Market sell size ≤ bid 
depth. 
 
Below, we discuss the strategies available to the specialist for each of the 6 cases. 
Case 1: SB = 0; LB > 0; MS > LB 
                                                 
53 We only discuss the cases for the bid quotes, as the cases for the ask quotes are the mirror image. 
54 Koksal (2005a) analyzes specialist’s decision of how much depth to add to the posted quotes in addition 
to the LOB. 
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 If the size of the incoming market order is greater than the posted bid depth, i.e., if 
MS > LB, then all three strategies are available to the specialist. Specifically, he may let 
the market order trade with the LOB; he may participate at the quoted price since the size 
of the market order is greater than the posted bid depth; or he may participate and 
improve the price and trade with the market order alone. This quote case provides the 
specialist with the highest degree of freedom, because since the size of the market order 
is greater than the corresponding depth coming from the LOB, the specialist can 
implement his strategy by choosing strategy 2 or strategy 3.  
 In this paper, we only analyze the initial decision of the specialist when the market 
order arrives. For example, the specialist may choose to fill part of the market order by 
participating and improving the price and he may let the remaining part filled by the 
LOB. We do not distinguish between filling the orders partially or completely.  
Case 2: SB = 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB 
 If the size of the incoming market order is less than or equal to the posted bid depth, 
i.e., if MS ≤ LB, then the specialist has the option to do nothing and let the market order 
trade with the LOB, or he can participate and improve the price. Hence, only the first and 
third strategies are available.  
Case 3: SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB 
 In this case, the specialist cannot choose strategy 1, i.e., the choice of “not 
participating”. He has to choose either strategy 2 and participate to the trade at the quoted 
price, or he can undercut the LOB and fill this order completely for his own account. 
Therefore, the available strategy set is {Strategy 2, Strategy 3}.  
Case 4: SB > 0; LB > 0;  MS ≤ LB 
 80
 In this case, the specialist cannot participate at the quoted price because of the 
public order precedence rule; hence second strategy is not available to the specialist. The 
available strategy set is {Strategy 1, Strategy 3}.  
Case 5: SB > 0; LB = 0; MS > SB, 
 In this case the specialist has no choice but to trade with the market order. 
Therefore, we don’t analyze this case. 
Case 6: SB > 0; LB = 0; MS ≤ SB, 
 Similar to Case 5 above, the specialist does not have any strategies to choose. 
 Table 2 lists all possible quote cases, and the available strategies of the specialist. In 
this table, SB and SA also include some orders left by the floor brokers with the specialist.  
 Given that a particular quote condition is SB = 0; LB > 0 or SB > 0; LB > 0, we use a 
multinominal logit framework to analyze Case 1, where all three strategies are available, 
and a logit framework to analyze the Cases 2, 3, and 4, where only two strategies are 
available.  
 
4.2. Explanatory variables for stock by stock analysis  
We use a multinominal logit model for our time series analysis of the specialist 
participation to the trades. This model will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3 
below. To test the hypotheses formulated in the first section we use the following 
variables for the time series analysis.  
Excess Spread is the current quote spread minus the minimum tick in cents; 
Relative Order Size is the log ratio of the market buy (sell) order size to the posted ask 
(bid) depth; 
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LOB Asymmetry is the total size of the sell limit orders minus the total size of the buy 
limit orders in the LOB multiplied by –1 if the incoming market order is a sell order;55 
 
Near LOB Asymmetry is the total sell limit orders minus total buy limit orders within 20 
cents of the best limit prices multiplied by –1 if the incoming market order is a sell order; 
 
Signed Cumulative Order Imbalance is the total buy volume minus sell volume in all 
exchanges during the last 15 minutes or 15 trades whichever is shorter multiplied by -1 if 
the incoming market order is a buy order;56 
 
Specialist’s Signed Inventory cumulative inventory of the specialist preceding the trade 
multiplied by -1 if the incoming market order is a sell order;57 
 
Medium Trade Dummy takes the value of 1 if the trade size is between 50th and 99th 
percentile and 0 otherwise; 
 
Order Type Dummy takes the value of 1 for the marketable limit orders and 0 otherwise. 
 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the transaction prices during the last ten minutes 
before the current quote; 
 
Trade idle time is the normalized time in seconds since the arrival of the last market 
order. 
 
4.3. Cross Sectional Analysis 
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression model to analyze how the 
participation of the specialists varies across stocks: 
iii
iiii
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55 If the specialist use information from the LOB as Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) found, they will trade 
more aggressively when they can step in front of the heavy side of the book 
56 We expect that the specialist will take the contra side of a market sell (buy) order more aggressively if 
the cumulative order imbalance preceding the trade is positive (negative), i.e., he updates his belief about 
the security value upwards (downwards) if the buy (sell) volume preceding the trade is greater than the sell 
(buy) volume.  To calculate the transaction volume used in our analysis, we use Lee and Ready (1991) 
method to classify transactions in the TAQ database of the NYSE as buyer- or seller-initiated. 
57 We assume that the inventory of the specialist is equal to zero at the beginning of the period and ignore 
overnight changes in the inventory. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) use this variable too. If the specialists 
manage inventory, they will trade more aggressively, i.e., increase the probability that they choose strategy 
2 or 3, if trading would restore their invento ries. 
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where, for stock i, iSpecPart  is the percentage of the trades that the specialist participated 
(at the quote or by improving the price), ilyVolLogMeanDai  is the log of average daily 
volume, ilTickRe  is the minimum tick size (=$0.01) divided by the average stock price 
over the sample period, iapLogMarketC  is the log of shares outstanding times average 
stock price, iVolatility  is the average of the volatility variable from the time series 
analysis, iageSpreadAvePercent  is the average percentage quoted spread over the sample 
period and iε  is the error term.  
 
5. Results 
5.1.  Stock by Stock analysis 
As discussed in Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings (2004), the exogenous variables affect 
the probability of choosing base case strategy, but because of the multinominal logit 
estimation, this effect can’t be determined directly from the coefficients. In addition, 
occasionally, the signs of the coefficients of the non-base case variables can be different 
from the signs of their impact on the choices. To solve this problem, following Ellul, 
Holden, Jain and Jennings (2004), we calculate what they refer to as impulse sensitivities. 
“Impulse sensitivity” is defined as the change in the probability of an event caused by a 
one standard deviation increase in an explanatory variable. The benchmark probability of 
each event is calculated by using the estimated logistic function evaluated at the mean of 
each of the explanatory variables. The significance of an impulse sensitivity is calculated 
by the method described in Ellul, Holden, Jain and Jennings (2004). 
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 In this paper, we don’t distinguish between the market sells and market buys. Hence 
all the discussion below applies to both market buys and sells, since the 6 different cases 
are mirror images of each other for market buys and sells.  
 Tables 3 through 6 report the results for each of the four quote cases. Panel B of 
these tables report the impulse sensitivity of the exogenous variables. We will discuss and 
interpret the mean impulse sensitivities. In all tables, the percentages of significant 
impulse sensitivities at the 5% level of significance range from 83.6% to 100%. 
 
Case 1. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS > LB   or   SA = 0; LA > 0; MB > LA 
 The mean coefficient estimates from the multinominal analysis are reported in 
Table 3, Panel A along with overall significance of variables at the 5% and 10% levels. 
Table 3, Panel B reports the mean impulse sensitivities along with the percentage of 
impulse sensitivities that are significant at the 5% level for each stock. 
 In this quote case, if the specialist wants to participate in a trade, he does not need 
to improve the price, because the size of the market order is large enough. The specialist 
will improve the price if the remaining size of the market order is not sufficient for the 
size he wants to trade.  
 Specialists can use the (possible) information in the buy (sell) transaction volume in 
two ways. For example, when there is a large buy (sell) transaction volume, this may 
indicate that the stock price will increase (decrease). Accordingly, first, the specialists 
can protect themselves by not participating in a trade when a large market buy (sell) order 
arrives. Second, they can be more aggressive in participating a trade when a market sell 
(buy) order arrives. The impulse sensitivities for Strategies 1, 2 and 3 are -2.62 %, 0.83 % 
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and 1.83%, respectively, when the “Cumulative Order Imbalance” increases by one 
standard deviation. As a result of one standard deviation increase in the “Cumulative 
Order Imbalance”, the specialist increases the probability that he chooses strategy 3 
(participate and improve price) by 1.83 %, increases the probability of strategy 2 by 0.83 
percent and decreases the probability that he chooses the first strategy by 2.62 %. 
Therefore, the specialist acts more aggressively to buy (sell) the stock, when he infers 
from “Cumulative Order Imbalance” that the stock price will increase (decrease). Hence, 
consistent with the Kyle (1985) model, he updates his belief of what the stock is worth 
and adjusts the price so as to minimize his loss to informed traders. 
 The effect of a one standard deviation in “Excess Spread” is to increase the 
probability of choosing strategy 3 by 5.54% on average. Probability of choosing other 
strategies decreases. Consistent with prediction of Seppi (1997), when excess spread 
increases, the specialist has more room to undercut the LOB, and he acts aggressively 
when a market order arrives. As discussed before, this result is also consistent with 
market making obligations of the specialists that they should be ready to trade when 
nobody else is willing to do so. 
 In their analysis of specialist strategies, Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that 
the LOB is informative about future price changes and the specialist uses this 
information. One of the variables that they use as measure of informativeness of the LOB 
is the overall LOB asymmetry. If the specialist uses information from the LOB, he would 
try to step in front of the heavy side of the LOB, i.e. he would be more aggressive and 
increase the probability that he chooses strategy 3. A one standard deviation disturbance 
to the “LOB Asymmetry” variable causes the specialist to increase his probability of 
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choosing strategy 3 (stepping in front of the heavy side of the LOB) on average by 
0.24%. Hence, the specialist uses the information in the LOB to predict future price 
changes but this effect seems small.  
 When the “Near LOB Asymmetry” increases by one standard deviation, the 
specialist interestingly decreases the probability of the most aggressive strategy by 
0.05%. This is in contrast to the results for the overall LOB asymmetry. It seems that the 
specialists use information from the LOB by using the overall asymmetry, however, they 
are constrained by their market making obligations and are not always able to step in 
front of the heavy side of the LOB.58 
 Our results provide some evidence along the lines of the findings of Barclay and 
Warner (1993) that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category. When 
the size of the market order is medium, the specialist decreases the probability of 
participating and increases the probability of choosing the most defensive strategy by 
1.23% 
 The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 for “Order Type Dummy” is -0.38%. The 
specialist decreases the probability of aggressively participating which is consistent with 
the implications of Peterson and Sirri (2002) analysis that it is more difficult and less 
profitable to execute marketable limit orders. 
  “Relative Order Size” is one of the most important variables for the specialist while 
deciding whether to participate to a trade. When the size of the arriving market sell (buy) 
order relative to the posted bid (ask) depth increases by one standard deviation, the 
specialist decreases his probability of participating to a trade  (i.e., choosing strategies 2 
                                                 
58 Koksal (2005a) shows that the asymmetry in the LOB close to the best limit prices is more informative in 
predicting the short term price changes. 
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or 3) by 6.32%. Hence, the specialist is less willing to participate to a relatively large 
order, possibly coming from an informed trader. 
 The total impulse sensitivity of choosing strategies 2 and 3 associated with the 
specialist’s inventory is 2.74 %. Hence, the specialist becomes more aggressive in 
participating to a trade, if the trade would restore his inventory. This supports the results 
in Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) that specialists selectively participate to trades to 
manage the inventory.59  
 As the time since the last trade increases, the specialist increases the probability of 
not participating by 6.27%. The reason might be that, as the idle time increases, the 
specialist does not have the necessary trading volume as a tool to revise his expectations 
about the true security value. Accordingly, he decreases probability of his participation to 
lower the risk of participating to a trade that might be coming from an informed trader.  
 Finally, as stock price volatility increases, the specialist decreases the probability of 
becoming more aggressive because the risks of carrying inventory is higher when the 
volatility of the stock increases. 
Case 2. SB = 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB   or   SA = 0; LA > 0; MB ≤ LA        
 In this case, the strategy of participating at the quoted price is not available because 
of the public order precedence rule. Therefore, the specialist must improve the price if he 
wants to trade. One implication is that, when the specialist wants to restore his inventory 
for example, he has to be more aggressive. The mean coefficient estimates and impulse 
sensitivities from the logit analysis are reported in Table 4 along with overall significance 
of variables at the 5% and 10% levels. 
                                                 
59 Koksal (2005a) provides some evidence that the specialists also use posted quotes to manage their 
inventories. 
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 Similar to the previous case, the specialist revises his belief about the stock value by 
using the “Cumulative Order Imbalance”. The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated 
with cumulative order imbalance is 2.67%. Therefore, if the buy (sell) volume relative to 
the sell (buy) volume has been higher, the specialist increases the probability of 
participating to a trade when a market sell (buy) order arrives, to minimize his losses and 
make profits. 
 The “Excess Spread” has the most significant impact on specialist’s choice of 
undercutting the LOB. The impulse sensitivity of Strategy 3 associated with excess 
spread is 10.85%. This number is almost twice high as that of the same impulse 
sensitivity in the previous quote case. Since the size of a, say, market sell order is less 
than the corresponding bid size in the posted quotes coming from the LOB, when the 
specialist trades with this market sell, and the prices move against him, he does not need 
to be on the contra side of upcoming market sells until the liquidity on the buy side of the 
LOB is exhausted. This is a type of quote-matching strategy discussed in Section1. On 
the other hand, the reason why the specialists are more aggressive when the spread is 
large might be the price smoothing obligation of the specialists. They may be improving 
the price to smooth the prices which otherwise would be more volatile because of the 
large spread. 
 The effect of an increase in both the total asymmetry and the asymmetry close to 
best limit prices in the LOB is an increase in the probability of specialist being more 
aggressive. Since the LOB asymmetry may be informative for the future price 
movements as shown by Koksal (2004), and Harris and Panchapagesan (2003), the 
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specialist increases the probability of being more aggressive if he can step in front of the 
heavy side of the LOB. 
 Similar to the previous case, the specialist is less likely to take the contra side of a 
marketable limit order because since the price is fixed it might be less profitable to trade 
with this order. 
 The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated with specialist’s inventory is 2.78% 
indicating that the specialist increases the probability of participating to a trade that will 
restore his inventory. Interestingly, this change in probability of choosing strategy3 is 
almost equal to the combined impulse sensitivity of the strategies 2 and 3 (which is 
2.74%) associated with the specialist’s inventory in quote case 1a. In the previous quote 
case, since the size of the incoming market order is large enough, the specialist can 
distribute his probability of participating to this trade to strategies 2 and 3. 
 The impulse sensitivity of the strategy 3 associated with “Relative Order Size” is 
negative, i.e., as the relative size of the market order increases the specialist decreases the 
probability of being aggressive.  In the previous quote case, the size of the market order is 
greater than the posted depth coming from the LOB. Therefore, the size of the market 
order is relatively larger than the market order in this quote case. Accordingly, the 
specialist is more aggressive in not participating to a trade with the arriving market order 
in quote case 1 when compared to quote case2. 
 
Case 3: SB > 0; LB > 0; MS > LB   or   SA > 0; LA > 0; MB > LA    
 Table 5 reports the results for quote case 5. This case is similar to case 1 except, the 
specialist has some depth in the posted quotes now. The specialist’s positive depth in the 
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posted bid (ask) quotes indicates that he is trying to increase (decrease) his holdings of 
the stocks. Accordingly, we can expect that, when compared to quote case 1, the 
specialist will be more aggressive, i.e., undercut the LOB, while participating to trades 
with upcoming market orders. This conjecture is indeed correct. For example, the 
impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated with “Cumulative Order Imbalance” for quote 
case 3 is 5.45%, which is more than twice as much as the combined impulse sensitivity 
for the same variable in quote case 1. Similar finding is true for the impulse sensitivity of 
strategy 3 for the “Excess Spread”. The impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 associated with 
the excess spread in quote case 3 is 21.73%, whereas the same number for quote case 1 is 
only 5.54%. 
 As the relative market order size increases by one standard deviation, the 
probability of choosing strategy 2 (base case) increases by 9.31%. This increase is similar 
to the previous quote cases, where the specialist increases the probability of not 
participating as a result of an increase in relative order size. In quote case 3, however, 
strategy 1 is not an available strategy; hence the specialist increases the probability of the 
most defensive strategy that he can choose, i.e., strategy 2. 
 The impulse sensitivities associated with the asymmetry in the LOB is consistent 
with the previous quote cases. The results suggest that the specialist has some tendency to 
increase the probability that he participates to a trade, if he can trade in front of the heavy 
side of the LOB.   
 The inventory effect is more apparent in this quote case. The impulse sensitivity of 
strategy 3 related to specialist’s inventory is 4.14%. As discussed above, in this quote 
case, the positive depth coming from the specialist in the posted quotes might be an 
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indication that the specialist wants to trade. If this depth is related to inventory concerns, 
we would expect to see that the specialist would be more aggressive in taking the other 
side of the incoming market order, which is the case here. 
 
Case 4: SB > 0; LB > 0; MS ≤ LB   or   SA > 0; LA > 0; MB ≤ LA    
 Case 4 is very similar to Case 2, in that the strategies available to the specialist are 
same. Since the size of the arriving market order is less then the depth coming from the 
LOB, the positive depth that the specialist adds is not very relevant. If he would like to 
trade, he has to undercut the LOB. There is one difference, however, similar to the 
difference between quote cases 1 and 3. The positive specialist depth in the quotes 
indicates that the specialist wants or needs to trade. To increase the probability that he 
trades, he adds some depth in the relevant side of the posted depth. Accordingly, we 
expect that the specialist will be more aggressive in participating to the trades in quote 
case 4, when compared to the quote case 2. The results reported in Table 6 are similar, 
however, suggesting that these two quote cases are similar to each other. 
 
5.1.1. Trading Volume Effects 
 There is considerable heterogeneity across stocks as reflected by distribution of 
estimated coefficients (not reported). Previous literature (e.g. Easley and et al. (1996)) 
finds that the specialists handle frequently traded stocks and infrequently traded stocks 
differently. The services of the specialists are mostly needed in thinly traded stocks. In 
their analysis of posted quote changes, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) find that there 
exist significant differences between high- and low-volume stocks.  
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 To investigate the effect of volume on the strategy of the specialist, we divide the 
stocks in our sample into two volume categories based on average daily volume. If the 
average daily volume of a stock is greater than the median, it is considered a high-volume 
stock; otherwise it is a low-volume stock. The results are presented in Table 7. We report 
and discuss the impulse sensitivities only. 
 The impulse sensitivity of the strategy 3 associated to the “Cumulative Order 
Imbalance” is higher for low volume stocks for all quote cases except for quote case 3. 
The effect of this variable is higher for low volume stocks, possibly because order 
imbalance carries more information for illiquid stocks. 
 The effect of “Excess Spread” is higher for high volume stocks for quote cases 1 
and 3, where the size of the market order is greater than the LOB depth in the posted 
quotes, and higher for low volume stocks for quote cases 2 and 4, where the size of the 
market order is less than the LOB depth in the posted quotes. This result has two 
implications. First, the specialist has more information than anyone about an illiquid 
stock that he oversees, because infrequently traded stocks are not closely followed by 
investors. In addition, the depth coming from the LOB for illiquid stocks is generally 
low, resulting in higher frequency of undercutting the LOB by the specialists consistent 
with their market making obligations to maintain price continuity. 
 In all four quote cases, the impulse sensitivity of undercutting the LOB associated 
with the specialist’s inventory is higher for low volume stocks. Specialists increase the 
probability of undercutting the LOB more for low volume stocks if the trade would 
restore their inventories because inventory management is more difficult for illiquid 
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stocks. Therefore, whenever they get the chance, they aggressively try to restore their 
inventory. 
 
5.1.2. Trading Price Effects 
Trading price of a stock can be important for the specialists because for the same number 
of shares, they have to use more capital for high-price stocks. Also, relative tick size, as 
defined by the ratio of the tick size to stock price, is smaller for the high-price stocks 
making the public order precedence rule less binding. In their analysis of specialist profits 
and the tick size, Coughenour and Harris (2003) find that after the decimalization, 
participation rates and high frequency trading profits increased for specialists handling 
low-price stocks. 
 To see if the strategies of the specialists depend on the price of the stocks, we divide 
the stocks into two price categories. If the mean price of a stock is greater than the 
median, it is in the high-price category; otherwise it is in the low-price category. Table 8 
reports the mean impulse sensitivities according to the price categories. 
 The effect of inventory on choosing strategy 3 is higher for low-price stocks. This 
implies that the specialists might be concerned more about the dollar value of their 
inventories. Since they have to trade more for low-price stocks to restore their inventories 
in dollar terms, the impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 related to inventory is higher for low-
price stocks. 
 A similar effect can be seen in the impulse sensitivity of strategy 3 related to 
“Cumulative Order Imbalance”. It is higher for low-price stocks, because higher number 
of shares is required to implement a particular trading strategy. 
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5.2. Cross Sectional Analysis 
 Table 9 presents the coefficient estimates of our cross sectional regression analysis. 
Coefficient of relative tick is negative and significant. Specialist participation to the 
trades increases as stock price increases. Hence, consistent with Seppi (1997), specialists 
participation increases for high price stocks because undercutting the LOB is less costly.  
 Estimated coefficient of the “Percentage Quoted Spread” provides a related result. 
As the percentage spread increases, the specialist has more price points to choose from, 
and accordingly his participation increases.  
 
5.3. Are the participation strategies of the specialists to the trades informative 
about future price changes? 
By using the TORQ database, Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) show that the LOB is 
informative about the future price movements, and that specialists use this information 
while making trading decisions. During the period of TORQ database the tick size was 
equal to $1/8, and after decimalization the strategies of the specialists have changed 
considerably.60  
 We use a direct method to test if the specialist’s trades are informative about future 
price changes. Specifically, we estimate the following model by using OLS for each 
security i and for each side of the market (i.e. buy-side and sell-side): 
titiiktiiikti SpPartRR ,,,,,, εββα +++= −+ 10  (2) 
where subscript t  denotes arrival time of the market order, ktiR +,  is the transaction price 
return in basis points over k  periods starting at time t , ktiR −,  is the transaction price 
                                                 
60 See Coughenour and Harris (2003). 
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return in basis points over k  periods ending at time t , tiSpPart ,  is a signed dummy 
variable that is equal to 1, if the specialist chooses strategy 2 or 3 for case 1, and is equal 
to 1 if the specialist chooses strategy 3 for cases 2, 3 and 4, and zero otherwise, and it is 
multiplied by -1 if the incoming market order is a buy order and ti ,ε  is the random error 
term. The definition of tiSpPart ,  implies that, a positive estimated coefficient indicates a 
correct prediction of the future returns by the specialist. k  equals 5 minutes, 1 hour or 1 
day. The model captures the predictive power of the trades that the specialists have 
participated over different time horizons. We include the lagged return to model return 
mean reversion in short horizon transaction price returns documented in the previous 
literature. 
 Table 10 reports the results from estimating equation (2) for all quote cases. For the 
first three quote cases, interestingly, the number of correct predictions increases as the 
time horizon increases except for Case 4. The highest percentage of success for 
predicting future returns is for quote case 4, short-term (5 minutes) returns. The specialist 
has positive depth in the posted quotes for this case, which might be an indication that the 
specialist has already predicted the direction of future price changes and added depth to 
the relevant side of the posted quote.61 In addition, the size of the market order is less 
then the depth coming from the LOB. So the specialist has to undercut the LOB if he 
wants to trade. Therefore, if the specialist has some depth in the current posted quotes 
and if he undercuts the LOB to be able to trade with coming market order, probably he 
has some strong predictions about the direction of short-term price changes.  
                                                 
61 Koksal (2005a) shows that the participation of specialists in the posted quotes has some predictive power 
over future stock returns, this power being stronger for short-term returns. 
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 Overall, the specialists are not very successful in predicting future returns. Panel B 
of Table 10 shows that, overall success of specialist in predicting future returns is around 
50%. Some specialists, however, are more successful in predicting future returns than 
others. The results from individual regressions (not reported) show that there are some 
specialists who can predict the future returns correctly over all time horizons. 
6. Conclusion 
Using 2001 NYSE system order data in the decimal pricing environment, we analyze 
how the specialists react to the changes in market variables while making participation 
decisions to the trades. We analyze the following options that are available to the 
specialist before he trades: don’t participate; participate at the quoted price; participate 
and improve the price. We find that the specialist uses information in the limit order book 
as summarized by the limit order book asymmetry. The specialist is more likely to 
participate to a trade with an arriving market order, if he can step in front of the LOB. If 
the relative size of the market order, as described by the ratio of the market order size to 
the posted depth at the relevant side of the market, is high, the specialist chooses not to 
participate and let the market order trade with the limit order book. Consistent with the 
theoretical results in the previous literature, specialists trade more aggressively when the 
spread is large. We find that specialist trading strategies in stocks from different volume 
and price categories vary substantially. Finally, there is evidence that the specialists trade 
selectively to manage their inventories. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Percentage participation by the NYSE specialists to the posted quotes 
     
This table reports the percentage of bid side and ask side position of the specialists for the 
stocks in our sample according to volume and price categories. If mean daily volume (mean 
price) of a stock is higher than the median, then it is in "high" category, otherwise it is in "low" 
category. The three possible cases for the posted quotes are: LOB alone, LOB+Specialist, and 
Specialist alone. SA and SB denotes the depth contributed by the specialist to the posted bid and 
ask quotes, respectively. Similarly, LA and LB denotes the depth contributed by the LOB to the 
posted bid and ask quotes, respectively.  The numbers in the rows sum up to 100% subject to 
rounding error.  
    
    
    
Volume Categories LOB Alone LOB+Specialist Specialist Alone 
Bid-Side of the posted quotes SB=0; LB>0 SB>0; LB>0 SB>0; LB=0 
High 76.98 7.48 15.54 
Low 64.61 3.61 31.78 
    
Ask-Side of the posted quotes SA=0; LA>0 SA>0; LA=0 SA>0; LA=0 
High 71.34 9.71 18.95 
Low 66.58 3.57 29.85 
    
    
Price Categories LOB Alone LOB+Specialist Specialist Alone 
Bid-Side of the posted quotes (SB=0; LB>0) (SB>0; LB>0) (SB>0; LB=0) 
High 71.93 6.96 21.11 
Low 80.28 6.49 13.23 
    
Ask-Side of the posted quotes SA=0; LA>0 SA>0; LA=0 SA>0; LA=0 
High 65.47 10.01 24.51 
Low 80.04 6.02 13.93 
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Table 2. Specialist's available choices for different cases.  
    
This table reports possible quote cases at the time a market sell (buy) order of size MS (MB) 
arrives to the specialist. SB and LB are the contributions to the posted depth from the specialist 
and limit order book, respectively (similar for posted ask). Possible strategies of the specialist 
are 1 (Do not participate), 2 (Participate at the quoted price), and 3 (Participate and improve 
the price) depending on the quote condition. 
    
  Possible Decisions  
Posted Bid Depth Size  = SB+LB 1. Do not participate.  
Posted Ask Depth Size = SA+LA 2. Participate at the quoted price.  
  3. Participate and improve the price.  
    
Bid Side Quote Condition Case 
Size of the Incoming  
Market Sell (MS) 
Possible  
Decisions 
1 MS > LB 1,2,3 SB=0; LB>0 
2 MS ≤ LB 1,3 
3 MS > LB 2,3 SB>0; LB>0 
4 MS ≤ LB 1,3 
5 MS > SB No Decision SB>0; LB=0 
6 MS ≤ SB No Decision 
    
Ask Side Quote Condition Case 
Size of the Incoming  
Market Buy (MB) 
Possible  
Decisions 
1 MB > LA 1,2,3 SA=0; LA>0 
2 MB ≤ LA 1,3 
3 MB > LA 2,3 SA>0; LA>0 
4 MB ≤ LA 1,3 
5 MB > SA No Decision SA>0; LA=0 
6 MB ≤ SA No Decision 
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Table 3. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for Quote Case 1 
      
In Panel A, we report the mean of estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that converged. 
In Panel B, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of an 
event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable. Available strategies of 
the specialist are as follows: 1 (Do not participate), 2 (Participate at the quoted price), and 3 
(Participate and improve the price). Overall significance in Panel A comes from "Type III Analysis 
of Effects" table produced by SAS logistic regression which gives the Wald Chi-square statistic for 
the effect of an explanatory variable.  Overall significance columns report the percentage of 
significant variables at the stated levels of significance. All coefficient estimates for explanatory 
variables with a * are multiplied by 100000. Strategy 1 is the base case. Significance column in 
Panel B reports the percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of significance. Panel 
C reports the percentage of negative and positive significant coefficients. 
      
Panel A. Mean Regression Coefficient Estimates   
      
  Strategies 
Overall  
Significance (%)  
Exogenous Variables Str2 Str3 5% sig. 10% sig.  
Cumulative Order Imbalance* 2.455 3.441 15.05 24.73  
Excess Spread 0.019 0.194 82.80 83.87  
Medium Trade Dummy -0.263 -0.522 19.35 32.26  
Trade Idle Time -0.026 -0.130 10.75 17.20  
Relative Order Size -0.314 -0.603 69.89 78.49  
LOB Asymmetry* 0.022 -0.005 15.05 21.51  
Near LOB Asymmetry* -0.201 0.112 6.45 8.60  
Order Type Dummy 0.308 -0.281 20.43 29.03  
Specialist's Inventory* 0.229 0.807 23.66 33.33  
Volatility -0.034 -1.817 9.68 20.43  
 
Panel B. Mean Impulse Sensitivities (%)      
       
  Available Strategies Significance (%) 
Exogenous Variables Str1 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str2 Str3 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -2.62 0.83 1.83 94.57 91.30 94.57
Excess Spread -5.07 -0.35 5.54 96.74 90.22 98.91
Medium Trade Dummy 1.23 -0.95 -0.29 94.57 96.74 89.13
Trade Idle Time -0.36 0.42 -0.05 94.57 94.57 94.57
Relative Order Size 6.27 -4.17 -2.15 96.74 96.74 93.48
LOB Asymmetry -0.72 0.38 0.35 91.30 92.39 91.30
Near LOB Asymmetry -0.83 0.59 0.24 94.57 92.39 86.96
Order Type Dummy -2.23 2.60 -0.38 93.48 94.57 94.57
Specialist's Inventory -2.70 1.04 1.70 95.65 91.30 94.57
Volatility 0.22 0.02 -0.25 96.74 94.57 94.57
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Panel C. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages   
       
 Str1 Str2 Str3 
Exogenous Variables Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 72.41 27.59 44.05 55.95 29.89 70.11
Excess Spread 92.13 7.87 54.22 45.78 2.2 97.8
Medium Trade Dummy 31.03 68.97 66.29 33.71 64.63 35.37
Trade Idle Time 63.22 36.78 39.08 60.92 45.98 54.02
Relative Order Size 0 100 91.01 8.99 96.51 3.49
LOB Asymmetry 50 50 51.76 48.24 53.57 46.43
Near LOB Asymmetry 63.22 36.78 37.65 62.35 48.75 51.25
Order Type Dummy 68.6 31.4 22.99 77.01 70.11 29.89
Specialist's Inventory 75 25 34.52 65.48 37.93 62.07
Volatility 33.71 66.29 63.22 36.78 58.62 41.38
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103
Table 4. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for  
Quote Case 2 
     
In Panel A, we report the mean of estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that 
converged. In Panel B, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change 
in the probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the 
explanatory variable. Available strategies of the specialist are as follows: 1 (Do not 
participate), and 3 (Participate and improve the price). Overall significance in Panel A 
comes from "Type III Analysis of Effects" table produced by SAS logistic regression 
which gives the Wald Chi-square statistic for the effect of an explanatory variable.  
Overall significance columns report the percentage of significant variables at the stated 
levels of significance. All coefficient estimates for explanatory variables with a * are 
multiplied by 100000. Strategy 1 is the base case. Significance column in Panel B 
reports the percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of significance. 
     
Panel A. Mean Regression Coefficient Estimates  
     
 Strategies Significance (%)  
Exogenous Variables Str3 5% sig. 10% sig.  
Cumulative Order Imbalance* 5.17 24.55 32.73  
Excess Spread 0.16 91.82 91.82  
Medium Trade Dummy -0.34 35.45 40.00  
Trade Idle Time 0.15 34.55 46.36  
Relative Order Size -0.13 51.82 58.18  
LOB Asymmetry* -0.15 30.00 35.45  
Near LOB Asymmetry* 0.12 16.36 20.91  
Order Type Dummy -0.34 25.45 32.73  
Specialist's Inventory* 1.30 35.45 45.45  
Volatility -0.19 25.45 32.73  
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Panel B. Mean Impulse Sensitivities (%)   
     
  Available Strategies Significance ( 5 % ) 
Exogenous Variables Str1 Str3 Str1 Str3 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -2.67 2.67 96.33 96.33
Excess Spread -10.85 10.85 99.08 99.08
Medium Trade Dummy 0.84 -0.84 94.50 94.50
Trade Idle Time -1.46 1.46 100.00 100.00
Relative Order Size 2.28 -2.28 98.17 98.17
LOB Asymmetry 0.55 -0.55 97.25 97.25
Near LOB Asymmetry -0.66 0.66 97.25 97.25
Order Type Dummy 0.85 -0.85 95.41 95.41
Specialist's Inventory -2.78 2.78 95.41 95.41
Volatility 0.42 -0.42 99.08 99.08
     
     
Panel C. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages  
     
 Str1 Str3 
Exogoneous Variables Neg Pos Neg Pos 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 78.1 21.9 21.9 78.1
Excess Spread 98.15 1.85 1.85 98.15
Medium Trade Dummy 43.69 56.31 56.31 43.69
Trade Idle Time 85.85 14.15 14.15 85.85
Relative Order Size 12.84 87.16 87.16 12.84
LOB Asymmetry 43.93 56.07 56.07 43.93
Near LOB Asymmetry 47.17 52.83 52.83 47.17
Order Type Dummy 23.08 76.92 76.92 23.08
Specialist's Inventory 68.27 31.73 31.73 68.27
Volatility 41.67 58.33 58.33 41.67
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Table 5. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for  
Quote Case 3 
     
In Panel A, we report the mean of estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that 
converged. In Panel B, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in 
the probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory 
variable. Available strategies of the specialist are as follows: 2 (Participate at the quoted 
price), and 3 (Participate and improve the price). Overall significance in Panel A comes 
from "Type III Analysis of Effects" table produced by SAS logistic regression, which gives 
the Wald Chi-square statistic for the effect of an explanatory variable.  Overall significance 
columns report the percentage of significant variables at the stated levels of significance. 
All coefficient estimates for explanatory variables with a * are multiplied by 100000. 
Strategy 2 is the base case. Significance column in Panel B reports the percentage of 
significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of significance. 
     
Panel A. Mean Regression Coefficient Estimates  
     
Specialist Buy (Market Sell) Strategies Significance (%)  
Exogenous Variables Str3 5% sig. 10% sig.  
Cumulative Order Imbalance* 1.64 16.39 22.95  
Excess Spread 0.33 77.05 80.33  
Medium Trade Dummy 0.11 6.56 14.75  
Trade Idle Time -0.02 4.92 11.48  
Relative Order Size -0.75 50.82 62.30  
LOB Asymmetry* 0.02 9.84 16.39  
Near LOB Asymmetry* 0.03 9.84 18.03  
Order Type Dummy -0.68 16.39 26.23  
Specialist's Inventory* 0.40 4.92 13.11  
Volatility 0.01 13.11 19.67  
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Table 5. cont'd  
     
     
     
Panel B. Mean Impulse Sensitivities (%)   
     
  Available Strategies 
Significance  
( 5 % ) 
Exogenous Variables Str2 Str3 Str2 Str3 
Cumulative Order 
Imbalance -5.45 5.45 93.44 93.44 
Excess Spread -21.73 21.73 93.44 93.44 
Medium Trade Dummy -2.08 2.08 91.80 91.80 
Trade Idle Time -1.38 1.38 91.80 91.80 
Relative Order Size 9.31 -9.31 86.89 86.89 
LOB Asymmetry -3.06 3.06 85.25 85.25 
Near LOB Asymmetry -1.08 1.08 88.52 88.52 
Order Type Dummy 3.63 -3.63 86.89 86.89 
Specialist's Inventory -4.14 4.14 83.61 83.61 
Volatility -1.91 1.91 90.16 90.16 
     
     
Panel C. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages 
     
 Str2 Str3 
Exogoneous Variables Neg Pos Neg Pos 
Cumulative Order 
Imbalance 
64.91 35.09 35.09 64.91 
Excess Spread 100 0 0 100 
Medium Trade Dummy 57.14 42.86 42.86 57.14 
Trade Idle Time 44.44 55.56 55.56 44.44 
Relative Order Size 3.57 96.43 96.43 3.57 
LOB Asymmetry 56.6 43.4 43.4 56.6 
Near LOB Asymmetry 44.23 55.77 55.77 44.23 
Order Type Dummy 26.42 73.58 73.58 26.42 
Specialist's Inventory 62.75 37.25 37.25 62.75 
Volatility 36.36 63.64 63.64 36.36 
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Table 6. Multinominal Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation for  
Quote Case 4 
      
In Panel A, we report the mean of estimated coefficients from logistic regressions that 
converged. In Panel B, we report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the 
probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable. 
Available strategies of the specialist are as follows: 1 (Do not participate), and 3 (Participate and 
improve the price). Overall significance in Panel A comes from "Type III Analysis of Effects" table 
produced by SAS logistic regression which gives the Wald Chi-square statistic for the effect of an 
explanatory variable.  Overall significance columns report the percentage of significant variables 
at the stated levels of significance. All coefficient estimates for explanatory variables with a * are 
multiplied by 100000. Strategy 1 is the base case. Significance column in Panel B reports the 
percentage of significant impulse sensitivities at 5% level of significance.case 
      
Panel A. Mean Regression Coefficient Estimates   
      
Specialist Buy (Market Sell) Strategies Significance (%)   
Exogenous Variables Str3 5% sig. 10% sig.   
Cumulative Order Imbalance* 4.32 14.49 26.09   
Excess Spread 0.23 62.32 75.36   
Medium Trade Dummy -0.13 11.59 20.29   
Trade Idle Time -0.03 11.59 14.49   
Relative Order Size 0.48 26.09 36.23   
LOB Asymmetry* 0.05 11.59 20.29   
Near LOB Asymmetry* -0.11 13.04 15.94   
Order Type Dummy -0.14 14.49 21.74   
Specialist's Inventory* 1.90 14.49 20.29   
Volatility -3.54 17.39 24.64   
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Table 6. cont'd  
     
     
     
Panel B. Mean Impulse Sensitivities (%)   
     
  
Available 
Strategies 
Significance  
( 5 % ) 
Exogenous Variables Str1 Str3 Str1 Str3 
Cumulative Order Imbalance -1.74 1.74 91.18 91.18 
Excess Spread -6.59 6.59 94.12 94.12 
Medium Trade Dummy 0.57 -0.57 91.18 91.18 
Trade Idle Time -0.57 0.57 92.65 92.65 
Relative Order Size -2.97 2.97 83.82 83.82 
LOB Asymmetry -1.51 1.51 85.29 85.29 
Near LOB Asymmetry -1.62 1.62 91.18 91.18 
Order Type Dummy -0.23 0.23 97.06 97.06 
Specialist's Inventory -0.65 0.65 91.18 91.18 
Volatility 1.32 -1.32 89.71 89.71 
     
     
Panel C. Signs of Significant Impulse Sensitivities in Percentages 
     
 Str1 Str3 
Exogenous Variables Neg Pos Neg Pos 
Cumulative Order Imbalance 69.35 30.65 30.65 69.35 
Excess Spread 98.44 1.56 1.56 98.44 
Medium Trade Dummy 41.94 58.06 58.06 41.94 
Trade Idle Time 67.74 32.26 32.26 67.74 
Relative Order Size 73.02 26.98 26.98 73.02 
LOB Asymmetry 54.39 45.61 45.61 54.39 
Near LOB Asymmetry 60.34 39.66 39.66 60.34 
Order Type Dummy 31.82 68.18 68.18 31.82 
Specialist's Inventory 51.61 48.39 48.39 51.61 
Volatility 22.95 77.05 77.05 22.95 
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Variable
Vol.
Cat. Str1 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3
H -1.59 0.47 1.13 -2.16 2.16 -5.76 5.76 -1.10 1.10
L -3.84 -0.18 4.02 -3.58 3.58 -1.98 1.98 -4.72 4.72
H -4.15 -1.67 5.82 -8.82 8.82 -22.46 22.46 -5.84 5.84
L -7.98 3.30 4.68 -14.48 14.48 -13.60 13.60 -10.11 10.11
H 0.58 -0.43 -0.15 -0.30 0.30 -2.33 2.33 0.03 -0.03
L 2.61 -1.88 -0.72 2.87 -2.87 0.74 -0.74 3.12 -3.12
H 5.55 -3.24 -2.31 1.64 -1.64 9.50 -9.50 -1.83 1.83
L 9.00 -7.37 -1.62 3.44 -3.44 7.15 -7.15 -8.32 8.32
H -0.52 0.10 0.42 -0.48 0.48 -2.78 2.78 -1.93 1.93
L 1.20 -1.31 0.11 2.41 -2.41 -6.17 6.17 0.45 -0.45
H -0.85 0.69 0.17 0.26 -0.26 -0.88 0.88 -0.25 0.25
L -1.60 1.12 0.48 -2.31 2.31 -3.36 3.36 -8.02 8.02
H -0.70 0.64 0.06 -1.56 1.56 -1.75 1.75 -0.72 0.72
L -0.10 0.51 -0.41 -1.26 1.26 2.79 -2.79 0.15 -0.15
H -1.49 1.96 -0.47 0.84 -0.84 3.83 -3.83 0.53 -0.53
L -4.50 4.59 -0.08 0.88 -0.88 1.41 -1.41 -3.77 3.77
H -3.08 1.58 1.49 -1.40 1.40 -3.96 3.96 -0.44 0.44
L -1.94 -0.38 2.32 -5.27 5.27 -6.23 6.23 -1.61 1.61
H 1.87 -1.54 -0.32 1.22 -1.22 -2.63 2.63 0.70 -0.70
L -1.13 1.15 -0.03 -1.02 1.02 6.21 -6.21 4.21 -4.21
This table reports report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the
probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable
from logistic regressions that converged for all quote cases by volume categories. If mean
daily volume of a stock is above the median, then it is in the high-volume category, otherwise
it is in the low-volume category. 
Quote 
Case 1
Relative Order
Size
Quote 
Case 2
Quote 
Case 3
Quote 
Case 4
Volatility
Medium Trade
Dummy
Near LOB
Asymmetry
Table 7. Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation according to volume 
categories
Trade Idle
Time
Order Type
Dummy
Specialist's
Inventory
LOB Asymmetry
Cumulative Order
Imbalance
Excess Spread
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Variable
Price.
Cat. Str1 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3 Str2 Str3 Str1 Str3
H -1.75 0.65 1.10 -1.95 1.95 -1.58 1.58 -1.70 1.70
L -2.65 -0.14 2.80 -3.49 3.49 -11.41 11.41 -1.80 1.80
H -5.10 -1.19 6.29 -10.42 10.42 -22.35 22.35 -6.38 6.38
L -5.06 0.50 4.56 -11.34 11.34 -20.77 20.77 -6.96 6.96
H 0.52 -0.48 -0.04 0.38 -0.38 -3.45 3.45 0.65 -0.65
L 1.80 -1.18 -0.62 1.35 -1.35 0.04 -0.04 0.43 -0.43
H 5.73 -3.32 -2.41 1.49 -1.49 9.31 -9.31 -2.59 2.59
L 7.27 -5.47 -1.80 3.19 -3.19 9.31 -9.31 -3.63 3.63
H -0.36 -0.30 0.66 0.21 -0.21 -3.70 3.70 -0.14 0.14
L 0.23 -0.18 -0.06 0.94 -0.94 -2.07 2.07 -3.87 3.87
H -0.87 0.65 0.21 -0.38 0.38 0.03 -0.03 -1.33 1.33
L -1.25 0.97 0.28 -0.97 0.97 -2.80 2.80 -2.12 2.12
H -0.36 0.45 -0.10 -1.58 1.58 -0.20 0.20 -1.06 1.06
L -0.82 0.81 0.00 -1.31 1.31 -3.19 3.19 0.27 -0.27
H -2.10 2.51 -0.41 0.50 -0.50 2.51 -2.51 -0.35 0.35
L -2.39 2.72 -0.33 1.26 -1.26 5.37 -5.37 -0.02 0.02
H -2.22 1.04 1.18 -2.32 2.32 -0.07 0.07 -1.00 1.00
L -3.56 1.19 2.37 -3.31 3.31 -10.42 10.42 -0.05 0.05
H 1.55 -1.22 -0.34 0.65 -0.65 -1.38 1.38 1.31 -1.31
L 0.59 -0.45 -0.14 0.15 -0.15 -2.72 2.72 1.34 -1.34
Relative Order
Size
Volatility
Medium Trade
Dummy
Near LOB
Asymmetry
Trade Idle
Time
Order Type
Dummy
Specialist's
Inventory
LOB Asymmetry
Table 8. Logit Model Results for stock by stock estimation according to price categories
Cumulative Order
Imbalance
Excess Spread
This table reports report the mean impulse sensitivities defined as the change in the probability of
an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable from logistic
regressions that converged for all quote cases by price categories. If mean daily price of a stock
is above the median, then it is in the high-price category, otherwise it is in the low-price category. 
Quote 
Case 1
Quote 
Case 2
Quote 
Case 3
Quote 
Case 4
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Table 9. OLS Results from Cross-sectional Regression of Specialist Participation 
This table reports results from estimation of equation 1. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. Dependent variable is the percentage of trades that the specialist has 
chosen strategy 2 (participate at the quoted price) or strategy 3 (participate at the 
improved price). 
    
    
Exogenous Variables Coefficients   
Intercept 0.480 **  
 (0.099)   
Log Mean Daily Volume -0.016   
 (0.016)   
Log Market Capitalization 0.004   
 (0.013)   
Relative Tick -14.103 *  
 (7.916)   
Volatility (Std. Dev. of Transaction Prices) -0.064   
 (0.045)   
Average Percentage Quoted Spread 6.738 **  
  (2.703)    
    
Sample Size 114   
Adj R2 0.28    
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Panel A. Distiribution of the coefficient estimates
Mean
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. Mean
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. Mean
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos. Mean
Std. 
Error Neg. Pos.
Variables
Intercept -0.79 5.34 63 48 -0.74 4.94 55 62 0.13 5.59 38 50 -2.55 9.41 57 31
Lagged Return 0.03 0.19 52 59 0.03 0.15 46 71 0.00 0.27 46 42 0.11 1.04 43 45
Specialist Participation -1.32 7.62 62 49 -1.06 5.96 64 53 -0.62 15.36 51 37 2.86 9.56 30 58
Intercept -7.99 30.43 71 49 -8.64 31.82 74 57 -11.26 36.14 58 31 -14.49 35.00 61 25
Lagged Return -0.03 0.19 68 52 -0.03 0.19 78 53 -0.06 0.22 55 34 -0.02 0.21 45 41
Specialist Participation -0.68 36.14 62 58 -1.37 24.56 64 67 11.20 82.87 43 46 5.68 32.17 37 49
Intercept -6.97 166.86 52 72 -8.97 159.42 51 81 -25.76 219.75 40 49 -17.07 173.25 39 49
Lagged Return -0.16 0.28 89 35 -0.15 0.24 98 34 -0.23 0.28 70 19 -0.24 0.28 71 17
Specialist Participation -5.14 119.83 57 67 -2.71 61.01 58 74 21.41 139.99 40 49 10.94 105.26 41 47
Panel B. Percentage of correct predictions 
k QC1 QC2 QC3 QC4
5 minutes 44% 45% 42% 66%
1 hour 48% 51% 52% 57%
1 day 54% 56% 55% 53%
Quote Case 4
k = 5 minutes
k = 1 hour
k = 1 day
Quote Case 3
k = 5 minutes
k = 1 hour
k = 1 day
k = 5 minutes
k = 1 hour
k = 1 day
Table 10. Time Series Regression of Future Returns
Quote Case 1
Panel A reports results from estimation of equation 2 for each of the 148 stocks in our sample. For each future return regression (k=5
minutes, 1 hour, or 1 day), mean and standard error of all coefficient estimates across stocks are reported. The last two columns report the
number of significant positive and negative coefficients. A positive coefficient of specialist participation to the trades indicates that the
specialist predicts the future return correctly. Panel B reports the percentage of correct predictions for each quote case.
Quote Case 2
k = 5 minutes
k = 1 hour
k = 1 day
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Symbol
Data
Period Symbol
Data
Period Symbol
Data 
Period Symbol
Data
Period
AIG x FMO xx MRK x SZ xx
ALS xx FNM x MU x T x
AOT xx FOE xx MWC xx TGT x
AP xx FTD xx MWD x TLM PRB xx
AVB xx MXE xx TMK x
AXP x GGT PR xx NAP xx TRP xx
AXP PRA xx GLW x NKE x TYC x
BAC x GNA xx NOK x UBT xx
BBV xx GPS x NPC xx UDS x
BK x GPT x NR xx UMG PRY xx
BKE xx GRP xx NUI xx USI xx
BPL xx GX x OFG xx VIAB x
BRM xx HD x OMX xx VOD x
BZL xx HI PRT xx ONE x VTP xx
C x HIF xx OUI xx WB x
CB x HPT xx PBR xx WFC x
CBA xx HRC x PCG x WMK xx
CHH xx HWP x PCS x WMS xx
CLP PRA xx IBM x PFE x WMT x
CM xx IMY xx PFP xx XOM x
CMS x IRT xx PNK xx XRX x
CNC x JBL x PP xx ZNH xx
CPN x JPM x PST PRA xx ZNT xx
CQB PRA xx JPM PRC xx PTM xx ZQK xx
CSD PRA xx JW B xx Q x ZTR xx
CUZ xx KGC xx RI xx
CWF xx KM x RKY x
DIS x KWD xx ROM PR xx
DL xx LMGA x SBC x
DRE xx LNC PRG xx SBP PRA xx
DRE PRA xx LNC PRY xx SCH x
DUC xx LTD x SGP x
EIX x MC xx SJI xx
ELY x MCD x SJR xx
ENE PRT xx MER x SKO xx
EQT x MIJ xx SLR x
F x MKT xx SQM A xx
FCP xx MO x SSS PRB xx
FIG PRA xx MOT x SUS xx
x : 04/02/2001 - 04/06/2001
xx: 04/02/2001 - 06/29/2001
Appendix A
Information about the sample that consists of 143 stocks we employ to compare 
specialist strategies. 
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Chapter 3 
Differences in Performances and Strategies of the Individual NYSE 
Specialists  
Abstract 
This paper shows that there exist differences in the performances of individual specialists 
in terms of the execution costs and participation strategies to the posted quotes and 
trades. We find that quoted and effective spreads, quoted depth, order-imbalance halt use 
and number of trades that receive price improvement differ significantly across individual 
specialists. The explanatory power of the model as measured by adjusted R2 increases 
when we include the individual specialist dummies. Evidence suggests that differences 
across specialist firms documented in the previous literature are largely due to the 
differences in individual specialists. Similar to Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997) who 
study the NYSE in 1993, we find evidence for a subsidy from active stocks to inactive 
stocks in 2001. We find that, as the trading frequency increases, order processing costs 
increase for both the specialist firms and individual specialist portfolios which implies 
that profits from active stocks subsidize inactive stocks. We also show that individual 
NYSE specialists differ significantly in their participation strategies to the posted quotes 
and trades. This suggests that there are significant differences in execution costs (spreads, 
depths, etc.) between specialists because they use different strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialists are responsible for making 
markets for the stocks assigned to them. Their primary obligation is to ensure that there 
exists a fair and orderly market in their stocks. They should be willing to trade when 
other traders are unwilling to trade and the bid-ask spread should not be too wide. In 
addition, the specialists should intervene to prevent large price jumps, and create price 
continuity.62 The NYSE uses the average width of the quoted bid-ask spread, the average 
depth of the quotes, the number of large price jumps, and the average size of price 
reversals to evaluate specialists’ performances. The specialists’ also have negative 
obligations that restrict their trading. Specialists cannot trade for their own accounts if 
there exist public orders at the same price or better. In addition, they should not trade 
with limit orders in order not to take the liquidity available to public traders. 63 
Specialists may have some market power in their stocks but they are greatly 
constrained by competition from limit order trades and floor brokers. If there are 
differences in execution qualities of stocks of different specialists, this implies that some 
investors pay higher transaction costs simply because a certain specialist oversees the 
stock that they want to trade. In their analysis of NYSE specialist firms, for example, 
Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997) estimate that differences in execution costs among 
specialist firms can be over $4.1 million per year.64 Barnea (1974) is one of the earliest 
                                                 
62 For a detailed description of the specialists’ functions, see Rule 104 (Dealings by Specialists) in NYSE 
(1999). 
63 See Harris (2003) p.494 for an extensive description of specialists’  roles and how they can act against 
the interests of the public investors on the NYSE. 
64 They estimate that effective spreads for 90th and 10th percentile specialist firms differ by 2.04 cents. 
Based on an average daily volume of 68,600 shares across the 23 stocks assigned to the 90th percentile 
specialist firm in their data, they calculate the cost difference as 1.02 cents x 68,600 shares/day x 256days x 
23 stocks = $4,120,000 
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papers that observes a specialist effect on the size of the bid-ask spread. Corwin (1999) 
finds that spreads, depth, transitory volatility, frequency and duration of order-imbalance 
halts are different across specialist firms. Coughenour and Deli (2002) find that some of 
these differences can be attributed to the organizational form of the specialist firms. This 
paper contributes to the existing literature by showing that there exist differences in the 
performances of individual specialists in terms of the execution costs of their stocks and 
by providing possible explanations for these differences. 
Analyzing the differences in individual specialists is very important because it 
helps us understand how the specialist contributes to various dimensions of market 
performance. On the NYSE, the dollar value of average monthly trading volume that the 
specialists oversee was $968.18 billion and average specialist volume as percentage of 
the NYSE total volume was around 20% in 2004.65 The NYSE specialists oversee this 
huge trading activity and there are potential conflict of interests between the specialists 
desire to make profits for themselves and their obligation to be fair to all public traders. 
There has been an important debate going on about the role of the specialists and whether 
their contributions are valuable in the overall trading activity. Recently, because of an 
investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission into floor trading 
practices, five largest specialist firms at the New York Stock Exchange were required to 
pay a combined $241.8 million to settle charges of improper trading.66  The NYSE claims 
                                                 
65 See “Market Activity” in the NYSE fact book that can be found at http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/. 
Generally, the specialist participation rate mentioned in the literature is the specialist volume as percent of 
NYSE 2x total volume which was approximately 10% in 2004. If one wants to calculate the total volume 
that the specialists traded for their own accounts, specialist volume as percent of NYSE total volume is the 
correct figure to use. 
66 See for example, “NYSE to Punish Five Specialists In Trading Inquiry”, Wall Street Journal (October 
16, 2003). More recently, New York Times (February 7, 2005) reported that Manhattan United States 
attorney's office was probing whether individual traders on New York Stock Exchange floor cheated 
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that the investors get the best available price most of the time in the specialist system. 
However, many institutional investors prefer faster executions and they believe that the 
human-based system for auctioning stocks unnecessarily slows down the trade execution 
process.67 To address these concerns, the NYSE is planning to allow investors to execute 
more stock orders automatically.68  
In this study, we find that quoted and effective spreads, quoted depth, order-
imbalance halt use and number of trades that receive price improvement differ 
significantly across individual specialists. The explanatory power of the model as 
measured by the adjusted R2 increases when we include the individual specialist 
dummies, but this increase is small. We find that differences across specialist firms 
documented in the previous literature are largely due to the differences in individual 
specialists.  
Similar to the findings in Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997) who study NYSE in 
1993, we find evidence for a subsidy from active stocks to inactive stocks in 2001. We 
find that, as the trading frequency increases, order processing costs increase for both the 
specialist firms and individual specialist portfolios which implies that profits from active 
stocks subsidize inactive stocks.  
By using the sample and methodology used by Koksal (2005a) and Koksal 
(2005b), we show that individual NYSE specialists also differ significantly in their 
                                                                                                                                                 
customers through executing proprietary orders before customer orders and getting involved in trade that 
should be carried out automatically with no intervention 
67 See “Fidelity Urges NYSE to Revamp Trading Operation“, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2003. 
68 See “NYSE's Automatic Transition”, Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2004  and NYSE Newsletter August 
2004 issue on http://www.nyse.com. 
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participation in the posted quotes and trades.69 This explains the differences in execution 
costs (spreads, depths etc) between specialists. There are significant differences between 
individual specialists because they use different strategies. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the alternative 
specialist performance measures. Section 2 discusses the variables that we use to analyze 
the differences in individual specialists’ strategies. The samples and data used to analyze 
the performances and strategies of the specialists are described in Section 3. Section 4 
presents the empirical methodology and results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Measures of Specialist Performance 
As discussed in Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997), under the assumption of perfect 
competition, only the most efficient specialist firms that make zero economic profits 
would exist in the market. A rejection of the null hypothesis that there are no significant 
differences between specialists imply that there are significant differences in the costs of 
doing business and/or specialist profits.  
 Following Corwin (1999) and Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997), we use the log of 
the following variables to analyze the differences in performances of individual 
specialists:  
• Percentage Quoted Spread,  
• Percentage Effective Spread based on national best bid and offer,  
• Percentage Effective Spread based on NYSE posted bid and offer,  
• Total Quoted Share Depth,  
                                                 
69 The sample and methodology employed in Koksal (2005a) and Koksal (2005b) are discussed in Section 4 
below. 
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• Total Quoted Dollar Depth,  
• Percentage Price improvement,  
• Order processing costs. 
 
2.1. Quotes, Spreads, and Depths 
Posted quotes and spreads are directly related to two important dimensions of 
liquidity: size and cost. Liquidity is essential for well functioning markets. As discussed 
before, two of the variables that the NYSE uses to evaluate specialist performances are 
the average width of the quoted bid-ask spread and the average depth of the quotes. 
Accordingly, we use the log of the following variables to compare the performances of 
the specialists.  
Percentage Quoted Spread is the ratio of the posted spread to the quote midpoint, 
i.e., 
2/)( BidAsk
BidAskSpreadQuotedPercentage +
−=  
where Ask and Bid are the ask and bid quotes posted by the NYSE specialist, 
respectively. We then calculate the mean percentage quoted spread for each stock for 
each day by averaging daily intraday quotes.70 Therefore, our sample has one observation 
for each stock for each day. Quoted spread is simply the round-trip cost of a trade, when 
the trader buys at the ask and sells at the bid. 
When a transaction takes place inside the quotes, the round-trip cost of the trade is 
less than the quoted spread. In this case, the difference between execution price and the 
                                                 
70 We use equally weighted averages to calculate our measures. Another possibility is to use time-weighted 
averages, which gives more weight to those spreads that have longer durations. 
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posted quote is called as price improvement and the round-trip cost of a trade is equal to 
the effective spread. We calculate the percentage effective spread by using two 
definitions of midpoint as follows: 
Midpoint
 MidpointPrice 
SpreadEffectivePercentage
−= *2 , 
where Price is the transaction price and Midpoint is either the average of the best bid and 
best ask or the average of the posted bid and ask quotes 15 seconds prior to the trade.71 
Then we calculate the mean percentage effective spread for each stock for each day by 
averaging over daily transactions during the sample period. Similar to Corwin (1999), we 
define the percentage of price-improved trades as: 
TradesofNumberTotal
Trades Improved Price of NumbertImprovemenPricegePercenta = . 
To determine the price improved trades, we use the best bid and offer as the benchmark 
rather than the posted quotes. A trade receives price improvement if it is executed within 
the national best bid and offer. 
Another measure related to the liquidity of a stock is the depth at the posted quotes. 
We calculate the total depth as: 
DepthAskPostedDepthBidPostedDepthQuotedTotal +=  
and calculate the mean total quote depth for each stock for each day by averaging daily 
intraday depths. 
Using this measure might be problematic, because for high-price stocks, the 
specialist is risking more capital if he is using his own inventory. That is, if two 
                                                 
71 The first study that finds that trades are often reposted with a lag is Lee and Ready (1991). Hasbrouck, 
Sofianos and Sosebee (1993) report a median lag of 14 seconds for a sample of 144 stocks over the first 
five trading days in November 1990. Following Corwin (1999), we use a 15 seconds rule. 
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specialists are posting the same depth, cet. par., the specialist of the stock with higher 
price is providing more liquidity. To account for the dollar value of the depth that the 
specialist posts, we also calculate: 
)()( AskDepthAskPostedBidDepthBidPosted Depth Total the of Value Dollar ×+×=  
and calculate daily averages for each stock. 
 
2.2. Execution Costs and Intersecurity Subsidization  
The order processing cost component of the bid ask spread can be used to identify 
differences in the business costs of providing liquidity among the specialists. Cao, Choe 
and Hatheway (1997) find that there are significant differences in order processing costs 
among specialist firms. They also find that order processing or noninformational costs of 
trading are higher for actively traded stocks in their sample that covers the period from 
March 1, 1993 to May 31, 1993.72  They interpret their results as to mean that actively 
traded stocks subsidize inactive stocks in the portfolios of specialist firms. 
Order processing costs include both the costs of doing business and the specialist 
profits.  Under the assumption of perfect competition, only the most efficient specialist 
firms that make zero economic profits would exist in the market. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis that there are no significant differences between specialists imply that there 
are significant differences in the costs of doing business and/or specialist profits. Gibson, 
Singh and Yerramilli (2003) find that the decline in spreads after the decimalization was 
caused by the decrease in the order processing cost component of the spread. The dollar 
value of the adverse information and inventory costs did not change significantly because 
                                                 
72 The coefficient of “the number of trades” is positive in the regressions where the dependent variable is 
the order processing cost component of the bid-ask spread. 
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of the decimalization. As the authors suggest, this is probably because of the decline in 
excess specialist profits. Hence, if we find significant differences in order processing 
costs between specialists by using 2001 data from the trading environment in 
decimalization, it will be safer to attribute the differences in the order processing costs to 
the differences in the efficiency of the specialists.  By using our NYSE post-panel data 
from the decimal trading environment, we analyze whether there are differences in terms 
of order processing costs between individual specialists and whether there is inter-
security subsidization within both the specialist firms’ and individual specialists’ 
portfolios. 
 We calculate the order processing cost for each stock by using the method 
described in Huang and Stoll (1997). Huang and Stoll (1997) show that price changes for 
a stock can be modeled as follows: 
tttttt eQ
SQQSPP +++−=− −−− 111 2)()(2 βα , (1)
where tP  is the stock price at time t, S  is the constant spread, tQ  is a trade indicator 
where 1=tQ  if the trade at t  is buyer-initiated and occurs above the midpoint, -1 if the 
trade is seller initiated and occurs below the midpoint, and 0 if the trade is at the quote 
midpoint, α  is the adverse information and β  is the inventory cost components of the 
bid-ask spread, and te  is the error term. )(1 βαφ +−≡  is the order processing 
component of the bid-ask spread which is an estimate of the costs of doing business. We 
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use the estimated value of φ  from these regressions as the dependent variable in our 
second stage regressions.73 
 
3. Measures of Specialist Strategies 
The previous section showed that there are important differences between individual 
NYSE specialists. In this section, we analyze if there are differences between the 
specialists’ participation in the posted quotes and trades. 
 
3.1. Net Specialist Participation to the Posted Quotes 
The posted quotes reflect trading interests of the limit order traders, floor brokers 
and the specialist; therefore, we need to estimate the LOB to separate the portion of the 
posted depth coming from the LOB. The LOBs are estimated by using the method 
described in Kavajecz (1999).  First, the LOB at the beginning of the sample period is 
estimated by searching for all execution and cancellation records that refer to orders 
placed before the sample period. Second, the initial LOB and each of the subsequent 
LOBs are updated sequentially depending on the placed orders, executions and 
cancellations. The result is the estimate of the LOBs at each point in time. After the 
LOBs have been estimated, the LOB bid (ask) depth is subtracted from the posted bid 
(ask) depth if the posted bid (ask) price is the same as the best limit bid (ask) price. The 
residual depth comes from the specialist’s trading interest and the orders left by the floor 
brokers with the specialist for the specialist to execute (passive floor broker 
participation). We define this residual as the “specialist’s participation in the posted 
                                                 
73 To estimate the order processing cost component in a reliable manner, we require that a stock has at least 
20 trades per day to be included in the sample for the second stage regressions. 
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quotes” and calculate the total percentage specialist participation to analyze the 
differences in participation strategies of the individual specialists in the quotes.74  
 For each quote revision, a specialist has the following choices: He may choose 
not to participate and let the posted quotes reflect the prices and depths on the LOB (0% 
contribution in the posted quotes from the specialist); he may add depth to the LOB at the 
best prices on the book (mixed case, specialist percentage contribution is positive and less 
than 100%); and he may undercut the LOB which implies that the posted quotes fully 
reflect the trading interest of the specialist (100% contribution from the specialist). 
Accordingly, to investigate if the specialists participate in the quotes differently, we 
partition the posted depth into the specialist’s contribution and the LOB’s contribution as 
described above, and define the percentage contribution of the specialists in the posted 
quotes as follows: 
2
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= DepthAskTotal
DepthAskSpecialist
DepthBidTotal
DepthBidSpecialist
ionParticipatSpecialistPercentageTotal
 
where bars denote equally weighted daily averages over the sample period (to be 
described in Section 5 below).  
 
3.2. Specialist Participation to the Trades 
We apply the method used by Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) and Koksal (2005b). 
When a market order arrives, the specialist faces the decision of choosing between the 
following strategies: 
                                                 
74 Our dataset does not allow us to split out the passive floor broker participation. 
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4. Do not participate, 
5. Participate at the quoted price, 
6. Participate and improve the price.75 
We define our measure of specialist participation in the trades as follows: 
Trades of Number Total
3 Strategy of Number 2 Strategy of NumberTradesthetoionParticipatSpecialistPercentage +=
 
4. Data 
4.1.  Analysis of Specialist Performance 
We use the NYSE’s Post-Panel data for 2001 to identify the stocks traded by each 
individual specialist.  Our regressions related to the analyses in Section 1.1 and Section 
1.3 use the data from March 2001. We obtain intraday quote and trade data from NYSE’s 
TAQ database. We use the CRSP database to identify the type of stocks in our sample.76 
 We have to include a large number of specialist dummies in our regressions and 
we need a large sample size. In addition, the specialist of a stock can change for various 
reasons.77 As a result, we cannot use the averages of our variables over the whole sample 
period because some stocks are not assigned to the same specialist for the whole sample 
period. Therefore, we calculate daily values of all variables.  
                                                 
75 In their analysis of specialist trading decisions, Harris and Panchapagesan (2003) add one more case 
which is to “stop the order”.  The percentage of orders in our sample that are stopped is around 0.01%. 
Accordingly, we exclude this choice from our analysis. 
76 See the variable definitions in Section 3 below. 
77 It is less likely that the specialist firm of a stock changes.  Since we identify individual specialist by using 
post-panels, we assume that each post-panel remained within the same firm during our sample period 
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 We only use quotes from normal trading environment.78 In addition, a quote or a 
trade is eliminated if for the current quote  
i. the effective spread is greater than $2.00, 
ii. bid or ask is equal to zero, 
iii. quoted spread is negative. 
In addition, to estimate the daily order processing costs by using equation (1) in a reliable 
manner, we require that the number of trades for that day is greater than 20. In our final 
sample, we have daily data for stocks traded by 462 individual specialists employed by 
19 specialist firms.79 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables for each specialist firm. In Panel A, we do not see any pattern in the dependent 
variables across the specialist firms, as many of these variables are normalized. Average 
quoted and effective spread for all firms is 18 cents and 12 cents, respectively. Average 
total quoted depth at the bid and ask is 4,762.24. In addition, 38.17% of the trades receive 
price improvement. Larger firms that employ greater number of specialists seem to 
provide more dollar depth. We observe from results in Table 1, Panel A that there is some 
variation between specialist firms which was formally shown to exist by Corwin (1999) 
and Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997). 
4.2.  Analysis of Specialist Strategies 
We employ the sample used by Koksal (2005a) to calculate the percentage specialist 
participation in the posted quotes and trades. Because of the volume of the data, it is 
                                                 
78These quotes have the quote mode 12 in the NYSE TAQ database. This restriction implies that we 
exclude opening and closing quotes, and quotes during regulatory or non-regulatory halts. 
79 As of April 2005, there are seven specialist firms because of the continued consolidation. See Hatch and 
Johnson (2002) for an analysis of specialist firm acquisitions on market quality 
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necessary to select a sub sample of NYSE-listed securities. The original sample was 
selected as follows:  Initially, 50 most actively traded NYSE stocks during the 20 trading 
days prior to January 29, 2001 were chosen. In addition, 25 stocks from each of the four 
Volume-Price groups were randomly selected. To pick the 100-stock random sample, 
NYSE-listed securities were ranked by share trading volume and, separately, by the 
average NYSE trade price during the 20 trading days prior to January 29, 2001. Each 
security was placed into one of the four categories after comparing its share price to the 
median NYSE share price and its trading volume to the median NYSE volume. These 
groups (of unequal numbers of stocks) are a high-volume/high-price group, a high-
volume/low-price group, a low-volume/high-price group, and, a low-volume/low-price 
group. Within each group, securities were arranged alphabetically (by symbol), and every 
Nth security was selected, where N was chosen to select 25 securities from that group. 
Because two of the 50 stocks with the highest trading volume were also randomly chosen 
as part of the high volume groups, the final sample has 148 securities.  
The NYSE’s SOD dataset gives detailed information on the entry and processing of 
orders. Order data include the name of the security, order type, a buy-sell indicator, order 
size, order date and time, limit price (if the order is a limit order), and the identity of the 
member firm submitting the order. Execution data include the date and time of each 
trade, the execution price, the number of shares executed, and cancellation information. 
Orders, executions and cancellations are time-stamped to the second. 
Because of the size of the dataset, we estimate the LOBs for active stocks using one 
week of data (April 2nd ,2001 – April 6th, 2001) only. For the rest of the stocks we 
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estimate the LOBs using three months of data ( April 2nd, 2001 – June 29th, 2001).  See 
the appendix for the symbols and the data periods for each stock used in the analysis.  
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
5.1. Analysis of Specialist Performance 
In this section, we investigate if there exist differences in performances of the individual 
NYSE specialists in terms of the liquidity they provide, and execution costs after 
controlling for stock characteristics. Specifically, following Cao, Choe and Hatheway 
(1997) and Corwin (1999), we estimate the following regression model for each specialist 
firm separately: 
ititit
N
j
itjjit MarketCapLogTradeSizeLogNTradeLogDDepVar )()()( 321
2
,0 βββαα ++++= ∑
=
(2)
itititititit ForeignFundionalQuoteMidLogVolatility εβββββ ++++++ 98654  Reg)point(   
where the subscript i  refers to the i th stock, t  refers to time (day), N is the number of 
individual specialists for a given specialist firm and DepVar is the log of average daily 
percentage quoted spread, log of average daily percentage effective spread based on 
NBBO or NYSE bid and ask prices, log of average daily total quoted depth, average daily 
dollar value of the total depth, daily percentage of trades that receive price improvement, 
and the log of proportion of order processing costs in the quoted spread; 
Dj is the individual specialist dummy variable  
LogNTrade is the log of the number of daily trades; 
logTradeSize is the log of average daily share volume per trade on the NYSE;  
logMarketCap is log of the mean daily price times shares outstanding; 
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Volatility is the coefficient of variation of transaction prices over a given day; 
LogQuoteMidpoint is the log of average daily quote midpoints; 
Regional is the percentage of trades executed on the regional exchanges; 
Fund is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock is a Unit, REIT, or closed-end 
fund; 
Foreign is a dummy variable that equals to one if the stock is a foreign security. 
We estimate equation 2 for each specialist firm separately to control for the specialist 
firm characteristics. The level of capital available for individual specialist use may have 
significant effects on the dependent variable. In addition, both Cao, Choe and Hatheway 
(1997) and Corwin (1999) show that there exist significant differences between specialist 
firms. Analyzing each specialist firm separately provides the cleanest results to analyze 
the differences between individual specialists.  
 
5.1.1. Quotes, Spreads, and Depths 
Table 2 through Table 7 report the OLS results for the quote, spread, and depth 
variables for each specialist firm. The distributions of the estimated coefficients of 
individual specialist dummy variables are also reported.  Number of trades and trade size 
are negatively related to the spread measures and positively related to the total quoted 
share depth and dollar depth. For active stocks, specialists face strong competition from 
limit order traders. In addition, they can spread the fixed costs of market making over 
more volume and they face less inventory risk because managing the inventory is easier. 
Therefore, as the number of trades and trade size increase, we see smaller spreads and 
larger quoted depths.  
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As the number of trades and trade size increase, we see fewer price improvements 
because when the bid and ask prices are very close to the market’s estimate of the true 
value of the stock (the spread is small in active stocks), it is less profitable to undercut the 
bid and/or ask prices. 
Risks of highly volatile assets cause spreads to be wider and depths to be smaller. 
Also high volatility and larger spreads make price improvement easy.  
Log of the quote midpoint has negative coefficients in spread and total quoted 
share depth and a positive coefficient in the price improvement and total quoted dollar 
depth regressions. As stock price increases, the tick size is less binding and undercutting 
posted quotes is less costly which increases the number of trades that receive price 
improvement.80 Since one of the variables that the NYSE uses to evaluate specialists’ 
performances is the average share depth of the quotes, as stock price increases, the dollar 
value of the posted depth increases for high price stocks.  
 The F-statistic in Panel A of Tables 2-7 is for the joint hypothesis that there exist 
no significant differences between individual specialists after controlling for stock 
characteristics. This null hypothesis is rejected for all regressions indicating that 
individual NYSE specialists post significantly different quotes and depths. In addition, 
the proportion of trades that receive price improvement is significantly different across 
individual specialists. The increase in adjusted R2s provide further evidence that adding 
the individual specialist dummies increase the explained variation in the dependent 
variables, but this increase is small. We also perform F-test for all pairs of estimated 
                                                 
80 See Harris (1994) for the arguments why smaller tick size could cause smaller spreads and smaller 
displayed depth. Seppi (1997) shows that specialist profits are maximized as the tick size approaches to 
zero. Consistent with this result, Koksal (2005a) finds higher specialist participation in posted quotes for 
high price stocks which might also cause narrower spreads for stocks with high quote midpoints (high 
prices). 
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specialist dummies. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons 
of specialist dummy coefficients that are significantly different from each other at the 
10% level for each firm. Overall, rejection rate is high, implying that results are robust to 
our arbitrary choice of the excluded specialist  
Panel B of Tables 2 to 7, reports the economic significance of the differences 
between specialists. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated 
specialist dummy coefficients. Second part of Panel B reports the economic significance 
of the specialist dummies. In Table 2, Panel B, for example, "Average percentage quoted 
spread" and "average quote midpoint" are the average of percentage quoted spread and 
quote midpoint for each specialist firm. "Average dollar spread" is calculated by 
multiplying "average percentage quoted spread" and "average quote midpoint". "Mean 
deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the value of the estimated coefficient of a 
specialist dummy, then the predicted change in the dependent variable with respect to the 
excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted 
value of the dependent variable for the excluded and included specialists, respectively. 
Then, Y2=Y1·eb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is the 
mean value of all estimated specialist dummy variables for a given firm. "Mean deviation 
in $" is calculated by multiplying "average dollar spread" by "mean deviation in %".  
“Mean deviation in %” ranges from a low of -33.15 % to a high of 38.60 %. This 
implies that the economic significance of the differences between specialists is large. 
These numbers in percentage terms translate to a range of -11 cents to 9 cents difference 
in quoted spreads between individual specialists employed by the same firm. 
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The economic magnitude of the differences between specialists can be large for 
investors. The magnitude of this difference in dollar terms can be estimated by using the 
estimated differences between specialists in percentage effective spreads. Table 3, Panel 
B reports the results for the percentage effective spread calculated by using the national 
best bid and offer.81 The mean deviation between specialists in percentages ranges from -
32.22 % to 31.48 %. In dollar terms, this range is from -7 cents to 5 cents. The real 
difference, however, depends on the daily volume handled by each specialist firm. We 
multiply the difference in effective spreads by average daily volume from Table 1, and 
report the results in the last column of Table 3, Panel B. The daily estimated difference to 
investors range from a low of -$31,751.68 to a  high of $24,188.62, with a mean value of 
-$1,350.23. The range for the estimated difference in spreads for the 21 trading days in 
March 2001 is from -$666,785.37 to $507,960.96. Our analysis use data from March 
2001, so it is difficult to estimate the yearly differences. But above figures suggest that, 
the differences between individual specialists can have significant economic implications 
for the investors. 
Table 5, Panel B reports the differences between specialists in terms of the share 
depth that they post. The mean deviation in shares range from -1,529.35 shares to 
1,557.45. These differences in shares may not be a good indicator of the differences 
between specialists in terms of the capital they risk, because that depends on the stock 
price. Mean deviation in dollar depth is reported in Panel B of Table 6. The range of the 
estimated differences between specialists in terms of the dollar depth they provide at the 
bid and ask is from -$24,160.74 to $32,287.88. 
                                                 
81 The results reported in Panel B of Table 4, and related interpretations for percentage effective spread 
which is based on the NYSE quotes are similar. 
 133
Finally, Panel B of Table 7 reports that mean deviation from average price 
improvement ranges from -8.38% to 8.31%. In addition, the increases in adjusted R2s 
after we include individual specialist dummies are larger for percentage price 
improvement. 
The results so far provide evidence that there are significant differences between 
individual specialists. To see if the differences between specialist firms documented in 
the previous literature are because of the differences between individual specialists or 
not, we run pooled regressions. First, we estimate a base model where only the firm 
specific dummies are included. Then we estimate a full model where we add individual 
specialist dummies. The results from these regressions are reported in Table 8. In Table 
8, we report the estimates and significance of specialist firm dummies, adjusted R2s, and 
test results where the null is the equality of specialist firm dummy coefficients before and 
after we add individual specialist firm dummies. Consistent with the previous results, 
adding the individual specialist dummies improve the predictive power of the model as 
reflected by the increases in adjusted R2s. However, the null hypothesis that there are no 
significant differences between specialist firms is rejected for both the base model and 
the full model. Therefore, we conclude that, some of the differences between specialist 
firms documented in the previous literature stems from the differences between the 
individual specialists they employ, but there are other factors that determine these 
differences as well. 
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5.1.2. Execution Costs and Intersecurity Subsidization  
Table 9 reports results from estimating equation (2) where the dependent variable is 
the log of order processing cost for each stock estimated by equation (1). The number of 
trades has a positive coefficient similar to what is found by Cao, Choe and Hatheway 
(1997) based on 1993 data. This is consistent with the hypothesis that active stocks 
subsidize inactive stocks. Order processing costs decrease with the price level; estimated 
coefficients for quote midpoint generally have negative coefficients. Finally, order-
processing costs are higher for Units, REITs, and closed-end funds. 
When we include the individual specialist dummies to the model, the adjusted R2 
increases for almost all firms, providing evidence that the individual specialists have 
significant impact on costs of the trade. In addition, the null hypothesis of no difference 
between specialists is strongly rejected for all but four firms. 101 of the 309 specialist 
dummies are significant at the 5% level. Estimated coefficients of the individual 
specialist dummies range from -1.01 to 0.696 with a mean value of -0.077. Negative 
coefficients imply that the specialists add value by lowering the order processing cost, but 
this is not true for all specialists as we see from the distribution of estimated coefficients. 
 Next, we examine whether active stocks subsidize inactive stocks within 
specialist firms’ and individual specialists’ stocks.  Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997) find 
that for their sample, when they regress the order processing cost on variables related to 
stock characteristics, they find that the coefficient of trading frequency (number of 
trades) is positive for 37 of the 40 specialist firms. They argue that their results may be an 
evidence of subsidy from liquid stocks to illiquid stocks.82 To see if this negative 
                                                 
82 See also, Huang and Liu (2004). 
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relationship between order processing costs and the trading frequency within specialist 
firms’ and individual specialists’ portfolios, we run a regression similar to the one used 
by Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997). Specifically, we estimate the following model for 
each specialist firm and for each individual specialist portfolio. 
 
itititit MarketCapLogTradeSizeLogNTradeLog )()()( 321 βββαφ +++=  (3)
itititit ionalRegpointQuoteMidLogVolatility εβββ ++++ 654 )(   
where the subscript i  refers to the i th stock for the specialist firm or for the portfolio of 
the individual specialist and t for time. The independent variables are defined as in 
equation (2). 
 The results from estimating equation (3) for each specialist firm are reported in 
Table 10. Following Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997), we only report the coefficient 
estimates for the number of trades. The estimated 1β  is positive for 20 of the 21 specialist 
firms. Among 20 positive coefficients, 13 of them are significant at the 0.1% level and 5 
of them are significant at the 1% level. The t-statistic for the mean of the estimated 
coefficients is 4.45, which is significant at the 0.1% level. This supports the results 
reported in Table 9. Order processing costs increase as the trading frequency increases 
within each specialist firm. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that active 
stocks subsidize inactive stocks and supports the results found by Cao, Choe and 
Hatheway (1997). 
 To see if intersecurity subsidization occurs within the portfolios of individual 
specialists, we estimate equation (3) for each individual specialist’s portfolio. Table 11, 
Panel A reports the distribution of the estimated 1β s for all individual specialist 
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portfolios. The results strongly suggest a positive relationship between the number of 
trades and order processing costs, i.e., the fixed costs (order processing costs) of doing 
business increase as the number of trades increase. The mean (median) for all and 
significant coefficients are 0.09 (0.08) and 0.12 (0.11), respectively. The t-statistic for the 
mean of all (significant) estimated coefficients is 17.39 (19.90), which is significant at the 
0.1% level. The histograms of the estimated coefficients are shown in Table 11 Panels B 
and C. 304 of the 339 estimated coefficients are positive and 231 of the 242 coefficients 
significant at the 10% level are positive.  
 Our results provide evidence that the specialists subsidize inactive stocks in 2001 
by increasing order processing cost component of the bid-ask spread for more active 
stocks. This suggests that specialists cover their fixed costs for illiquid stocks by charging 
higher spreads for active stocks.  
 
5.2. Analysis of Specialist Strategies 
We estimate the following model by OLS: 
ititit
j
itjjit MarketCapLogTradeSizeLogNTradeLogDDepVar )()()( 321
340
1
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where the subscript i  refers to the i th stock, t  refers to the time (trading day), DepVar is 
the percentage specialist participation in the quotes and trades as defined in Section 4, 
and the dependent variables are as defined in Section 3. We calculate equally weighted 
daily averages for each of the dependent and independent variables to estimate equation 
(4). 
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5.2.1. Net Specialist Participation to the Posted Quotes 
The results about percentage specialist participation in the quotes are presented in 
Table 12. The signs and significance of the explanatory variables are robust to adding 
individual specialist dummies.  
 The results for other exogenous variables are consistent with the findings of 
Koksal (2005a). As the number of trades increases, specialists tend to decrease their 
participation, because specialist services are needed more in illiquid stocks. There is a 
negative relationship between the average trade size and specialist participation in the 
quotes. As the trade size increases, specialists decrease their participation in current 
quotes, because when they add depth to the quotes, their strategies are constrained by 
their position in the quotes. If large trades are more likely to come from the informed 
trades, then there is less specialist participation for the stocks with a larger average trade 
size. We observe higher specialist participation for more volatile stocks, which is 
consistent with the price-smoothing obligation of the specialists. Also we observe higher 
specialist participation for high-price (measured by quote midpoint) stocks; as discussed 
in Koksal (2005a), the tick size is less binding and undercutting the LOB is less costly for 
high-price stocks. Therefore, it may be more profitable to participate in the quotes for 
high-price stocks. 
 The F-statistic for the null hypothesis is 23.8 and it is significant at the 0.1% level. 
Therefore, there exist strong differences between individual specialists in their 
participation in the quotes. As we expect, the explanatory power of the model increases 
significantly, from 0.2278 to 0.5396, after we include the individual specialist dummy 
variables. This larger increase in adjusted R2 when compared to spread and depth 
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regressions suggests that there is more idiosyncratic variation in specialist quote 
participation policy than in their other policies. 
The results of this section explain why we observe the differences in quotes and 
spreads as discussed in Section 3.1. This is because the specialists implement different 
strategies while participating in the posted quotes. The difference between specialists is 
significant even after controlling for stock characteristics such as trading volume, 
volatility and the trading frequency. 
 
5.2.2. Specialist Participation to the Trades 
In this section, we analyze the participation strategies of individual specialists to the 
trades following a market order arrival. The results from estimating equation (4) are 
reported in Table 13. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.1398 to 0.2875 after the individual 
specialist dummy variables are included. 
 We observe a negative relationship between the number of transactions and 
aggressiveness of trades made by specialists. As the number of trades decreases, it 
becomes more likely that the specialists participate in a trade at the quoted or improved 
price. Similar to the results of section 6.1, this behavior is consistent with the specialist 
obligation to be ready to trade when no one else is willing to trade. Our finding might 
also imply that it is more profitable to participate to the trades in illiquid stocks. 
 As the trade size increases, specialists are more likely to let the market order trade 
with the LOB, since this would protect them from the possibility of informed trading. 
Consistent with their obligation to stabilize prices, the specialists are more likely to 
participate in the trades for more volatile stocks. 
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The F-statistic for the joint hypothesis that there are no significant differences 
between individual specialists after controlling for stock characteristics equals 8.5584, 
which is significant at the 0.1% level. Therefore, there are significant differences between 
specialists when they have to decide whether to take the other side of an incoming market 
order. These results explain why we observe, for instance, significant differences between 
the levels of price improvements for stocks controlled by different specialists. Indeed, the 
differences are likely to arise because the specialists employ different strategies. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows that there exist differences in the performances of individual 
specialists in terms of the execution costs and participation strategies to the posted quotes 
and trades. We find that the quoted and effective spreads, quoted depth, and number of 
trades receiving price improvement differ significantly across individual specialists. The 
explanatory power of the model as measured by the adjusted R2 increases when 
individual specialist dummies are included. Our findings suggest that the differences 
across specialist firms documented in the previous literature are largely due to the 
differences in individual specialists. 
We find a positive relationship between order processing costs and the trading 
frequency for both the specialist firms and individual specialist portfolios. This finding 
supports the results found by Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997) that profits from active 
stocks subsidize inactive stocks. 
We show that individual NYSE specialists differ significantly in their 
participation in the posted quotes and trades. This explains the differences in the 
execution costs (spreads, depths, etc.) between the specialists.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Dependent Variables
Specialist Firm No
Number
of 
Specs
%
Quoted 
Spread
Quoted 
Spread
%
Effective 
Spread 
(NBBO)
% 
Effective 
Spread 
(NYSE)
Effective 
Spread 
(NYSE)
Total 
Quoted 
Share 
Depth
Total 
Quoted 
Dollar 
Depth
% of 
Price 
Improved 
Trades
Labranche And Co. 1 82 0.81 0.21 0.57 0.57 0.11 5,492.00 110,199.0 38.01
Spear, Leeds And Kellogg Spec. Llc 2 73 0.95 0.16 0.61 0.62 0.09 4,623.27 105,227.0 38.24
Wagner Stott Mercator Llc 3 68 1.16 0.22 0.75 0.77 0.13 4,860.18 106,680.0 39.88
Fleet Meehan Specialist Inc 4 64 1.00 0.18 0.68 0.69 0.11 4,635.63 96,041.9 37.86
Van Der Moolen Specialist Usa Llc 5 51 1.20 0.17 0.81 0.83 0.11 4,629.23 84,473.9 40.15
Rpm Specialist Corp. 6 17 0.92 0.19 0.62 0.62 0.12 4,230.79 97,084.2 37.85
Bear Hunter Specialist Llc 7 16 1.06 0.16 0.72 0.73 0.11 4,835.98 87,305.4 38.44
Walter N. Frank And Co. Llc 8 13 1.31 0.25 0.88 0.88 0.14 5,408.40 85,454.3 34.05
Benjamin Jacobson And Sons Llc 9 12 1.04 0.20 0.74 0.71 0.12 4,366.73 96,313.5 35.60
Performance Specialist Group, L.P. 10 12 1.54 0.18 1.08 1.10 0.13 4,630.32 60,833.4 37.49
Stern And Kennedy 11 10 0.98 0.19 0.68 0.68 0.13 3,601.83 77,673.3 42.19
Bocklet And Co. Llc 12 8 1.12 0.20 0.73 0.73 0.12 4,361.82 89,025.0 39.09
Susquehanna Specialists 13 8 1.15 0.15 0.77 0.78 0.10 5,586.19 91,496.0 36.27
Labranche & Co/Freedom/Adrian & Co 14 6 1.21 0.18 0.85 0.85 0.14 3,704.50 59,853.6 37.54
Lyden, Dolan, Nick & Co.,Llc. 15 6 1.28 0.16 0.81 0.83 0.10 5,410.25 86,048.7 39.80
Scavone,Mc Kenna,Cloud And Co Llc 16 6 1.15 0.23 0.76 0.77 0.13 4,382.10 85,567.3 34.74
Weiskopf, Silver Specialists,  Llc 17 5 1.22 0.12 0.89 0.90 0.09 5,865.12 98,624.8 32.98
Freedom Specialists/Adrian/Rpm Spe 18 3 1.16 0.18 0.79 0.80 0.13 4,145.69 71,770.1 38.30
Buttonwood/Albert Fried & Co Llc 19 2 1.55 0.16 0.97 0.99 0.10 5,712.60 81,369.8 46.77
Average 1.15 0.18 0.78 0.78 0.12 4,762.24 87,949.5 38.17
Panels A and B report the mean values of the dependent and independent variables. For each stock, mean value of each variable per 
day is calculated. The average each variable is then calculated for each specialist firm. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying 
mean daily price of each stock by the number of shares outstanding. Volatility is the coefficient of variation of the daily prices.
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Panel B. Exogenous Variables
Specialist Firm No
Number 
of
Trades
Mean 
Daily 
Trade 
Size
Average 
Daily 
Volume
Market 
Cap.
(Millions) Volatility
Mean 
Daily 
Quote 
Midpoint
% of 
Regional
Trades Fund Foreign
LABRANCHE AND CO. 1 222.07 1,291.47 492,507 6,307.42 0.69 34.99 18.61 0.135 0.037
SPEAR, LEEDS AND KELLOGG SPEC. LLC 2 232.43 1,457.29 409,330 5,042.33 0.77 26.11 17.60 0.182 0.038
WAGNER STOTT MERCATOR LLC 3 199.52 1,343.18 413,846 5,064.19 0.74 26.37 20.48 0.149 0.028
FLEET MEEHAN SPECIALIST INC 4 219.47 1,364.21 414,494 5,975.91 0.73 25.89 18.25 0.162 0.028
VAN DER MOOLEN SPECIALIST USA LLC 5 175.21 1,312.60 375,981 3,872.12 0.78 22.23 18.48 0.198 0.074
RPM SPECIALIST CORP. 6 162.68 1,208.90 255,057 5,152.48 0.62 27.20 18.71 0.114 0.016
BEAR HUNTER SPECIALIST LLC 7 196.16 1,335.38 464,798 4,509.65 0.76 22.87 20.55 0.172 0.047
WALTER N. FRANK AND CO. LLC 8 109.35 1,577.88 202,660 1,458.11 0.74 22.76 18.16 0.255 0.060
BENJAMIN JACOBSON AND SONS LLC 9 213.44 1,172.75 361,104 5,574.53 0.73 25.88 18.86 0.129 0.036
PERFORMANCE SPECIALIST GROUP, L.P. 10 59.50 1,226.46 78,981 863.02 0.78 19.05 19.80 0.309 0.050
STERN AND KENNEDY 11 158.95 1,104.80 261,305 3,541.34 0.62 23.30 16.90 0.309 0.000
BOCKLET AND CO. LLC 12 144.00 1,317.96 223,441 2,998.02 0.78 23.64 16.96 0.180 0.037
SUSQUEHANNA SPECIALISTS 13 162.26 1,383.40 267,884 1,615.87 0.73 20.17 17.48 0.211 0.053
LABRANCHE & CO/FREEDOM/ADRIAN & CO 14 143.38 2,271.41 236,045 1,606.25 0.89 20.45 13.83 0.178 0.061
LYDEN, DOLAN, NICK & CO.,LLC. 15 116.75 1,456.76 187,216 1,577.17 0.80 19.54 20.13 0.231 0.051
SCAVONE,MC KENNA,CLOUD AND CO LLC 16 107.67 1,306.69 171,468 2,925.24 0.65 23.09 18.14 0.223 0.073
WEISKOPF, SILVER SPECIALISTS,  LLC 17 60.83 1,213.84 89,464 564.28 0.80 19.28 23.68 0.283 0.037
FREEDOM SPECIALISTS/ADRIAN/RPM SPE 18 117.56 1,195.20 190,861 1,669.79 0.65 21.81 15.40 0.171 0.059
BUTTONWOOD/ALBERT FRIED & CO LLC 19 79.55 1,051.69 76,849 748.99 0.69 21.71 18.45 0.234 0.000
Average 151.62 1,346.94 272,278.32 3,214.04 0.73 23.49 18.45 0.20 0.041  
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Table 2. Regression Results: Log of Percentage Quoted Spread               
                        
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of percentage quoted spread. See Appendix B, 
Panel A for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-
statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different from each other and the p-value is the 
corresponding p-value for this F-test. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons of specialist dummy coefficients that are significantly different 
from each other at the 10% level for each firm. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy coefficients. Second part of Panel B 
reports the economic significance of the specialist dummies. "Average percentage quoted spread" and "average quote midpoint" are the average of percentage quoted 
spread and quote midpoint for each specialist firm. "Average dollar spread" is calculated by multiplying "average percentage quoted spread" and "average quote 
midpoint". "Mean deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the estimated coefficient of a specialist dummy, then the predicted change in the dependent variable with 
respect to the excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted value of the dependent variable for the excluded and included 
specialists, respectively. Then, Y2=Y1xeb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is the mean value of all estimated specialist dummy variables for 
a given firm. "Mean deviation in $" is calculated by multiplying "average dollar spread" by "mean deviation in %". 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates and Test Results
Specialist Firm 
No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat
P-
Value
Pairwise 
Rejection
Rate
1 -1.596 *** -0.186 *** -0.067 *** -0.073 *** 0.230 *** -0.470 *** 0.089 *** -0.162 *** 0.209 *** 0.8099 0.8448 25.11 0.000 94.72%
2 -1.154 *** -0.192 *** -0.065 *** -0.092 *** 0.189 *** -0.495 *** 0.056 * -0.288 *** 0.025 0.8261 0.8499 19.79 0.000 95.61%
3 -0.413 *** -0.176 *** -0.099 *** -0.153 *** 0.150 *** -0.415 *** 0.356 *** -0.458 *** 0.019 0.8063 0.8247 8.08 0.000 78.74%
4 -1.511 *** -0.222 *** -0.073 *** -0.077 *** 0.280 *** -0.423 *** 0.132 *** -0.177 *** 0.036 0.8190 0.8466 24.86 0.000 97.14%
5 -0.811 *** -0.180 *** -0.082 *** -0.124 *** 0.260 *** -0.481 *** -0.149 *** -0.353 *** 0.135 *** 0.8345 0.8448 6.97 0.000 70.15%
6 -1.508 *** -0.227 *** -0.105 *** -0.054 *** 0.337 *** -0.488 *** 0.050 -0.084 ** 0.350 *** 0.8309 0.8489 10.52 0.000 75.24%
7 -1.848 *** -0.188 *** -0.062 *** -0.078 *** 0.272 *** -0.463 *** 0.046 -0.350 *** -0.129 *** 0.8319 0.8443 14.45 0.000 83.52%
8 -1.365 *** -0.210 *** -0.114 *** -0.057 *** 0.350 *** -0.514 *** -0.262 *** -0.259 *** -0.040 0.7309 0.7445 7.57 0.000 89.09%
9 -0.984 *** -0.250 *** -0.069 *** -0.142 *** 0.220 *** -0.282 *** 0.058 -0.532 *** 0.055 0.8347 0.8456 6.77 0.000 86.67%
10 -0.266 -0.193 *** -0.085 *** -0.178 *** 0.259 *** -0.342 *** 0.036 -0.244 *** 0.114 ** 0.8009 0.8206 16.83 0.000 100.00%
11 -1.122 *** -0.177 *** -0.027 -0.233 *** 0.298 *** -0.181 *** 0.371 ** -0.289 *** 0.6967 0.7282 5.82 0.000 96.43%
12 -1.765 *** -0.159 *** 0.012 -0.143 *** 0.215 *** -0.351 *** -0.099 -0.230 *** 0.178 *** 0.8603 0.8658 8.54 0.000 46.67%
13 -1.171 *** -0.173 *** -0.075 *** -0.093 *** 0.217 *** -0.544 *** -0.034 -0.209 *** 0.136 *** 0.7805 0.7929 15.23 0.000 93.33%
14 -0.015 -0.086 *** -0.024 -0.260 *** 0.091 *** -0.410 *** -0.013 -0.352 *** -0.081 0.8668 0.8701 3.00 0.019 16.67%
15 -1.619 *** -0.245 *** 0.016 -0.112 *** 0.285 *** -0.382 *** -0.230 *** -0.218 *** 0.056 0.7972 0.8076 19.48 0.000 100.00%
16 -0.629 *** -0.128 *** -0.085 *** -0.155 *** 0.316 *** -0.469 *** -0.107 -0.230 *** 0.048 0.8450 0.8487 1.65 0.159 100.00%
17 -0.423 ** -0.061 *** -0.041 ** -0.243 *** 0.084 *** -0.439 *** 0.051 -0.336 *** 0.076 0.8577 0.8721 9.58 0.000 100.00%
18 -0.579 -0.116 *** -0.105 *** -0.156 *** 0.350 *** -0.533 *** -0.498 ** -0.322 *** 0.100 0.8472 0.8472 1.33 0.250 na
19 0.328 -0.250 *** -0.176 *** -0.135 *** 0.297 *** -0.464 *** -0.751 *** -0.851 *** 0.7934 0.8122 53.61 0.000 na
ForeignIntercept
Log
(# of 
Trades)
% of 
Regional 
Trades Fund
Log
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Cap.) Volatility
Log
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Log
(Trade 
Size)
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Panel B.  
 
Distribution of the Estimated Specialist  
Dummy Coefficients Economic Significance of the Estimates 
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
Av. % Quoted 
Spread 
Av. Quote 
Midpoint 
Av. Dollar
Spread 
Mean 
Deviation in % 
Mean 
Deviation in $ 
1 -0.288 -0.286 0.182 -0.752 0.076 0.81% $34.99 $0.28 -25.06% -$0.07 
2 -0.187 -0.206 0.163 -0.572 0.253 0.95% $26.11 $0.25 -17.01% -$0.04 
3 -0.076 -0.107 0.182 -0.423 0.666 1.16% $26.37 $0.31 -7.35% -$0.02 
4 -0.184 -0.192 0.167 -0.640 0.244 1.00% $25.89 $0.26 -16.78% -$0.04 
5 -0.034 -0.042 0.132 -0.315 0.297 1.20% $22.23 $0.27 -3.32% -$0.01 
6 -0.184 -0.160 0.140 -0.452 0.003 0.92% $27.20 $0.25 -16.83% -$0.04 
7 0.114 0.106 0.123 -0.080 0.302 1.06% $22.87 $0.24 12.11% $0.03 
8 -0.001 0.022 0.123 -0.174 0.141 1.31% $22.76 $0.30 -0.09% $0.00 
9 0.153 0.121 0.213 -0.247 0.514 1.04% $25.88 $0.27 16.57% $0.04 
10 -0.279 -0.312 0.139 -0.434 0.024 1.54% $19.05 $0.29 -24.31% -$0.07 
11 0.326 0.297 0.197 0.045 0.642 0.98% $23.30 $0.23 38.60% $0.09 
12 -0.017 0.026 0.095 -0.216 0.062 1.12% $23.64 $0.26 -1.66% $0.00 
13 -0.118 -0.126 0.145 -0.315 0.122 1.15% $20.17 $0.23 -11.14% -$0.03 
14 -0.019 -0.043 0.091 -0.128 0.088 1.21% $20.45 $0.25 -1.89% $0.00 
15 -0.108 -0.158 0.119 -0.234 0.053 1.28% $19.54 $0.25 -10.20% -$0.03 
16 -0.120 -0.118 0.046 -0.163 -0.048 1.15% $23.09 $0.27 -11.27% -$0.03 
17 0.243 0.251 0.087 0.144 0.327 1.22% $19.28 $0.24 27.52% $0.06 
18 0.058 0.058 0.053 0.021 0.096 1.16% $21.81 $0.25 5.98% $0.02 
19 -0.403 -0.403 na -0.403 -0.403 1.55% $21.71 $0.34 -33.15% -$0.11 
Average -0.127 -0.144 0.209 -0.752 0.666 1.15% $23.49 $0.26 -4.17% -$0.01 
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Table 3. Regression Results: Log of Percentage Effective Spread (NBBO)           
                       
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of percentage effective spread based on national 
best bid and offer. See Appendix B, Panel A for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual 
specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different 
from each other and the p-value is the corresponding p-value for this F-test. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons of specialist dummy 
coefficients that are significantly different from each other at the 10% level for each firm. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy 
coefficients. Second part of Panel B reports the economic significance of the specialist dummies. "Average percentage quoted spread" and "average quote midpoint" are 
the average of percentage quoted spread and quote midpoint for each specialist firm. "Average dollar spread" is calculated by multiplying "average percentage quoted 
spread" and "average quote midpoint". "Mean deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the value of the estimated coefficient of a specialist dummy, then the 
predicted change in the dependent variable with respect to the excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted value of the 
dependent variable for the excluded and included specialists, respectively. Then, Y2=Y1xeb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is the mean 
value of all estimated specialist dummy variables for a given firm. "Mean deviation in $" is calculated by multiplying "average dollar spread" by "mean deviation in %". 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates and Test Results
Specialist 
Firm No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat P-Value
Pairw ise 
Rejection
Rate
1 -2.448 *** -0.182 *** -0.019 *** -0.072 *** 0.279 *** -0.418 *** 0.138 *** -0.074 *** 0.197 *** 0.7832 0.8106 16.23 0.000 99.46%
2 -2.589 *** -0.193 *** 0.036 *** -0.093 *** 0.224 *** -0.413 *** 0.148 *** -0.144 *** 0.025 0.6887 0.7105 10.06 0.000 92.27%
3 -1.744 *** -0.200 *** -0.016 -0.134 *** 0.180 *** -0.356 *** 0.300 *** -0.324 *** 0.009 0.7796 0.7999 7.78 0.000 81.12%
4 -2.600 *** -0.215 *** -0.011 -0.075 *** 0.327 *** -0.382 *** 0.104 *** -0.061 *** 0.040 0.7968 0.8194 17.66 0.000 85.30%
5 -1.850 *** -0.192 *** -0.018 * -0.124 *** 0.320 *** -0.419 *** -0.132 *** -0.209 *** 0.064 *** 0.8031 0.8177 8.60 0.000 77.30%
6 -2.949 *** -0.243 *** -0.023 -0.029 ** 0.377 *** -0.464 *** 0.076 -0.042 0.206 *** 0.8267 0.8377 6.55 0.000 55.24%
7 -3.142 *** -0.148 *** 0.023 -0.106 *** 0.311 *** -0.375 *** 0.441 *** -0.224 *** -0.256 *** 0.4111 0.4174 2.12 0.009 86.81%
8 -2.325 *** -0.225 *** -0.085 *** -0.043 *** 0.395 *** -0.475 *** -0.231 *** -0.137 *** -0.041 0.7166 0.7272 5.54 0.000 81.82%
9 -2.173 *** -0.267 *** -0.018 -0.120 *** 0.325 *** -0.222 *** 0.227 ** -0.363 *** 0.003 0.8165 0.8240 5.29 0.000 53.33%
10 -0.967 *** -0.191 *** -0.046 *** -0.190 *** 0.291 *** -0.289 *** 0.023 -0.096 *** 0.108 ** 0.7750 0.7877 7.20 0.000 97.78%
11 -2.457 *** -0.201 *** 0.063 ** -0.214 *** 0.376 *** -0.110 ** 0.280 * -0.271 *** 0.6542 0.6683 2.47 0.012 89.29%
12 -2.215 *** -0.130 *** 0.079 *** -0.216 *** 0.248 *** -0.230 *** -0.160 * -0.068 ** 0.310 *** 0.8384 0.8461 10.22 0.000 60.00%
13 -2.146 *** -0.170 *** -0.006 -0.101 *** 0.255 *** -0.499 *** -0.176 * -0.170 *** 0.088 * 0.7572 0.7691 14.93 0.000 86.67%
14 -1.578 *** -0.147 *** 0.068 ** -0.202 *** 0.113 *** -0.365 *** 0.198 -0.292 *** -0.051 0.8224 0.8219 0.79 0.529 0.00%
15 -2.616 *** -0.231 *** 0.071 *** -0.106 *** 0.278 *** -0.384 *** -0.161 ** -0.155 *** 0.013 0.7844 0.7912 12.46 0.000 100.00%
16 -1.968 *** -0.140 *** -0.020 -0.130 *** 0.352 *** -0.430 *** -0.208 ** -0.163 *** 0.044 0.8261 0.8309 7.69 0.000 83.33%
17 -1.428 * -0.029 0.086 -0.299 *** 0.110 *** -0.288 *** 0.121 -0.362 *** 0.174 0.3263 0.3379 4.68 0.003 100.00%
18 -2.108 *** -0.203 *** -0.075 * -0.088 ** 0.453 *** -0.447 *** -0.408 * -0.229 *** 0.239 ** 0.7832 0.7856 3.51 0.062 na
19 -0.989 ** -0.215 *** -0.078 ** -0.112 *** 0.245 *** -0.546 *** -0.756 *** -0.570 *** 0.7791 0.7970 47.46 0.000 na
Log
(Trade Size)
Log(Market 
Capitalization) Volatility Fund Foreign
Log(Quote 
Midpoint)
% of 
Regional 
Trades
Log(Number 
of Trades)Intercept
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Panel B.             
 
Distribution of the Estimated Specialist 
Dummy Coefficients Economic Significance of the Estimates 
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
Av. % Effective 
Spread (NBBO)
Av. Quote 
Midpoint 
Av. Dollar 
Spread 
Mean 
Deviation in % 
Mean 
Deviation in $
Total Daily 
Deviation in $
Total Estimated 
Deviation for  
March 2001 
1 -0.388 -0.383 0.163 -0.797 0.134 0.57% $34.99 $0.20 -32.15% -$0.06 -$31,751.68 -$666,785.37 
2 -0.145 -0.171 0.177 -0.473 0.305 0.61% $26.11 $0.16 -13.48% -$0.02 -$8,815.38 -$185,122.88 
3 -0.085 -0.102 0.196 -0.430 0.554 0.75% $26.37 $0.20 -8.12% -$0.02 -$6,691.58 -$140,523.12 
4 -0.115 -0.129 0.149 -0.530 0.294 0.68% $25.89 $0.18 -10.84% -$0.02 -$7,875.08 -$165,376.60 
5 0.016 -0.036 0.204 -0.250 0.544 0.81% $22.23 $0.18 1.64% $0.00 $1,109.65 $23,302.63 
6 -0.076 -0.057 0.109 -0.276 0.059 0.62% $27.20 $0.17 -7.36% -$0.01 -$3,140.19 -$65,944.05 
7 0.274 0.275 0.125 0.029 0.456 0.72% $22.87 $0.17 31.48% $0.05 $24,188.62 $507,960.96 
8 0.063 0.090 0.121 -0.147 0.225 0.88% $22.76 $0.20 6.46% $0.01 $2,613.92 $54,892.26 
9 0.071 -0.013 0.198 -0.195 0.472 0.74% $25.88 $0.19 7.34% $0.01 $5,107.97 $107,267.38 
10 -0.288 -0.284 0.113 -0.444 -0.038 1.08% $19.05 $0.21 -24.99% -$0.05 -$4,076.43 -$85,605.07 
11 0.252 0.219 0.170 0.085 0.618 0.68% $23.30 $0.16 28.72% $0.05 $11,885.05 $249,586.14 
12 0.010 0.051 0.110 -0.173 0.151 0.73% $23.64 $0.17 0.96% $0.00 $370.81 $7,787.07 
13 -0.028 -0.065 0.141 -0.208 0.170 0.77% $20.17 $0.15 -2.75% $0.00 -$1,139.64 -$23,932.53 
14 -0.113 -0.124 0.077 -0.192 0.011 0.85% $20.45 $0.17 -10.68% -$0.02 -$4,398.64 -$92,371.37 
15 -0.084 -0.100 0.096 -0.190 0.064 0.81% $19.54 $0.16 -8.07% -$0.01 -$2,394.92 -$50,293.23 
16 -0.051 -0.054 0.077 -0.150 0.039 0.76% $23.09 $0.18 -4.94% -$0.01 -$1,494.06 -$31,375.22 
17 0.150 0.197 0.191 -0.118 0.325 0.89% $19.28 $0.17 16.22% $0.03 $2,493.96 $52,373.17 
18 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.029 0.176 0.79% $21.81 $0.17 10.80% $0.02 $3,572.62 $75,024.92 
19 -0.389 -0.389 na -0.389 -0.389 0.97% $21.71 $0.21 -32.20% -$0.07 -$5,219.43 -$109,608.10 
Average -0.116 -0.124 0.234 -0.797 0.618 0.78% $23.49 $0.18 -2.73% -$0.01 -$1,350.23 -$28,354.89 
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Table 4. Regression Results: Log of Percentage Effective Spread (NYSE) 
  
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of percentage effective spread based on NYSE 
quotes. See Appendix B, Panel A for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance 
levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual specialist 
dummies. F-stat is the value of F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different from each 
other and the p-value is the corresponding p-value for this F-test. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons of specialist dummy coefficients 
that are significantly different from each other at the 10% level for each firm. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy 
coefficients. Second part of Panel B reports the economic significance of the specialist dummies. "Average percentage quoted spread" and "average quote midpoint" are 
the average of percentage quoted spread and quote midpoint for each specialist firm. "Average dollar spread" is calculated by multiplying "average percentage quoted 
spread" and "average quote midpoint". "Mean deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the value of the estimated coefficient of a specialist dummy, then the 
predicted change in the dependent variable with respect to the excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted value of the 
dependent variable for the excluded and included specialists, respectively. Then, Y2=Y1xeb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is the mean 
value of all estimated specialist dummy variables for a given firm. "Mean deviation in $" is calculated by multiplying "average dollar spread" by "mean deviation in %". 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates and Test Results
Specialist Firm 
No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat
P-
Value
Pairwise 
Rejection
Rate
1 -2.372 *** -0.178 *** -0.026 *** -0.075 *** 0.272 *** -0.427 *** 0.172 *** -0.078 *** 0.204 *** 0.7884 0.8162 17.05 0.000 98.96%
2 -2.337 *** -0.193 *** 0.014 * -0.094 *** 0.219 *** -0.439 *** 0.181 *** -0.177 *** 0.028 0.8042 0.8289 18.36 0.000 95.86%
3 -1.640 *** -0.195 *** -0.028 ** -0.132 *** 0.177 *** -0.381 *** 0.369 *** -0.337 *** 0.009 0.7867 0.8049 7.21 0.000 83.40%
4 -2.393 *** -0.211 *** -0.024 *** -0.078 *** 0.313 *** -0.407 *** 0.186 *** -0.080 *** 0.028 0.8047 0.8273 18.42 0.000 89.53%
5 -1.726 *** -0.189 *** -0.024 *** -0.127 *** 0.311 *** -0.432 *** -0.046 -0.235 *** 0.081 *** 0.8132 0.8269 8.35 0.000 76.87%
6 -2.827 *** -0.240 *** -0.027 * -0.033 ** 0.359 *** -0.477 *** 0.096 -0.068 ** 0.205 *** 0.8322 0.8439 7.14 0.000 56.19%
7 -3.052 *** -0.150 *** 0.021 -0.106 *** 0.302 *** -0.393 *** 0.464 *** -0.258 *** -0.287 *** 0.4209 0.4272 2.17 0.007 85.71%
8 -2.282 *** -0.221 *** -0.084 *** -0.043 *** 0.390 *** -0.495 *** -0.237 *** -0.162 *** -0.029 0.7309 0.7431 6.47 0.000 89.09%
9 -2.282 *** -0.268 *** -0.013 -0.113 *** 0.312 *** -0.224 *** 0.141 -0.383 *** -0.009 0.8222 0.8302 5.71 0.000 48.89%
10 -0.829 *** -0.184 *** -0.060 *** -0.191 *** 0.287 *** -0.312 *** 0.037 -0.105 *** 0.101 ** 0.7779 0.7912 8.31 0.000 100.00%
11 -2.373 *** -0.190 *** 0.065 ** -0.226 *** 0.357 *** -0.118 *** 0.499 *** -0.272 *** 0.6586 0.6739 2.38 0.016 89.29%
12 -2.234 *** -0.128 *** 0.072 *** -0.208 *** 0.242 *** -0.250 *** -0.078 -0.098 *** 0.285 *** 0.8469 0.8549 11.09 0.000 66.67%
13 -1.961 *** -0.160 *** -0.020 -0.108 *** 0.247 *** -0.514 *** -0.096 -0.165 *** 0.097 ** 0.7674 0.7784 14.33 0.000 100.00%
14 -1.537 *** -0.150 *** 0.063 * -0.202 *** 0.112 *** -0.365 *** 0.202 -0.298 *** -0.056 0.8211 0.8203 0.69 0.601 0.00%
15 -2.476 *** -0.230 *** 0.058 *** -0.108 *** 0.282 *** -0.398 *** -0.072 -0.154 *** 0.010 0.7928 0.8001 13.67 0.000 100.00%
16 -1.782 *** -0.127 *** -0.034 ** -0.135 *** 0.345 *** -0.460 *** -0.094 -0.155 *** 0.068 0.8325 0.8362 6.15 0.000 83.33%
17 -1.426 * -0.031 0.086 -0.296 *** 0.108 *** -0.290 *** 0.157 -0.380 *** 0.154 0.3297 0.3393 4.22 0.006 100.00%
18 -2.036 *** -0.198 *** -0.061 -0.096 ** 0.437 *** -0.463 *** -0.500 ** -0.241 *** 0.225 ** 0.7892 0.7898 2.04 0.154 na
19 -0.866 ** -0.226 *** -0.096 *** -0.113 *** 0.272 *** -0.536 *** -0.548 *** -0.649 *** 0.8025 0.8204 53.57 0.000 na
Intercept
Log
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Regional 
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Log
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Panel B.            
 
Distribution of the Estimated Specialist 
Dummy Coefficients Economic Significance of the Estimates 
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
Av. % Effective 
Spread (NYSE) 
Av. Quote 
Midpoint 
Av. Dollar 
Spread 
Mean 
Deviation in %
Mean 
Deviation in $
1 -0.361 -0.354 0.164 -0.768 0.122 0.57% $34.99 $0.20 -30.29% -$0.06
2 -0.141 -0.170 0.176 -0.472 0.306 0.62% $26.11 $0.16 -13.13% -$0.02
3 -0.097 -0.118 0.176 -0.432 0.468 0.77% $26.37 $0.20 -9.23% -$0.02
4 -0.133 -0.148 0.151 -0.529 0.290 0.69% $25.89 $0.18 -12.47% -$0.02
5 -0.004 -0.044 0.189 -0.275 0.498 0.83% $22.23 $0.18 -0.41% $0.00
6 -0.071 -0.043 0.113 -0.276 0.072 0.62% $27.20 $0.17 -6.85% -$0.01
7 0.268 0.282 0.128 0.028 0.447 0.73% $22.87 $0.17 30.74% $0.05
8 0.070 0.095 0.125 -0.136 0.230 0.88% $22.76 $0.20 7.26% $0.01
9 0.077 -0.001 0.192 -0.180 0.439 0.71% $25.88 $0.18 8.03% $0.01
10 -0.281 -0.276 0.119 -0.440 -0.020 1.10% $19.05 $0.21 -24.52% -$0.05
11 0.275 0.245 0.172 0.122 0.650 0.68% $23.30 $0.16 31.70% $0.05
12 0.012 0.058 0.108 -0.156 0.148 0.73% $23.64 $0.17 1.17% $0.00
13 -0.035 -0.068 0.138 -0.200 0.166 0.78% $20.17 $0.16 -3.45% -$0.01
14 -0.172 -0.162 0.071 -0.282 -0.105 0.85% $20.45 $0.17 -15.79% -$0.03
15 -0.088 -0.124 0.100 -0.187 0.070 0.83% $19.54 $0.16 -8.46% -$0.01
16 -0.049 -0.050 0.071 -0.146 0.020 0.77% $23.09 $0.18 -4.75% -$0.01
17 0.126 0.181 0.184 -0.137 0.280 0.90% $19.28 $0.17 13.46% $0.02
18 0.074 0.074 0.079 0.018 0.130 0.80% $21.81 $0.17 7.67% $0.01
19 -0.395 -0.395 na -0.395 -0.395 0.99% $21.71 $0.21 -32.66% -$0.07
Average -0.117 -0.135 0.224 -0.768 0.650 0.78% $23.49 $0.18 -3.26% -$0.01
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Table 5. Regression Results: Log of Total Quoted Share Depth 
         
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of total quoted share depth. See Appendix B, 
Panel A for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-
statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different from each other and the p-value is the 
corresponding p-value for this F-test. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons of specialist dummy coefficients that are significantly different 
from each other at the 10% level for each firm. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy coefficients. Second part of Panel B 
reports the economic significance of the specialist dummies. "Mean deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the value of the estimated coefficient of a specialist 
dummy, then the predicted change in the dependent variable with respect to the excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted 
value of the dependent variable for the excluded and included specialists, respectively. Then, Y2=Y1xeb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is 
the mean value of all estimated specialist dummy variables for a given firm. "Mean deviation in shares" is calculated by multiplying "average total quoted share" by "mean 
deviation in %". 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates and Test Results
Specialist Firm 
No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat
P-
Value
Pairwise 
Rejection
Rate
1 -0.087 0.097 *** 0.470 *** 0.091 *** -0.138 *** -0.434 *** 0.069 0.316 *** 0.007 0.5307 0.5666 10.01 0.000 45.38%
2 -0.193 ** 0.093 *** 0.487 *** 0.054 *** -0.092 *** -0.339 *** 0.123 *** 0.210 *** 0.118 *** 0.4565 0.5166 16.05 0.000 86.36%
3 -0.048 0.098 *** 0.513 *** 0.056 *** -0.082 *** -0.352 *** 0.117 * 0.332 *** 0.065 0.5640 0.5870 4.82 0.000 61.77%
4 -0.049 0.134 *** 0.471 *** 0.062 *** -0.183 *** -0.460 *** -0.005 0.281 *** -0.114 *** 0.5081 0.5568 15.37 0.000 94.82%
5 0.291 ** 0.052 *** 0.436 *** 0.084 *** -0.138 *** -0.371 *** 0.034 0.152 *** 0.096 *** 0.4542 0.4714 4.20 0.000 47.53%
6 0.212 0.133 *** 0.546 *** 0.033 -0.247 *** -0.425 *** 0.105 0.056 0.115 0.5218 0.5482 5.77 0.000 57.14%
7 0.616 *** 0.102 *** 0.403 *** 0.080 *** -0.188 *** -0.483 *** -0.037 0.420 *** 0.717 *** 0.5130 0.5371 10.65 0.000 76.92%
8 0.794 *** 0.058 *** 0.494 *** 0.072 *** -0.213 *** -0.437 *** -0.107 0.168 *** -0.263 *** 0.6056 0.6618 18.56 0.000 100.00%
9 1.224 *** 0.015 0.309 *** 0.082 *** -0.068 ** -0.310 *** 0.099 0.093 * 0.063 0.3212 0.3395 3.72 0.000 57.78%
10 0.251 0.113 *** 0.418 *** 0.096 *** -0.153 *** -0.536 *** -0.098 0.309 *** -0.060 0.5913 0.6187 15.54 0.000 86.67%
11 -0.310 0.074 ** 0.478 *** 0.128 *** -0.151 *** -0.479 *** -0.664 *** 0.310 *** 0.5260 0.5401 3.21 0.001 35.71%
12 0.151 0.060 *** 0.389 *** 0.106 *** -0.072 *** -0.385 *** 0.261 ** 0.031 0.119 0.5070 0.5319 9.69 0.000 93.33%
13 0.502 * 0.124 *** 0.433 *** 0.061 ** -0.129 *** -0.429 *** 0.031 0.504 *** 0.102 0.4330 0.4668 15.72 0.000 100.00%
14 -0.291 0.094 ** 0.418 *** 0.161 *** -0.069 *** -0.552 *** 0.270 0.292 *** 0.088 0.5794 0.5783 0.87 0.484 0.00%
15 0.561 ** 0.120 *** 0.405 *** 0.090 *** -0.172 *** -0.510 *** -0.002 0.371 *** 0.376 *** 0.3547 0.3808 18.81 0.000 83.33%
16 -0.143 0.056 ** 0.310 *** 0.237 *** -0.154 *** -0.627 *** -0.093 0.311 *** -0.110 * 0.4373 0.4549 6.34 0.000 100.00%
17 0.270 0.029 0.433 *** 0.123 *** -0.061 *** -0.447 *** 0.007 0.173 *** -0.324 *** 0.5327 0.5563 3.06 0.028 100.00%
18 -1.141 * 0.024 0.534 *** 0.159 *** -0.239 *** -0.395 *** 0.833 ** 0.231 ** -0.203 0.5286 0.5273 0.52 0.471 na
19 -1.781 *** 0.210 *** 0.487 *** 0.266 *** -0.294 *** -0.853 *** 0.238 1.035 *** 0.5844 0.5892 7.14 0.008 na
Intercept
Log
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Log
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Log
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Log
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Panel B.          
 
Distribution of the Estimated Specialist 
Dummy Coefficients Economic Significance of the Estimates 
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
Average Total Quoted 
Share Depth 
Mean 
Deviation in % 
Mean Deviation 
in Shares 
1 -0.002 -0.026 0.185 -0.386 0.465 5,492.00 -0.18% -10.14
2 0.203 0.158 0.224 -0.150 1.139 4,623.27 22.52% 1,041.08
3 -0.071 -0.074 0.161 -0.382 0.565 4,860.18 -6.90% -335.36
4 0.290 0.267 0.181 0.010 0.763 4,635.63 33.60% 1,557.45
5 -0.010 -0.030 0.138 -0.319 0.242 4,629.23 -1.00% -46.34
6 -0.075 -0.060 0.176 -0.401 0.294 4,230.79 -7.19% -304.23
7 0.003 -0.024 0.149 -0.173 0.289 4,835.98 0.29% 14.02
8 -0.332 -0.284 0.233 -0.795 0.105 5,408.40 -28.28% -1,529.35
9 -0.043 -0.041 0.134 -0.272 0.210 4,366.73 -4.20% -183.39
10 0.136 0.163 0.191 -0.169 0.522 4,630.32 14.56% 673.96
11 -0.094 -0.077 0.147 -0.329 0.066 3,601.83 -8.96% -322.89
12 0.148 0.158 0.144 -0.059 0.358 4,361.82 15.93% 694.90
13 -0.192 -0.255 0.184 -0.320 0.211 5,586.19 -17.49% -977.26
14 -0.208 -0.227 0.098 -0.333 -0.103 3,704.50 -18.81% -696.87
15 -0.019 -0.070 0.189 -0.170 0.305 5,410.25 -1.88% -101.60
16 -0.170 -0.182 0.114 -0.274 0.014 4,382.10 -15.63% -684.95
17 -0.271 -0.278 0.061 -0.338 -0.190 5,865.12 -23.75% -1,393.05
18 -0.101 -0.101 0.060 -0.143 -0.059 4,145.69 -9.59% -397.71
19 0.219 0.219 na 0.219 0.219 5,712.60 24.46% 1,397.54
Average 0.043 0.027 0.234 -0.795 1.139 4,762.24 -1.71% -84.43
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Table 6. Regression Results: Log of Total Quoted Dollar Depth 
         
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of total quoted dollar depth. See Appendix B, Panel 
A for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-statistic 
for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different from each other and the p-value is the corresponding p-
value for this F-test. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons of specialist dummy coefficients that are significantly different from each other at 
the 10% level for each firm. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy coefficients. Second part of Panel B reports the economic 
significance of the specialist dummies. "Average percentage quoted spread" and "average quote midpoint" are the average of percentage quoted spread and quote midpoint 
for each specialist firm. "Mean deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the value of the estimated coefficient of a specialist dummy, then the predicted change in the 
dependent variable with respect to the excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted value of the dependent variable for the excluded 
and included specialists, respectively. Then, Y2=Y1xeb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is the mean value of all estimated specialist dummy 
variables for a given firm. "Mean deviation in $" is calculated by multiplying "average total quoted dollar depth" by "mean deviation in %". 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates and Test Results
Specialist Firm 
No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat
P-
Value
Pairwise 
Rejection
Rate
1 -0.087 0.097 *** 0.470 *** 0.091 *** -0.138 *** 0.566 *** 0.068 0.316 *** 0.007 0.6925 0.7160 10.01 0.000 45.32%
2 -0.189 ** 0.094 *** 0.487 *** 0.053 *** -0.093 *** 0.662 *** 0.124 *** 0.210 *** 0.117 *** 0.7015 0.7345 16.06 0.000 86.24%
3 -0.051 0.099 *** 0.514 *** 0.055 *** -0.083 *** 0.649 *** 0.117 * 0.331 *** 0.065 * 0.7285 0.7427 4.80 0.000 61.26%
4 -0.049 0.134 *** 0.471 *** 0.062 *** -0.184 *** 0.541 *** -0.006 0.281 *** -0.114 *** 0.6925 0.7229 15.33 0.000 94.82%
5 0.287 ** 0.052 *** 0.436 *** 0.084 *** -0.138 *** 0.630 *** 0.033 0.153 *** 0.097 *** 0.6997 0.7092 4.20 0.000 47.96%
6 0.213 0.134 *** 0.546 *** 0.032 -0.248 *** 0.576 *** 0.106 0.056 0.115 0.6930 0.7100 5.76 0.000 57.14%
7 0.617 *** 0.102 *** 0.403 *** 0.080 *** -0.188 *** 0.517 *** -0.036 0.420 *** 0.718 *** 0.6986 0.7135 10.64 0.000 76.92%
8 0.796 *** 0.058 *** 0.494 *** 0.072 *** -0.214 *** 0.562 *** -0.106 0.167 *** -0.263 *** 0.6299 0.6827 18.60 0.000 100.00%
9 1.230 *** 0.016 0.308 *** 0.081 *** -0.069 ** 0.690 *** 0.097 0.094 * 0.063 0.6888 0.6973 3.74 0.000 57.78%
10 0.250 0.113 *** 0.417 *** 0.097 *** -0.154 *** 0.463 *** -0.100 0.309 *** -0.060 0.6405 0.6646 15.54 0.000 86.67%
11 -0.318 0.074 ** 0.478 *** 0.128 *** -0.151 *** 0.524 *** -0.662 *** 0.310 *** 0.6636 0.6736 3.21 0.001 35.71%
12 0.147 0.060 *** 0.389 *** 0.106 *** -0.071 *** 0.614 *** 0.260 ** 0.031 0.117 0.7659 0.7777 9.65 0.000 93.33%
13 0.511 * 0.124 *** 0.432 *** 0.061 ** -0.129 *** 0.571 *** 0.031 0.503 *** 0.104 0.6120 0.6352 15.78 0.000 100.00%
14 -0.286 0.094 ** 0.417 *** 0.162 *** -0.070 *** 0.448 *** 0.268 0.291 *** 0.086 0.6365 0.6356 0.86 0.487 0.00%
15 0.562 ** 0.121 *** 0.405 *** 0.089 *** -0.174 *** 0.491 *** -0.001 0.373 *** 0.378 *** 0.5944 0.6109 18.95 0.000 83.33%
16 -0.148 0.056 ** 0.311 *** 0.237 *** -0.155 *** 0.373 *** -0.092 0.312 *** -0.109 * 0.6644 0.6750 6.33 0.000 100.00%
17 0.280 0.030 0.432 *** 0.123 *** -0.062 *** 0.552 *** 0.008 0.174 *** -0.324 *** 0.6997 0.7148 3.05 0.028 100.00%
18 -1.138 * 0.023 0.533 *** 0.160 *** -0.238 *** 0.603 *** 0.832 ** 0.231 ** -0.203 0.6053 0.6042 0.54 0.462 na
19 -1.794 *** 0.210 *** 0.488 *** 0.266 *** -0.294 *** 0.150 ** 0.241 1.037 *** 0.6473 0.6514 7.20 0.008 na
Foreign
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Panel B.          
 
Distribution of the Estimated Specialist 
Dummy Coefficients Economic Significance of the Estimates 
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
Average  
Total Quoted  
Dollar Depth 
Mean 
Deviation in % 
Mean 
Deviation in $ 
1 -0.002 -0.027 0.185 -0.388 0.465 $110,198.58 -0.24% -$266.50
2 0.202 0.157 0.224 -0.151 1.139 $105,227.43 22.42% $23,594.37
3 -0.072 -0.074 0.161 -0.382 0.565 $106,680.16 -6.91% -$7,370.11
4 0.290 0.268 0.180 0.011 0.760 $96,041.93 33.62% $32,287.88
5 -0.009 -0.029 0.138 -0.317 0.243 $84,473.88 -0.88% -$743.38
6 -0.074 -0.059 0.176 -0.401 0.294 $97,084.20 -7.17% -$6,958.69
7 0.002 -0.025 0.149 -0.174 0.287 $87,305.43 0.20% $171.10
8 -0.332 -0.284 0.234 -0.796 0.107 $85,454.28 -28.27% -$24,160.74
9 -0.042 -0.040 0.134 -0.272 0.211 $96,313.50 -4.14% -$3,989.88
10 0.135 0.166 0.191 -0.169 0.521 $60,833.35 14.47% $8,800.43
11 -0.093 -0.076 0.147 -0.329 0.066 $77,673.34 -8.92% -$6,932.19
12 0.147 0.159 0.144 -0.060 0.357 $89,024.96 15.89% $14,142.87
13 -0.192 -0.255 0.184 -0.319 0.212 $91,496.02 -17.44% -$15,955.71
14 -0.209 -0.227 0.098 -0.334 -0.103 $59,853.57 -18.83% -$11,270.48
15 -0.021 -0.071 0.189 -0.173 0.304 $86,048.74 -2.04% -$1,753.84
16 -0.170 -0.182 0.114 -0.274 0.014 $85,567.29 -15.67% -$13,407.46
17 -0.270 -0.277 0.061 -0.337 -0.190 $98,624.85 -23.69% -$23,361.36
18 -0.102 -0.102 0.061 -0.144 -0.059 $71,770.09 -9.65% -$6,927.81
19 0.219 0.219 na 0.219 0.219 $81,369.85 24.54% $19,971.76
Average 0.043 0.027 0.234 -0.796 1.139 $87,949.55 -1.72% -$1,269.99
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Table 7. Regression Results: Log of Price Improvement 
        
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of price improvement. See Appendix B, Panel A 
for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-statistic 
for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different from each other and the p-value is the corresponding 
p-value for this F-test. Pairwise rejection rate is the percentage of all pairwise comparisons of specialist dummy coefficients that are significantly different from each other 
at the 10% level for each firm. The first part of Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy coefficients. Second part of Panel B reports the 
economic significance of the specialist dummies. "Mean deviation in %" is calculated as follows: If b is the value of the estimated coefficient of a specialist dummy, then 
the predicted change in the dependent variable with respect to the excluded specialist is given by log(Y2)-log(Y1)=b, where log(Yi), i=1,2 is the predicted value of the 
dependent variable for the excluded and included specialists, respectively. Then, Y2=Y1xeb and "mean deviation in %" is given by (Y2-Y1)/Y1=eb-1, where b is the mean 
value of all estimated specialist dummy variables for a given firm. "Mean deviation from average price improvement" is calculated by multiplying "average price 
improvement" by "mean deviation in %". 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates and Test Results
Specialist Firm 
No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat
P-
Value
Pairwise 
Rejection
Rate
1 -0.721 *** -0.045 *** -0.081 *** 0.046 *** -0.002 0.034 *** -0.429 *** -0.193 *** -0.067 *** 0.1299 0.2119 11.93 0.000 73.83%
2 -0.522 *** -0.054 *** -0.082 *** 0.013 ** 0.037 *** 0.099 *** -0.472 *** -0.242 *** -0.143 *** 0.1522 0.2280 12.62 0.000 63.74%
3 -0.780 *** -0.048 *** -0.051 *** 0.009 0.028 *** 0.115 *** -0.456 *** -0.207 *** -0.067 ** 0.1407 0.2341 9.18 0.000 72.12%
4 -0.846 *** -0.070 *** -0.083 *** 0.033 *** 0.049 *** 0.114 *** -0.257 *** -0.169 *** -0.082 *** 0.1158 0.1838 11.73 0.000 74.09%
5 -0.542 *** -0.076 *** -0.083 *** 0.035 *** 0.039 *** 0.061 *** -0.591 *** -0.225 *** -0.093 *** 0.1325 0.1849 6.83 0.000 67.86%
6 -0.779 *** -0.034 ** -0.064 *** 0.003 0.030 0.097 *** -0.312 *** -0.025 0.027 0.0840 0.1213 4.42 0.000 43.81%
7 -0.903 *** -0.078 *** -0.062 *** 0.043 *** 0.058 *** 0.072 *** -0.511 *** -0.266 *** -0.167 *** 0.1332 0.1870 12.78 0.000 81.32%
8 -1.168 *** -0.135 *** -0.085 *** 0.070 *** 0.105 *** 0.146 *** -0.790 *** -0.179 *** -0.004 0.2676 0.2930 5.00 0.000 54.55%
9 -1.391 *** -0.136 *** -0.074 *** 0.097 *** 0.061 ** 0.043 -0.319 *** -0.343 *** -0.330 *** 0.1503 0.1521 1.14 0.325 40.00%
10 -0.618 *** -0.122 *** -0.116 *** 0.044 ** 0.083 *** 0.143 *** -0.368 *** -0.279 *** -0.144 ** 0.2514 0.2867 10.38 0.000 82.22%
11 -0.836 *** -0.066 *** -0.031 0.023 0.040 0.056 -0.802 *** -0.073 0.1375 0.1506 2.15 0.030 21.43%
12 -1.512 *** -0.078 *** -0.001 0.033 0.041 ** 0.128 *** -0.254 ** -0.229 *** -0.174 ** 0.1270 0.2428 26.71 0.000 80.00%
13 -0.392 * -0.107 *** -0.157 *** 0.023 0.063 *** 0.211 *** -0.193 * -0.375 *** 0.073 0.2500 0.2806 11.58 0.000 93.33%
14 0.421 0.001 -0.197 *** -0.028 0.019 0.078 -0.153 -0.212 *** 0.036 0.1947 0.1842 0.34 0.851 0.00%
15 -1.217 *** -0.137 *** -0.029 0.022 0.110 *** 0.245 *** -0.579 *** -0.189 *** -0.061 0.2098 0.2499 21.85 0.000 83.33%
16 0.131 0.042 ** -0.048 ** -0.105 *** 0.042 * 0.236 *** -0.438 *** -0.335 *** -0.187 *** 0.1734 0.1961 5.79 0.000 83.33%
17 -0.469 -0.063 ** -0.125 *** 0.028 0.017 0.016 -0.346 *** -0.359 *** -0.404 *** 0.2149 0.2390 3.38 0.018 100.00%
18 0.252 0.041 -0.110 ** -0.042 0.040 -0.051 -0.256 -0.082 0.001 0.0597 0.0685 2.09 0.149 na
19 0.651 * -0.178 *** -0.276 *** 0.029 0.133 *** 0.232 *** -0.391 ** -0.344 *** 0.3489 0.3665 14.59 0.000 na
Fund Foreign
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Panel B.          
 
Distribution of the Estimated Specialist 
Dummy Coefficients Economic Significance of the Estimates 
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
Average Price 
Improvement 
Mean 
Deviation in % 
Mean 
Deviation from 
Average Price 
Improvement 
1 -0.162 -0.133 0.146 -0.601 0.167 38.01% -14.92% -5.67%
2 -0.067 -0.041 0.129 -0.478 0.155 38.24% -6.49% -2.48%
3 -0.035 -0.049 0.153 -0.435 0.305 39.88% -3.43% -1.37%
4 -0.089 -0.083 0.121 -0.409 0.167 37.86% -8.52% -3.23%
5 -0.034 -0.021 0.149 -0.325 0.288 40.15% -3.32% -1.33%
6 0.017 0.027 0.105 -0.226 0.206 37.85% 1.70% 0.64%
7 -0.040 -0.009 0.112 -0.287 0.105 38.44% -3.89% -1.49%
8 -0.076 -0.086 0.112 -0.209 0.203 34.05% -7.36% -2.50%
9 0.071 0.041 0.067 -0.013 0.170 35.60% 7.37% 2.62%
10 -0.066 -0.099 0.164 -0.336 0.200 37.49% -6.36% -2.39%
11 0.050 0.030 0.086 -0.060 0.199 42.19% 5.09% 2.15%
12 0.028 0.033 0.210 -0.362 0.323 39.09% 2.79% 1.09%
13 -0.035 -0.021 0.136 -0.261 0.131 36.27% -3.39% -1.23%
14 0.106 0.096 0.040 0.074 0.176 37.54% 11.24% 4.22%
15 0.059 0.036 0.148 -0.145 0.262 39.80% 6.12% 2.43%
16 -0.135 -0.182 0.114 -0.267 -0.010 34.74% -12.65% -4.39%
17 0.225 0.226 0.082 0.123 0.323 32.98% 25.19% 8.31%
18 0.065 0.065 0.085 0.005 0.125 38.30% 6.74% 2.58%
19 -0.198 -0.198 na -0.198 -0.198 46.77% -17.93% -8.38%
Average -0.062 -0.053 0.149 -0.601 0.323 38.17% -1.16% -0.55%
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Table 8. Pooled Regression Results
Specialist
Firm No Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
1 -0.152 0.000 0.374 0.000 -0.113 0.000 0.648 0.000 -0.114 0.000 0.622 0.000
2 -0.019 0.030 0.324 0.000 -0.033 0.003 0.407 0.000 -0.025 0.020 0.416 0.000
3 0.045 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.025 0.044 0.430 0.000 0.029 0.013 0.435 0.000
4 -0.009 0.343 0.305 0.000 0.016 0.154 0.426 0.000 0.023 0.031 0.442 0.000
5 0.041 0.000 0.252 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.437 0.000
6 -0.080 0.000 0.107 0.111 -0.089 0.000 0.121 0.162 -0.080 0.000 0.137 0.094
8 0.031 0.020 0.175 0.000 0.051 0.002 0.273 0.000 0.052 0.001 0.275 0.000
9 0.104 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.397 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.361 0.000
10 0.109 0.000 0.469 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.634 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.630 0.000
11 -0.017 0.366 -0.075 0.150 -0.009 0.696 0.121 0.073 0.004 0.840 0.125 0.050
12 0.001 0.938 0.158 0.001 -0.038 0.035 0.276 0.000 -0.037 0.030 0.276 0.000
13 -0.058 0.000 0.184 0.000 -0.028 0.082 0.310 0.000 -0.024 0.111 0.312 0.000
14 -0.042 0.095 0.103 0.480 -0.021 0.498 0.418 0.026 -0.028 0.359 0.405 0.023
15 0.073 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.025 0.118 0.389 0.000 0.038 0.011 0.404 0.000
16 0.071 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.060 0.001 0.384 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.396 0.000
17 -0.081 0.000 -0.109 0.016 -0.052 0.009 0.131 0.024 -0.054 0.005 0.148 0.008
18 -0.079 0.002 0.100 0.067 -0.062 0.056 0.253 0.000 -0.064 0.040 0.253 0.000
19 -0.016 0.404 0.152 0.000 -0.049 0.038 0.283 0.000 -0.045 0.049 0.287 0.000
Adj. R2
H0: D2=D3=...=D19=0
F-Stat
P-value
Log of % Quoted Spread Log of % Effective Spread (NBBO) Log of % Effective Spread (NYSE)
Full ModelFull Model Base Model
0.0000 0.0000
74.93% 76.57%
This Table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values for the specialist firm dummies and adjusted R2 
for both the base model, where individual specialist dummies are excluded, and the full model, where individual
specialist dummies are included. In addition, F-stats and the associated p-values are reported for the null hypothesis
that specialist firm dummies are equal. Specialist Firm 7 is the excluded firm.
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Base Model Full Model Base Model
81.69% 83.69% 72.38% 74.00%
55.7823 15.058896.2510 20.2706 49.1576 13.7579
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Table 8. cont'd
Specialist
Firm No Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value
1 0.029 0.021 0.024 0.798 0.029 0.022 0.023 0.802 -0.030 0.003 0.121 0.098
2 0.017 0.169 -0.213 0.000 0.017 0.177 -0.213 0.000 -0.023 0.020 0.023 0.613
3 0.133 0.000 0.135 0.025 0.133 0.000 0.134 0.026 -0.012 0.270 -0.018 0.719
4 -0.010 0.420 -0.326 0.000 -0.010 0.406 -0.327 0.000 -0.052 0.000 -0.016 0.771
5 0.038 0.005 -0.012 0.807 0.038 0.005 -0.014 0.774 0.055 0.000 0.071 0.077
6 0.063 0.001 0.224 0.018 0.063 0.001 0.222 0.019 -0.066 0.000 -0.114 0.126
8 0.167 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.433 0.000 -0.120 0.000 -0.037 0.510
9 0.105 0.000 0.091 0.091 0.105 0.000 0.090 0.096 -0.086 0.000 -0.173 0.000
10 -0.030 0.071 -0.250 0.000 -0.030 0.069 -0.250 0.000 -0.060 0.000 0.028 0.571
11 -0.030 0.239 -0.079 0.283 -0.031 0.232 -0.081 0.273 0.058 0.004 0.036 0.548
12 0.051 0.011 -0.075 0.270 0.051 0.012 -0.076 0.262 -0.037 0.019 -0.149 0.006
13 0.009 0.613 0.045 0.420 0.009 0.610 0.044 0.429 -0.116 0.000 -0.016 0.731
14 -0.032 0.361 0.139 0.501 -0.032 0.357 0.139 0.501 0.004 0.884 -0.067 0.676
15 0.077 0.000 0.011 0.834 0.077 0.000 0.011 0.841 -0.002 0.904 -0.057 0.192
16 -0.006 0.759 0.061 0.260 -0.007 0.735 0.060 0.268 0.006 0.699 0.005 0.912
17 0.006 0.788 0.110 0.087 0.006 0.788 0.108 0.092 -0.092 0.000 -0.349 0.000
18 0.040 0.268 0.023 0.766 0.041 0.262 0.024 0.761 0.025 0.381 -0.055 0.372
19 0.008 0.773 -0.019 0.708 0.006 0.811 -0.021 0.677 0.093 0.000 0.070 0.098
Adj. R2
H0: D2=D3=...=D19=0
F-Stat
P-value
20.9249 11.7815 26.3523 9.3786
Log of Total Quoted Share Depth Log of Total Quoted Dollar Depth Log of Price Improvement
Base Model Full Model Base Model Full Model Base Model Full Model
49.15% 53.05% 68.51% 70.92% 12.04% 18.14%
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
20.8895 11.8048
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Table 9. Regression Results: Log of Order Processing Costs 
          
This Table  reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is log of order processing 
costs. See Appendix B, Panel A for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and 
after adding the individual specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist 
dummies are not statistically significantly different from each other and the p-value is the corresponding p-value for this F-test.  
 
Specialist 
Firm No
Adj. R2 
(Before)
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat
P
value
1 3.794 *** 0.103 *** 0.022 0.033 * -0.216 *** -0.297 *** 0.212 * 0.053 -0.090 0.0555 0.0851 3.61 0.000
2 3.582 *** 0.065 *** 0.044 *** 0.045 *** -0.153 *** -0.270 *** -0.022 0.019 0.009 0.0955 0.1469 6.61 0.000
3 3.751 *** 0.026 0.018 0.045 *** -0.094 *** -0.160 *** 0.258 ** 0.102 ** 0.027 0.0628 0.1012 3.03 0.000
4 4.003 *** 0.044 *** 0.006 0.034 ** -0.145 *** -0.225 *** 0.101 0.117 *** -0.002 0.0462 0.0830 4.98 0.000
5 4.242 *** 0.076 *** 0.035 * -0.020 -0.171 *** -0.143 *** 0.018 0.051 0.019 0.0544 0.0763 2.47 0.000
6 4.250 *** 0.088 *** 0.035 -0.024 -0.267 *** -0.139 *** 0.102 0.043 0.087 0.0570 0.0854 3.00 0.000
7 3.869 *** 0.131 *** 0.011 0.050 *** -0.179 *** -0.384 *** 0.018 0.087 * 0.132 * 0.1331 0.1651 5.40 0.000
8 3.327 *** 0.046 0.033 0.081 ** -0.190 *** -0.252 *** 0.057 0.094 -0.031 0.1231 0.1422 2.72 0.002
9 4.266 *** 0.010 -0.026 0.043 -0.229 *** -0.189 *** 0.071 -0.096 0.126 0.0560 0.0923 3.74 0.000
10 4.524 *** 0.075 ** -0.086 *** 0.055 * -0.152 *** -0.305 *** -0.113 0.052 0.132 0.1180 0.1405 3.89 0.000
11 3.601 *** 0.099 * -0.002 0.031 -0.153 *** -0.133 * -0.122 0.134 * 0.0709 0.0726 1.18 0.308
12 3.139 *** 0.051 0.050 0.033 -0.076 *** -0.128 ** 0.151 0.113 * -0.106 0.0458 0.0910 6.24 0.000
13 3.867 *** 0.072 * 0.064 * 0.001 -0.151 *** -0.217 *** 0.207 0.061 0.005 0.0805 0.0885 2.34 0.030
14 4.661 *** 0.301 ** -0.024 -0.115 -0.051 -0.192 -0.104 0.477 *** -0.035 0.0876 0.0686 0.41 0.801
15 3.834 *** 0.016 0.037 0.058 * -0.174 *** -0.252 *** -0.335 * 0.223 *** 0.130 0.0522 0.0653 3.51 0.007
16 4.263 *** 0.056 0.034 0.006 -0.189 *** -0.213 *** -0.122 0.044 0.041 0.0645 0.0896 5.58 0.000
17 4.412 *** 0.135 ** -0.048 0.074 -0.215 *** -0.530 *** -0.478 ** 0.095 -0.186 0.1852 0.1832 0.68 0.564
18 4.185 *** 0.356 ** 0.272 *** -0.353 *** -0.251 ** 0.297 1.884 ** -0.028 0.180 0.1508 0.1445 0.93 0.335
19 4.566 *** 0.019 -0.068 -0.023 -0.171 *** 0.050 0.726 0.008 0.0242 0.0283 2.04 0.155
Fund ForeignIntercept
Log
(# of 
Trades)
Log
(Trade 
Size)
Log
(Market 
Cap.) Volatility
Log
(Quote 
Midpoint)
% of 
Regional 
Trades
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Table 10. Regression Results for Each Specialist Firm.  
    
This table reports the coefficient estimates for the trading frequency, from estimating equation (3) for 
each specialist firm. 
    
    
    
Specialist Firm Log(Number of Trades) 
(P-
Value)  
BEAR HUNTER SPECIALIST LLC 0.0768 (0.0000)  
BEAR HUNTER STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 0.0646 (0.6518)  
BENJAMIN JACOBSON AND SONS LLC 0.0596 (0.1266)  
BOCKLET AND CO. LLC 0.0736 (0.0000)  
BUTTONWOOD/ALBERT FRIED & CO LLC -0.0611 (0.2964)  
FLEET MEEHAN SPECIALIST INC 0.0479 (0.0000)  
FREEDOM SPECIALISTS/ADRIAN/RPM SPE 0.4140 (0.0035)  
LABRANCHE & CO/FREEDOM/ADRIAN & CO 0.1360 (0.0000)  
LABRANCHE AND CO. 0.1075 (0.0000)  
LYDEN, DOLAN, NICK & CO.,LLC. 0.0341 (0.0038)  
PERFORMANCE SPECIALIST GROUP, L.P. 0.0715 (0.0000)  
RPM SPECIALIST CORP. 0.0983 (0.0016)  
SCAVONE,MC KENNA,CLOUD AND CO LLC 0.0374 (0.0086)  
SPEAR, LEEDS AND KELLOGG SPEC. LLC 0.0681 (0.0000)  
STERN AND KENNEDY 0.1216 (0.0000)  
SUSQUEHANNA SPECIALISTS 0.0554 (0.0000)  
VAN DER MOOLEN SPECIALIST USA LLC 0.0729 (0.0000)  
WAGNER STOTT BEAR SPECIALISTS LLC 0.0552 (0.0000)  
WAGNER STOTT MERCATOR LLC 0.0368 (0.0020)  
WALTER N. FRANK AND CO. LLC 0.0619 (0.0000)  
WEISKOPF, SILVER SPECIALISTS,  LLC 0.1243 (0.0000)  
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Table 11.  Distribution of Estimated Coefficients for Trading Frequency 
for Individual Specialist Portfolios 
      
This table reports the distribution of coefficient estimates for the trading frequency, from 
estimating equation (3) for each individual specialist portfolio. 
      
Panel A.       
      
  
All 
Coefficients  
Significant 
Coefficients   
Mean 0.09  0.12   
Median  0.08  0.11   
      
Minimum -0.23  -0.23   
10th Percentile -0.01  0.06   
20th Percentile 0.03  0.07   
30th Percentile 0.05  0.08   
40th Percentile 0.07  0.10   
50th Percentile 0.08  0.11   
60th Percentile 0.10  0.12   
70th Percentile 0.12  0.14   
80th Percentile 0.14  0.17   
90th Percentile 0.18  0.21   
Maximum 0.78  0.78   
      
# of negative coefficients  35  11   
# of positive coefficients 304  231   
      
# of significant coefficients at the 1% level  184   
# of significant coefficients at the 5% level  220   
# of significant coefficients at the 10% level  242   
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Panel B. Histogram of All Estimated Coefficients     
 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Panel C. Histogram of Significant Coefficients     
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Table 12. Percentage Specialist Participation to the Quotes         
                  
Panel A reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is the average of mean 
percentage specialist participation at the bid and ask. See Appendix B, Panel B for the names of the specialist firms and the number of 
individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of 
F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not statistically significantly different from each 
other and the p-value is the corresponding p-value for this F-test. Panel B reports the distribution of the estimated specialist dummy 
coefficients. 
                  
Panel A: Percentage Specialist Participation to the Quotes                
Specialist 
Firm No Intercept 
Log(Number 
of Trades) 
Log 
(Trade Size) 
Log(Market 
Capitalization) Volatility 
Log(Quote 
Midpoint) 
Adj. R2 
(Before) 
Adj. R2 
(After) F-Stat P-value 
Pairwise 
Tests 
1 0.189  -0.017 ** 0.008  -0.026 *** 0.049 *** 0.126 *** 0.3459 0.6112 24.49 0.000 69.05%
2 2.123 *** -0.019 * -0.009  -0.089 *** 0.022 *** 0.023  0.0617 0.3581 14.87 0.000 98.42%
3 -1.205 ** -0.011  0.027 ** 0.053 ** 0.013 *** 0.166 * 0.3290 0.5895 14.07 0.000 50.00%
4 0.319 ** 0.000  -0.026 ** -0.032 *** 0.042 *** 0.166 *** 0.3582 0.5482 13.65 0.000 91.11%
5 -0.896  -0.019  0.072 *** 0.040  -0.008  0.060  0.2146 0.5078 5.39 0.000 37.78%
6 -1.564 *** 0.004  0.001  0.153 *** 0.009  -0.005  0.2826 0.4902 16.63 0.000 100.00%
7 0.304 * 0.004  -0.048 *** 0.002  0.070 *** 0.033  0.1419 0.2870 8.56 0.000 40.00%
8 4.814  0.029  -0.133 *** -0.173  0.025  -0.219  0.6503 0.6824 2.15 0.074 0.00%
9 -0.996 *** -0.004  0.036 *** 0.103 *** 0.010  -0.192 *** 0.4834 0.5804 15.57 0.000 100.00%
10 0.019  -0.055 *** -0.028  0.011  0.055 ** 0.130 *** 0.3855 0.4211 3.54 0.017 100.00%
11 1.333 *** 0.004  -0.020  -0.134 *** 0.098 *** 0.278 *** 0.2924 0.3350 9.14 0.003 na 
12 48.620 * -0.019  -0.030  -5.619 * 0.020  4.776  0.2106 0.2403 2.99 0.090 na 
13 8.893 *** -0.019   -0.006   -1.206 *** 0.062 * 2.482 *** 0.0610 0.1779 17.78 0.000 na 
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Panel B. Distribution of the Absolute Value of the Estimated Specialist 
Dummy Coefficients 
      
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max 
1 0.09 0.06 0.10 -0.09 0.31 
2 -0.55 -0.54 0.24 -1.03 -0.10 
3 -0.04 -0.03 0.19 -0.39 0.38 
4 0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.09 0.26 
5 -0.11 -0.15 0.14 -0.33 0.16 
6 -0.28 -0.30 0.13 -0.46 -0.07 
7 0.07 0.04 0.11 -0.03 0.29 
8 -1.07 -0.97 0.80 -1.88 0.02 
9 -0.04 -0.05 0.24 -0.29 0.22 
10 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.15 
11 -0.11 -0.11 na -0.11 -0.11 
12 27.42 27.42 na 27.42 27.42 
13 -0.08 -0.08 na -0.08 -0.08 
Average 0.09 -0.03 2.55 -1.88 27.42 
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Table 13. Percentage Specialist Participation to the Trades         
                  
Panel A  reports the OLS results from estimating equation (2) for each specialist firm where the dependent variable is the percentage of trades 
that the specialist has chosen strategy 2 (participate at the quoted price) or strategy 3 (participate at the improved price). See Appendix B, Panel 
B for the names of the specialist firms and the number of individual specialists employed by each firm. ***, ** and * denotes significance levels 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Adjusted R2 before and after shows the value of adjusted R2 before and after adding the individual 
specialist dummies. F-stat is the value of F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual specialist dummies are not 
statistically significantly different from each other and the p-value is the corresponding p-value for this F-test. Panel B reports the distribution of 
the estimated specialist dummy coefficients. 
                  
Panel A: Percentage Specialist Participation to the Trades                
Specialist 
Firm No Intercept 
Log(Number 
of Trades) 
Log 
(Trade Size) 
Log(Market  
Capitalization) Volatility 
Log(Quote 
Midpoint) 
Adj. R2 
(Before) 
Adj. 
R2  
(After) 
F-
Stat P-value 
Pairwise 
Tests 
1 0.754 *** -0.101 *** -0.004  0.013  0.033 ** 0.007  0.2436 0.3695 7.67 0.000 40.21% 
2 2.118 ** -0.041 * -0.091 *** -0.036  0.024 ** -0.014  0.1717 0.2104 2.34 0.001 21.05% 
3 0.487  -0.075 *** -0.043 ** 0.042  0.003  -0.037  0.2260 0.2542 1.77 0.030 14.17% 
4 1.035 *** -0.053 * -0.033  -0.014  0.059 ** -0.042  0.1652 0.4853 17.34 0.000 93.33% 
5 1.918 * -0.090  0.020  0.007  -0.007  -0.919  0.1815 0.2824 1.96 0.048 13.33% 
6 -0.992  0.016  -0.055  0.156 ** 0.031  -0.012  0.1345 0.1722 2.73 0.006 52.38% 
7 -0.022  -0.159 *** -0.076 ** 0.130 *** 0.105 ** -0.094  0.0875 0.1044 1.62 0.131 0.00% 
8 19.081 * 0.128  -0.292 *** -0.526 * 0.117  -2.240  0.2134 0.3465 2.79 0.030 50.00% 
9 -1.394 *** -0.053 ** -0.002  0.195 *** 0.006  -0.332 *** 0.1669 0.2736 10.18 0.000 66.67% 
10 1.342  -0.035  -0.050  -0.057  0.038  0.090  0.0987 0.1617 3.93 0.010 0.00% 
11 0.162  -0.104 * 0.042  0.015  0.185 *** 0.018  0.1790 0.1875 2.22 0.139 na 
12 -19.795  -0.062  -0.150 ** 3.166  0.161  -5.435  0.3393 0.3250 0.23 0.632 na 
13 -0.252   -0.073 ** 0.012   0.064   0.081   -0.043   0.0147 0.0101 0.46 0.498 na 
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Panel B. Distribution of the Estimated Specialist Dummy Coefficients 
        
Specialist 
Firm No Mean Median Std Min Max   
1 -0.05 -0.03 0.14 -0.34 0.18   
2 -0.39 -0.42 0.14 -0.63 -0.12   
3 0.05 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.16   
4 -0.22 -0.26 0.24 -0.55 0.17   
5 1.53 1.71 0.63 0.14 2.30   
6 -0.29 -0.24 0.16 -0.54 -0.09   
7 0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.11 0.19   
8 -5.64 -4.58 4.12 -10.83 -0.45   
9 0.03 0.00 0.30 -0.25 0.37   
10 0.00 -0.10 0.19 -0.12 0.22   
11 -0.11 -0.11 na -0.11 -0.11   
12 -14.78 -14.78 na -14.78 -14.78   
13 -0.02 -0.02 na -0.02 -0.02   
Average -0.33 -0.07 1.99 -14.78 2.30   
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Symbol
Data
Period Symbol
Data
Period Symbol
Data 
Period Symbol
Data
Period
AIG x FMO xx MRK x SZ xx
ALS xx FNM x MU x T x
AOT xx FOE xx MWC xx TGT x
AP xx FTD xx MWD x TLM PRB xx
AVB xx MXE xx TMK x
AXP x GGT PR xx NAP xx TRP xx
AXP PRA xx GLW x NKE x TYC x
BAC x GNA xx NOK x UBT xx
BBV xx GPS x NPC xx UDS x
BK x GPT x NR xx UMG PRY xx
BKE xx GRP xx NUI xx USI xx
BPL xx GX x OFG xx VIAB x
BRM xx HD x OMX xx VOD x
BZL xx HI PRT xx ONE x VTP xx
C x HIF xx OUI xx WB x
CB x HPT xx PBR xx WFC x
CBA xx HRC x PCG x WMK xx
CHH xx HWP x PCS x WMS xx
CLP PRA xx IBM x PFE x WMT x
CM xx IMY xx PFP xx XOM x
CMS x IRT xx PNK xx XRX x
CNC x JBL x PP xx ZNH xx
CPN x JPM x PST PRA xx ZNT xx
CQB PRA xx JPM PRC xx PTM xx ZQK xx
CSD PRA xx JW B xx Q x ZTR xx
CUZ xx KGC xx RI xx
CWF xx KM x RKY x
DIS x KWD xx ROM PR xx
DL xx LMGA x SBC x
DRE xx LNC PRG xx SBP PRA xx
DRE PRA xx LNC PRY xx SCH x
DUC xx LTD x SGP x
EIX x MC xx SJI xx
ELY x MCD x SJR xx
ENE PRT xx MER x SKO xx
EQT x MIJ xx SLR x
F x MKT xx SQM A xx
FCP xx MO x SSS PRB xx
FIG PRA xx MOT x SUS xx
x : 04/02/2001 - 04/06/2001
xx: 04/02/2001 - 06/29/2001
Appendix A
Information about the sample that consists of 143 stocks we employ to compare 
specialist strategies. 
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Panel A. Execution Costs
Specialist Firm No
Number of 
Specialists
BEAR HUNTER SPECIALIST LLC 7 16
BENJAMIN JACOBSON AND SONS LLC 9 12
BOCKLET AND CO. LLC 12 8
BUTTONWOOD/ALBERT FRIED & CO LLC 19 2
FLEET MEEHAN SPECIALIST INC 4 64
FREEDOM SPECIALISTS/ADRIAN/RPM SPE 18 3
LABRANCHE & CO/FREEDOM/ADRIAN & CO 14 6
LABRANCHE AND CO. 1 82
LYDEN, DOLAN, NICK & CO.,LLC. 15 6
PERFORMANCE SPECIALIST GROUP, L.P. 10 12
RPM SPECIALIST CORP. 6 17
SCAVONE,MC KENNA,CLOUD AND CO LLC 16 6
SPEAR, LEEDS AND KELLOGG SPEC. LLC 2 73
STERN AND KENNEDY 11 10
SUSQUEHANNA SPECIALISTS 13 8
VAN DER MOOLEN SPECIALIST USA LLC 5 51
WAGNER STOTT MERCATOR LLC 3 68
WALTER N. FRANK AND CO. LLC 8 13
WEISKOPF, SILVER SPECIALISTS,  LLC 17 5
Total 462
Panel B. Specialist Strategies
Specialist Firm No
Number of 
Specialists
Labranche And Co. 1 30
Spear, Leeds And Kellogg Spec. Llc 2 22
Fleet Meehan Specialist Inc 3 18
Wagner Stott Bear Specialists Llc 4 12
Wagner Stott Mercator Llc 5 12
Performance Specialist Group, L.P. 6 9
Van Der Moolen Specialist Usa Llc 7 8
Bear Hunter Specialist Llc 8 6
Susquehanna Specialists 9 5
Walter N. Frank And Co. Llc 10 4
Bocklet And Co. Llc 11 2
Labranche & Co/Freedom/Adrian & Co 12 2
Scavone,Mc Kenna,Cloud And Co Llc 13 2
Total 132
Appendix B. Specialist Firms
Panel A reports the number of individual specialists employed by each specialist
firm for the analysis of differences between specailists in terms of quotes, spreads,
depths, and execution costs. Panel B reports the number of individual specialists
employed by each specialist firm for the analysis of differences between specailists
in terms of their participation strategies in the quotes and trades..
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